

# Joint Publication 3-68



## Joint Noncombatant Evacuation Operations



26 May 2022





## PREFACE

### 1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess joint noncombatant evacuation operations.

### 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces of the United States in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the achievement of objectives.

### 3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



STUART B. MUNSCH  
Vice Admiral, United States Navy  
Director, Joint Force Development

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES  
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-68  
DATED 18 NOVEMBER 2015**

- **Incorporates observations and lessons learned from the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021, as appropriate.**
- **Adds three vignettes related to the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021, as appropriate.**
- **Creates a new Appendix H, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Checklist,” from planning discussion that was within the body of the document.**
- **Reiterates the inherent right of self-defense during the conduct of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO).**
- **Includes discussion related to the information joint function as appropriate for the planning and execution of a NEO.**
- **Updates discussion on biometrics in the context of this publication as it relates to a NEO.**
- **Updates specific Department of State (DOS) text discussions for consistency with DOS policy.**
- **Modifies the following definitions for clarity and succinctness: “authorized departure,” “emergency action plan,” “evacuation,” “joint reception coordination center,” “noncombatant evacuation operation,” “noncombatant evacuation operation tracking system,” “safe haven,” and “Washington Liaison Group.”**
- **Modifies term “dependents” to be a singular term “dependent” and definition, in accordance with policy on standardization of military and associated terminology.**
- **Removes the definition of “foreign service national,” as this is primarily a DOS term as used in this publication and DOS has their own definition.**
- **Removes the definition of “noncombatant evacuees,” as a standard dictionary definition of “noncombatant” and “evacuee” allows for a full understanding of the term as used in this publication.**

- **Modifies the definition of “ordered departure” for consistency with DOS’s definition.**
- **Removes the definition of “repatriation” as a standard dictionary definition of the term is sufficient for Department of Defense use in the context of this publication.**
- **Modifies figures and other text discussions for consistency with current policy and procedures.**
- **Updates Department of Defense Form 2585, *Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet*, to the current version dated September 2014, which now includes the required Privacy Act statement.**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides an overview of how noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted by the Department of Defense to assist the Department of State in the evacuation of United States citizens and nationals, lawful permanent residents, Department of Defense civilian personnel, and designated persons (e.g., host nation and third-country nationals), whose lives are in danger, from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed by the Department of State
- Discusses the roles and responsibilities of principal people and organizations, whether governmental, civil, international, or military, with whom the joint force commander may interact while planning or executing a noncombatant evacuation operation
- Outlines noncombatant evacuation operations authorities and relationships, command and control, joint task force organization, and multinational command and control considerations
- Discusses United States embassy and consulate plans
- Provides an overview of military planning for noncombatant evacuation operations, focusing on operational environment considerations and intelligence support
- Discusses notification procedures, notification phases, evacuee identification, coordination with senior in-country military officials, embassy security and operations, intermediate staging base considerations, repatriation considerations, and other planning considerations, to include multinational planning considerations
- Provides assessment and after action report considerations for noncombatant evacuation operations
- Presents employment and evacuation operation procedures
- Discusses the primary duties of the joint force commander and the joint task force commander during evacuee processing
- Outlines safe haven and repatriation operations

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### Overview

#### *Introduction*

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) to

assist the Department of State (DOS) in the evacuation of United States (US) citizens and nationals, lawful permanent residents, DOD civilian personnel, and designated persons (e.g., host nation [HN] and third-country nationals), whose lives are in danger, from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed by DOS. A NEO is an ordered departure for personnel under chief of mission (COM) authority and assisted evacuation for other US citizens and designated personnel from a threatened area abroad that is carried out with the assistance of DOD through the use of military assets and/or existing commercial and/or chartered transportation services (as opposed to ordered departures that do not require DOD assistance).

**US Policy.** Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended, and other related executive orders, and pursuant to procedures to be developed jointly by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Secretary of State (SECSTATE), SecDef is responsible for the deployment and use of military forces for the protection of US citizens and nationals and, in connection therewith, other designated persons or categories of persons, in support of their evacuation from threatened areas overseas.

### *Terminology*

As the President's personal representative to the HN, the COM is the lead diplomatic official. Variations of the title COM, or other titles referring to the senior DOS diplomatic agent, could be interchanged throughout this publication and not change its relevancy. A US ambassador to the HN, if assigned, is always the COM.

### *Special Nature of Evacuation Operations*

The planning, coordination, command and control structure, execution, and the political and diplomatic factors involved in timing the execution of the military support of NEOs make them different from other military operations. During NEOs, the COM, and neither the combatant commander (CCDR) with a designated area of responsibility (AOR) nor the subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the senior United States Government (USG) authority for the evacuation. Therefore, the COM is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate a US embassy is retained by the COM.

*Operational Environments*

NEOs are planned with consideration for operational environments throughout the competition continuum. During cooperation, a NEO can support a partner nation during a natural disaster, which can include support to US and partner nation evacuations while simultaneously responding to disaster relief efforts. During competition in countries where conditions are nearing escalation to violence, a NEO can be directed to move embassy staff and US citizens to safety. During conflict, a NEO can formulate slowly or rapidly as a nation deteriorates into violence, thereby requiring a rapid US response. Combatant command (CCMD) and joint force planners have standing plans for potential NEOs in their operational area to implement or modify based on the situation.

*Military Planning and Forces*

In DOD Directive 3025.14, *Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad*, DOD is tasked with preparing and implementing plans for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of DOD noncombatant evacuees. Actual evacuation assistance can be provided only upon the request of SECSTATE to either SecDef or the President. Once requested, approved, and directed, the CDR directs assigned and/or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of DOS and the COM. CCDRs prepare, maintain, exercise, execute, and continually assess plans for protection and evacuation from threatened areas abroad.

**Roles, Coordination, and Interaction**

*Department of State*

DOD and DOS personnel at all levels need to coordinate to successfully execute the NEO. While the protection of US citizens being evacuated remains paramount, NEOs are most likely conducted in an environment where diplomatic and/or political concerns and constraints are key considerations.

**Washington Liaison Group (WLG).** The WLG consists of members of DOS, DOD, and other relevant USG departments and agencies, chaired by a representative of DOS. The WLG **coordinates and implements plans for the protection and emergency evacuation of persons abroad for whom SECSTATE or SecDef are responsible.**

**Liaison Groups.** SECSTATE and SecDef may establish a liaison group collocated with CCMDs as necessary to coordinate and synchronize emergency and evacuation planning by their departments in the field. If established, the liaison group is chaired by a DOS representative, who receives instructions from SECSTATE. Membership includes representatives of the appropriate CCDR and any subordinate component commands as desired.

**Emergency Action Committee (EAC).** The EAC, established by the COM at a foreign service post, directs and coordinates the post's response to contingencies. It also drafts the post's emergency action plan (EAP). The EAC is the focal point for DOS and DOD evacuation site interface.

*United States Embassy  
Representatives*

Joint forces involved in NEOs should familiarize themselves with the duties of the following positions normally found at US embassies and/or missions:

- **COM.** The COM is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country or to the international organization to which they are accredited. The COM recommends and implements national policy regarding the foreign country or international organization and oversees the activities and operations of USG executive branch employees in the mission.
- **Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).** The DCM is selected from the ranks of career Foreign Service officers, through a rigorous selection process, to be the principal deputy to the COM.
- **Consular Officer.** Consular officers provide consular protection and services to US citizens abroad.
- **Senior Defense Official (SDO)/Defense Attaché (DATT).** The SDO/DATT serves under the authority of the COM and is the principal military advisor to the COM on defense issues. The SDO/DATT plans, coordinates, and supports US defense activities in the HN,

including security cooperation programs under the oversight of the CCDR.

- **Chief of Station (COS).** As the senior intelligence advisor to the COM, the COS is an excellent source of information on the country and the current situation.
- **Management Officer.** The management officer is a Foreign Service officer responsible for the logistical and administrative activities at the embassy.
- **Political Officer and/or Economic Officer.** Normally, these are Foreign Service officers who report on political and economic developments, negotiate with the host government, and represent the views and policies of the USG to their contacts and the public.
- **Foreign Service Medical Specialist (FSMS).** Medical personnel at embassies and consulates may include a regional medical officer who is a US-licensed physician and/or a medical provider who is a US-licensed nurse practitioner or physician's assistant, collectively referred to as FSMSs.
- **Regional Security Officer (RSO).** The RSO is a special agent with the Diplomatic Security Service (the security and law enforcement arm of DOS) responsible for the security functions of all US diplomatic facilities in a given nation or a group of adjacent countries.
- **Public Affairs Officer (PAO).** The PAO is the COM's advisor concerning public affairs (PA) and overseer of US cultural center operations.
- **Country Team.** The interdepartmental country team consists of key members of the US diplomatic mission or embassy that work directly with the HN government.
- **United States Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment.** A Marine security guard (MSG)

detachment has a detachment commander and a minimum of seven MSGs, with the maximum number dictated by need.

- **DOD Force Protection Detachments (FPDs).** The primary mission of DOD FPDs is to detect and warn of threats to DOD personnel (military, civilian, and dependents) and resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent DOD counterintelligence presence.

**Mission Disaster Response Officer (MDRO).** The MDRO, appointed by the COM, is the focal point for the post's disaster-related information, planning, and activities.

*Other United States  
Government Departments  
and Agencies*

Other USG departments and agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs include the following:

- **United States Agency for International Development (USAID).** USAID is an independent US agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from SECSTATE. USAID works in tandem with DOS to support US foreign policy, and it is the principal US agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared foreign disasters worldwide.
- **Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).** By law (Title 42, United States Code, Section 1313) and Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended, DHHS is the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States.
- **Department of Justice.** The Department of Justice maintains a world-wide database of biometric data that could be used to positively identify and support security screening of individuals seeking evacuation, if necessary.
- **Department of Homeland Security (DHS).** The DHS Automated Biometric Identification System is the central DHS-wide system,

managed by the Office of Biometric Identity Management, for the storage and processing of biometric and associated biographical information for national security; law enforcement; immigration and border management; intelligence; background investigations for national security positions and certain positions of public trust; and associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, or other administrative uses.

- **United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).** The USCIS is part of DHS. If the United States is designated as the safe haven, the USCIS may meet evacuees at the port of entry.
- **United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP).** CBP's mission is to safeguard America's borders, thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the nation's global economic competitiveness through sustainment of legitimate trade and travel.
- **General Services Administration (GSA).** GSA provides substantial capacity for domestic contracting, which could support a large-scale repatriation effort to the United States.

*Secretary of Defense,  
Combatant Commanders,  
and United States Military  
Commanders*

**SecDef.** SecDef advises and assists SECSTATE and the heads of other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of US citizens in overseas areas.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).** When authorized by SecDef, the CJCS coordinates the deployment and employment of US forces in support of a NEO and monitors US force participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatant evacuees.

**CCDR's Responsibility.** In accordance with (IAW) DOD policy, CCDRs must prepare, maintain, exercise, and execute plans for the protection and evacuation of US civilians and noncombatant evacuees abroad. Plans include the evacuation of military personnel who are not

in the consular and/or embassy plans. Plans also include identification of emergency-essential civilians operating in support of combat units who are not to be evacuated.

**Special Responsibilities of Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM).** CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for receiving evacuees in the continental United States, Alaska, and the US territories within the Caribbean during repatriation. CDRUSINDOPACOM is responsible for receiving evacuees in Hawaii and US territories within the Pacific during repatriation.

**Special Responsibilities of Commander, United States Special Operations Command.** As a member of the WLG, the special operations forces representative coordinates with DOS, the CCDRs, and the Services to ensure the adequacy and timeliness of special operations planning, responding forces, required capabilities, and coordination in support of NEOs.

**Commander, United States Transportation Command.** United States Transportation Command, through its Service component commands, can either access organic lift or leverage its ability to obtain commercial lift by using existing services contracts, as appropriate.

### *Host Nation*

Coordination and interaction with the HN governments may be required to determine, among other things, legal authority to conduct a NEO; overflight rights; staging base access; safe haven availability; the duties and obligations of neutral states; rules of engagement; operational limitations due to HN laws and status of international agreements (e.g., status-of-forces agreements, memorandums of understanding); requests for, and/or approval of, NEO-related intelligence collection activities; and the legal status of evacuation force personnel.

### *Nongovernmental and International Organizations*

The JFC should remain cognizant of the fact that personnel working for these organizations cannot be ordered to depart. However, they may be able to provide valuable up-to-date information as to the location of US citizens. Some of these agencies may be reluctant to openly cooperate with US forces to preserve their

perceived neutrality among the HN population. Other organizations may openly oppose US objectives. An early determination of their position in relation to US policy is essential and can inform JFCs with appropriate courses of action (COAs).

***Multinational  
Noncombatant Evacuation  
Operation***

Multinational evacuations involve multiple nation diplomatic initiatives—with multinational forces (MNFs) conducting a NEO in a supporting role. To conduct a NEO with an MNF, each participating nation is required to affirm its participation. However, military-to-military engagement can be conducted to facilitate unilateral national NEOs, so long as no binding agreements (formal or informal) are initiated—because binding agreements fall under the auspices of DOS.

**Command and Control**

***Introduction***

The Under Secretary of State for Management, at the request of the COM, can authorize the ordered or authorized departure of USG personnel and dependents other than uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and designated emergency-essential DOD civilians who are not under the authority of the COM.

Military assistance is provided in a variety of circumstances, not just when requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission. When SECSTATE requests military assistance from DOD, approval and the military response are directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS to the appropriate CCDR, who initiates military operations.

***Authorities and  
Relationships***

Within the HN, the COM, although not in the military chain of command, is the lead federal official for protection and evacuation of all US noncombatant evacuees, including DOD dependents. The JFC ensures DOD actions relating to the evacuation of DOD dependents and DOD civilian employees and their families are consistent with the direction of the COM. The authority of the COM to order evacuation does not extend to personnel of the Services not under COM authority, except as agreed upon between DOS and DOD.

***Command and Control***

Guidance provided by higher authority normally covers areas of key concern to the President and SecDef and provides the supported CCDR with an overview of the diplomatic and political context within which the NEO is being considered. The scope and objective of US involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response are often provided in general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate COAs. The CJCS warning order defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any planning constraints. The warning order also identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution or requests the CCDR develops as part of the commander's COA.

***Joint Task Force Organization***

The supported CCDR has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission. As such, the supported CCDR could decide to assign the NEO mission to a Service component or establish a joint task force (JTF). If a JTF is formed, it should be established and organized IAW Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*, and JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*. The JFC is responsible for all phases of the operation, to include the intermediate staging base (ISB) and temporary safe haven (if located outside the United States and within the joint operations area [JOA]). An ISB or temporary safe haven outside the JTF JOA falls under the responsibility of the supported CCDR. The NEO JTF typically supports and transports the evacuees to ISBs and safe havens outside the JOA.

***Multinational Command and Control***

Since the military is in a supporting role during a NEO, it is important to note that, within the HN, the applicable heads of mission (HOMs), as the senior national government representatives, are the overall responsible authorities for the evacuation. The JFC retains responsibility for the conduct of all military operations in support of an evacuation and for the security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the operational area in consultation and coordination with the HOMs. During a multinational NEO, the MNF conducts operations in response to initiating directive (ID) guidance—the HOM(s) does not exercise military command over the MNF. In cases when significant differences between the MNF commander and an HOM

become an obstacle to success of the operation, they seek resolution from their respective superiors.

### **Planning**

#### ***United States Embassy and Consulate Plans***

**EAPs.** US embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs that account for the safety, security, and potential evacuation of embassy staff and families and US citizens traveling or working abroad and to coordinate for HN support and US military support. The COM prepares and maintains EAPs, one section of which addresses the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals and emergencies that require augmented military security. The CDR reviews, plans, and organizes a responsive military capability to support EAPs. EAPs are not tactical operation plans (OPLANs) in the sense that military planners think of, but they are the reference materials that support the formulation of an OPLAN.

#### ***Military Planning— Combatant Command Plans***

Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JFC receives the warning order from the CDR and lasts until the evacuation force deploys to either an ISB or the evacuation site.

#### ***Operational Environment Considerations***

The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander for the NEO. Understanding the operational environment in which the NEO is to be conducted requires a holistic view that encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); and the electromagnetic operational environment. Included within these are the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems and any relevant network considerations for the country in which the evacuation is to occur.

#### ***Intelligence Support***

A geospatial-intelligence base for contingency operations (GIBCO) contains specific maps, charts, imagery, and other geospatial products to support evacuation planning and operations. A GIBCO is placed in the NEO package for each country, city, or region. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency produces GIBCOs, which give users flexibility through the use of Web browser technology for navigation and display of geospatial data.

Support to JFCs should include forward-deploying CCMD-based intelligence community representatives and subject matter experts to support intelligence operations and facilitate access to parent agencies. Combat support agencies may deploy personnel as part of national intelligence support to work with the NEO, consistent with other military operations. After assessing capabilities and requirements and evaluating unfulfilled needs, CCDRs should submit a request for forces, specifically stating manning and capability shortfalls.

### *Notification Procedures*

To develop a realistic evacuation plan, the JTF staff should know how long it will take to assemble the evacuees once the decision to evacuate has been made. Messaging to US citizens may be done through the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program, where US citizens, who are registered with the US embassy, receive e-mail notifications. Alerts and travel advisories may also be disseminated via the DOS website, social media platforms, television, radio, and other similar electronic means.

### *Notification Phases*

**Drawdown.** The options for drawdown are authorized departure and ordered departure.

- **Authorized Departure.** The COM requests authorized departure status from DOS. Employees who wish to leave the post obtain approval from the COM. Family members who wish to leave the post as an official evacuee also obtain approval from the COM.
- **Ordered Departure.** When the COM determines a situation has deteriorated to a point that family members and certain employees should leave the post for their safety, orders are issued for them to leave. When the ordered departure status is terminated, official evacuees return to the post.

**Evacuation.** The decision to evacuate personnel assumes that the decision to draw down, at least in part, has been made. When feasible, notification of potential evacuees involves communicating via electronically transmitted alerts and the American Liaison Network. As a rule, written messages are more reliable than oral

messages and should be used whenever possible. There are four notification phases for an evacuation:

- **Shelter in Place.** When a country’s political or security environment has deteriorated and it is perceived that US citizens are threatened, but an evacuation is either not required or is temporarily impossible, US citizens are requested to “shelter in place” and are given preliminary instructions for preparing to evacuate the country.
- **Leave Commercial.** Due to the gravity of the situation, nonessential US citizens may be told to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible.
- **Evacuation.** When the political or security environment is believed to have deteriorated to the point that the safety of US citizens is threatened, the COM (with DOS approval) orders the departure of the personnel listed in Chapter IV, “Planning,” subparagraph 8.c., “Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance,” keeping only essential personnel of the country team.
- **Embassy or Post Closing.** The situation may deteriorate to the point that the embassy must close and all remaining US citizens and embassy employees must be evacuated. This does not include private US citizens and their dependents who desire to remain in the country.

*Evacuee Identification*

The first question most often asked by both diplomatic and military planners is, “Who are the potential evacuees?” The COM may direct some to evacuate and some may volunteer to leave. Understanding how evacuees are organized, notified, and moved to assembly areas helps in determining the number and assembly time estimates.

*Coordination with Senior In-Country Military Officials*

The JFC should establish and maintain close liaison with the SDO/DATT. The SDO/DATT is able to assist in the coordination of JTF activities with the embassy and to

assist the JFC in obtaining the COM's evaluation of the situation.

***Embassy Security and Operations***

Security outside the embassy is the responsibility of the HN, while security of the COM and embassy grounds is the responsibility of the RSO. In some cases, US embassies do not have armed security forces. The RSO typically oversees a contingent of local guards along with DOS security personnel and may have an MSG detachment to accomplish this mission.

***Intermediate Staging Base Considerations***

The JFC may determine that an ISB is needed to support the NEO. Selecting an ISB is a time-sensitive issue. DOS informs the CCDR of the location and availability of countries for establishment of possible ISBs.

***Repatriation Considerations***

Repatriation is the procedure whereby US citizens are officially processed back into the United States following evacuation from overseas. Repatriation is not a part of, but subsequent to, a NEO. The ideal case for an evacuation is normally to have the safe haven in the United States, in which repatriation occurs. Because there may be a seamless transition between the NEO and the repatriation, NEO planners should have an understanding of repatriation considerations.

***Other Planning Considerations***

Additional consideration should include:

- **NEO Transition and Termination Criteria.**
- **Prioritization of Multiple or Simultaneous NEOs.**
- **Interpreters.**
- **Communication and Information Sharing.**

***Multinational Planning Considerations***

Since many evacuations involve other nations, the potential use of an MNF in a NEO should be a planning consideration. Detailed multinational planning and training (to include exercises) are important factors in ensuring a successful operation. An ID is important to start detailed planning since it establishes the authority and parameters for the NEO and includes guidance regarding the situation, objectives, mission, participating nations, and timing. Unity of effort within

an MNF should be established as early in the operation as possible, especially in a time-sensitive NEO.

*Assessment and After  
Action Report  
Considerations*

Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint forces during military operations and determines the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. A NEO presents a unique challenge in assessment. If done correctly, the duration of a NEO is not long enough to actually observe indicators of performance and adapt the operation, especially since the NEO is conducted to evacuate personnel out of harm's way and not create an effect on the enemy.

**Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures**

*Evacuation Plan  
Implementation*

While the military may play a key role in planning and conducting the operation, it is most often viewed as the last resort in a series of evacuation options. It is important for the JFC and staff to understand this role when preparing a plan for the evacuation.

The military and DOS representatives conduct extensive coordination to develop a feasible and supportable military plan that supports the COM's requirements and objectives.

*Intermediate Staging Base*

An ISB is a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the HN. Use of an ISB during deployment provides the JFC many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station and the likelihood of hostilities increase. The ISB may be located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under US control.

*Advance Party*

As early as possible in the planning, the JFC forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. The advance party may consist of two elements: the forward command element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. In a permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE should be inserted before the evacuation site party arrives. In a hostile environment, the COM's decision may be to insert the entire

***Joint Task Force Main Body Organization and Missions***

evacuation force to immediately commence the operation.

A JTF main body deploys to conduct the on-scene evacuation process. After insertion of the main body, each element prepares for its part in the operation. As the advance party rejoins the main body, the main body may consist of a headquarters, evacuee processing element, marshalling element, security element, and logistic element. Depending on the operation, other elements may also be added. The size of the main body depends on the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation.

***General Considerations***

**Medical.** During evacuation operations, it may be difficult to insert and establish the medical support function for the JTF because of time and operational constraints.

**Veterinary Support.** If DOS allows pet evacuations, considerations may include means of movement, kennel requirements, identification microchips, gaining country quarantine requirements, vaccination requirements, outgoing physical examinations, health certificates, and rabies certificates.

**Personnel Recover (PR).** If the NEO environment becomes increasingly uncertain or hostile, the JFC should establish a joint PR center to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area.

**Mortuary Affairs.** Mortuary affairs personnel ensure proper and dignified treatment of human remains. The JTF should plan for mortuary affairs for both military personnel and evacuees.

**Communication Synchronization.** The JFC and/or the JTF commander should ensure information and communication products are synchronized at all levels. Communication planning and integration is important in PA, information activities, and defense support to public diplomacy.

**Information Sharing.** Generally, the best approach to information sharing with nongovernmental

organizations and international organizations is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to accomplish the mission.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN).** Evacuation operations in a CBRN environment require procedures to gain awareness and understanding of CBRN hazards; to provide CBRN-related protection to all personnel; and to mitigate the impact of CBRN contaminants on evacuees, NEO personnel, and equipment.

### **Evacuee Processing**

#### *Evacuee Processing*

**Procedures During Processing.** At an air terminal, port, or beach, the evacuee processing should be located in a building, tent, or other appropriate place to provide shelter and safety to the evacuees. The area should be staffed with screeners, security, interpreters, local immigration (US personnel if available) and customs officials, embassy support liaison, and medical personnel.

**Onboard Ship.** Should the environment on land preclude the use of an in-country evacuation control center (ECC), evacuees may be processed onboard a ship. If it is a United States Navy ship or United States Coast Guard cutter, the responsibility for processing evacuees rests with the vessel's commanding officer, in coordination with DOS. In this situation, the activities of the ECC are accomplished onboard ship. Accounting and manifesting should be accomplished by using the noncombatant evacuation operation tracking system or other appropriate tracking means.

#### *Evacuation Control Center*

The ECC processes, screens, and conducts selected logistic functions associated with emergency evacuation of designated noncombatant evacuees in support of DOS. The JTF should, however, be prepared to perform functions that are DOS responsibilities, if required.

#### *Evacuation Control Center Organization and Operations*

The three guiding principles for any ECC are accuracy—all personnel are accounted for, security—evacuees and the evacuation force are safeguarded from all threats, and speed—processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees

to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven or the United States. All evacuees should be screened (biometrically screened if appropriate) to certify identification and to ensure documentation is accurate and all information provided is current. Representatives from the embassy's consular affairs office should be in the ECC to determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees.

***Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees***

For organizational purposes, all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator from DOS. These categorizations are used to identify, move, and locate evacuees to facilitate an orderly evacuation. The JTF staff stays informed of changes in the projected number of potential evacuees by receiving periodic updates from the embassy's staff. These updates are provided in the form of a total number for all evacuees and number by category.

**Safe Haven and Repatriation Operations**

***Temporary Safe Haven Site***

A safe haven is a designated area(s) to which noncombatant evacuees under the USG's responsibility may also be evacuated during an emergency. It is a location within or outside the United States to which noncombatant evacuees are authorized to travel for the purpose of temporarily remaining there until they are authorized to return to the location from which evacuated or until they are authorized to travel to their final destination. Safe havens are normally designated by DOS, in coordination with DOD. A safe haven should be in an area or country in which evacuees can be moved to quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven is in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an intermediate or temporary safe haven.

***Alternate Safe Haven Site***

During a NEO, evacuees may prefer to reside somewhere other than the designated safe haven (normally continental United States). Most often, the request is for the family to reside overseas in the designated spouse's native country, if applicable.

***Repatriation Operations***

Repatriation is the procedure whereby US citizens and their families are officially processed back into the United States following evacuation from overseas. Evacuees are also provided various services to ensure their well-being and onward movement to their final destination. Although

repatriation is not part of, but subsequent to, a NEO, the NEO JFC and other key joint force members should understand repatriation operations.

CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM are responsible for repatriating DOD noncombatant evacuees to the United States and/or US territories within their respective AORs. CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM establish and operate joint reception coordination centers (JRCCs) and manage all of the noncombatant evacuees' needs as specified in their respective CCMD noncombatant evacuee repatriation plans. The JRCC maintains oversight of the entire DOD repatriation operation and keeps DOD and other USG departments and agencies informed about repatriation matters.

All CCDRs should plan for possible repatriation contingencies and coordinate with CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM, depending on where the repatriation into the United States or US territories occurs.

***Organization and  
Functional Considerations***

The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC's processing section, operates under the control of the JFC in coordination with the appropriate DOS representative. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following elements.

- **Command Group**
- **Reception Team**
- **Processing Team**
- **Scheduling Team**
- **Security Team**
- **Religious Support Team/Religious Ministry Team**
- **Family Support Services**

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess joint NEOs.

## CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

*“In conjunction with the Secretary of State, DOD [Department of Defense] will prepare and implement plans for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of DOD noncombatants in threatened areas abroad; integrate such plans into DOS’s [Department of State’s] plans for evacuating non-DOD noncombatants from foreign countries; and assist the Secretary of State in carrying out those responsibilities where militarily feasible and when formally requested by the Secretary of State.”*

**Department of Defense Directive 3025.14, *Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad***

### 1. Introduction

a. **Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)** are conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) to assist the Department of State (DOS) in the evacuation of United States (US) citizens and nationals, lawful permanent residents, DOD civilian personnel, and designated persons (e.g., host nation [HN] and third-country nationals [TCNs]), whose lives are in danger, from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed by DOS. A NEO is an ordered departure for personnel under chief of mission (COM) authority and assisted evacuation for other US citizens and designated personnel from a threatened area abroad that is carried out with the assistance of DOD through the use of military assets and/or existing commercial and/or chartered transportation services (as opposed to ordered departures that do not require DOD assistance). DOS may declare a NEO based on the nature of the threat or the lack of availability of alternative forms of transportation or inability of HNs to provide sustained security and essential services. The United States Government (USG) considers evacuating TCNs and host-country nationals on a case-by-case, space-available, and reimbursable basis. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster or other exigent circumstance. Due to the nature of NEOs, which may require a broad USG approach, interagency coordination should be established early in the planning process, preferably before the crisis begins, between DOS, DOD, and any other appropriate USG departments and agencies, to help achieve success.

#### b. US Policy

(1) Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended, and other related executive orders, and pursuant to procedures to be developed jointly by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Secretary of State (SECSTATE), SecDef is responsible for the deployment and use of military forces for the protection of US citizens and nationals and, in connection therewith, other designated persons or categories of persons, in support of their evacuation from threatened areas overseas. Additionally, SecDef is responsible for advising and assisting SECSTATE

and the heads of other federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of US citizens in threatened areas overseas. As the President's personal representative to the HN, the COM (other titles referring to the senior DOS diplomatic representative could include US ambassador [if one is assigned], chargé d'affaires, ad interim, or principal officer at posts designated diplomatic in nature) is the lead federal official for the protection and evacuation of all US civilians designated as noncombatant evacuees, including DOD dependents. SecDef, after consultation with SECSTATE, may authorize the evacuation of all DOD noncombatants. Military commanders ensure DOD actions relating to the evacuation of DOD dependents, nonessential and essential DOD civilian employees, and their families are consistent with the direction of the COM. The authority of the COM to order evacuation does not extend to personnel of the Services that are not under the COM's authority, except as agreed upon between DOS and DOD.

(2) US policy is contained in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between DOS and DOD, titled *Memorandum of Agreement between the Departments of State and Defense on the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Nationals and Designated Other Persons from Threatened Areas Overseas* [short title: DOS and DOD MOA]. The MOA addresses the roles and responsibilities of each department in implementing evacuations. While DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of all US citizens abroad and exercises overall responsibility for evacuating US citizens under the MOA, DOS can request DOD assistance. Once the decision has been made to use military personnel and equipment to assist in the implementation of emergency evacuation plans, DOD exercises overall responsibility for conducting the evacuation, in consultation with the COM in the affected country. During an evacuation, the MOA calls for high-level coordination between DOS and DOD through a designated liaison group responsible for evacuation planning and implementation. This coordination is facilitated by synchronization between the COM and the commander responsible for executing the NEO. In the event of an emergency abroad affecting the safety of US citizens, DOD supports SECSTATE's overall formal responsibilities, which are shown in Figure I-1.

c. **Characteristics.** A NEO may indicate the loss of the United States' confidence in its, or the HN's, ability to protect the lives of US citizens on the HN's soil; therefore, NEOs may have significant and enduring humanitarian, military, informational, economic, diplomatic, and political implications. NEOs may vary greatly depending on the situation, threat, and capabilities available. In many instances, NEOs involve a swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.

## 2. Terminology

a. As the President's personal representative to the HN, the COM is the lead diplomatic official. Variations of the title COM, or other titles referring to the senior DOS diplomatic agent, could be interchanged throughout this publication and not change its relevancy. A US ambassador to the HN, if assigned, is always the COM. When a US

### Secretary of State's Formal Responsibilities on Protection and Evacuation of United States Citizens and Other Designated Personnel

- Protect United States (US) citizens and nationals and designated other persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.
- Reduce to a minimum the number of US citizens and nationals and designated other persons subject to the risk of death and/or seizure as hostages.
- Reduce to a minimum the number of US citizens and nationals and designated other persons in probable or actual combat areas so that combat effectiveness of US and allied forces is not impaired.

**Figure I-1. Secretary of State's Formal Responsibilities on Protection and Evacuation of United States Citizens and Other Designated Personnel**

ambassador is not assigned, the highest ranking DOS agent (e.g., chargé d'affaires, ad interim) at the post is the COM.

b. The shortened word form NEO is used throughout this publication. DOS and DOD may refer to the NEO in other terms because of diplomatic or other considerations.

c. When planning a multinational NEO, some differences in terminology among partner nations may become evident. Instead of COM, for example, multinational NEOs may use head of mission (HOM) for the national diplomatic agent of the highest rank in the affected territory. Planners should review the "Lexicon" section in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*.

### 3. Special Nature of Evacuation Operations

a. The planning, coordination, command and control (C2) structure, execution, and the political and diplomatic factors involved in timing the execution of the military support of NEOs make them different from other military operations. During NEOs, the COM, and neither the combatant commander (CCDR) with a designated area of responsibility (AOR) nor the subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the senior USG authority for the evacuation. Therefore, the COM is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate a US embassy is retained by the COM. The order to evacuate may not be given at the most opportune time but may be delayed until the last possible moment to avoid actions that may be viewed as a tacit admission of diplomatic and/or political failure or lack of USG confidence in the HN government. The CCDR can propose a response force to augment DOD embassy security as the situation may deteriorate in the HN or in response to

escalating or violent anti-US protests that can provide situational awareness for a potential NEO request.

b. The CDR may assign a joint task force (JTF) commander or task a Service component commander to conduct the NEO.

c. Rules of engagement (ROE) may be such that commanders should be prepared to protect personnel (military and evacuees) from a variety of threats without the authority to conduct offensive military operations or preempt hostile actions by proactive military measures. ROE should provide maximum flexibility so as not to unduly restrain the use of force. The commander conducting the NEO is provided tailored ROE from the CDR to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission, with the authority to protect civilians, while demonstrating restraint and, when appropriate, using force proportional to the threat. The JFC should establish ROE well ahead of any NEO, to work through the process of obtaining supplemental measures to the standing ROE. The JFC always retains the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense.

(1) Dissemination and use of clearly defined ROE are critical. Although the objectives (diplomatic and military) are not to destroy enemy forces and avoid armed conflict whenever possible, an appropriate and proportional use of force may become necessary. ROE are as precise as practical, while never denying the use of appropriate self-defense measures.

(2) The JFC discusses the ROE with the COM as early and as frequently as required. Modifications to the ROE are made and approved by the appropriate authorities via the supported CDR.

*See Appendix A, "Rules of Engagement," for additional guidance concerning ROE.*

#### **4. Operational Environments**

a. NEOs are planned with consideration for operational environments throughout the competition continuum. During cooperation, a NEO can support a partner nation during a natural disaster, which can include support to US and partner nation evacuations while simultaneously responding to disaster relief efforts. During competition in countries where conditions are nearing escalation to violence, a NEO can be directed to move embassy staff and US citizens to safety. During conflict, a NEO can formulate slowly or rapidly as a nation deteriorates into violence, thereby requiring a rapid US response. Combatant command (CCMD) and joint force planners have standing plans for potential NEOs in their operational area to implement or modify based on the situation.

b. NEOs can occur in hostile, uncertain, or permissive operational environments. Evacuation operations are typically characterized by uncertainty and may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country's government. A sudden hostile threat to US citizens from a force within or external to an HN, or a devastating natural or man-made disaster, may lead to a NEO. An understanding of the operational environment

and its political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) considerations is necessary to successfully complete the evacuation. Time is always a consideration in conducting a NEO. Network engagement analysis can provide additional understanding of friendly, neutral, and threat actors and their relationships in complex situations. The impact of introducing US forces into an already unstable environment could be further destabilizing. As a result, a primary planning limitation may be direction from DOS to maintain a small footprint, thus limiting the level of forces or activity to the minimum required. Planning should consider challenging operational environments, including potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards and forcible entry requirements. Additional considerations should be made to account for unique aspects of operations in the information environment associated with a NEO and repatriation efforts.

### AFGHANISTAN AUGUST 2021

**Following the rapid collapse of Afghanistan's government and with Taliban forces seizing control of most regions and all border crossings, the United States (US) and its allies and partners conducted a massive evacuation in August 2021 to airlift nationals, embassy staff, and Afghan citizens who worked with coalition forces. Defense News reported this was the largest noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) ever conducted by the US military, with General Frank McKenzie stating: "In total, US and coalition aircraft combined to evacuate more than 123,000 civilians, which were all enabled by US military service members who were sourcing and operating the airfield."**

**This was also, at times and places, a contested NEO that required heightened perimeter security, crowd control, and enhanced force protection measures in an environment that included both desperate civilians and suicide bombers. Such an environment makes clear the need for a range of capabilities and rules of engagement that allow for appropriate, proportional, and effective responses. Nonlethal weapons and other intermediate force capabilities can play a key role in future NEOs in such environments, where use of lethal force is not desired or use of lethal capabilities is enabled by isolating, stopping, or moving targets to positions of advantage.**

**Various Sources**

*For further information on friendly, neutral, and threat network analysis, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.*

## 5. Military Planning and Forces

a. In Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.14, *Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad*, DOD is tasked with preparing and implementing plans for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of DOD noncombatant evacuees. Actual evacuation assistance can be provided only upon the request of

SECSTATE to either SecDef or the President. Once requested, approved, and directed, the CCDR directs assigned and/or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of DOS and the COM. CCDRs prepare, maintain, exercise, execute, and continually assess plans for protection and evacuation from threatened areas abroad. It is imperative the COM's evacuation plan and the CCDR's plan for the NEO be mutually supportive, coordinated, synchronized, and fully integrated to meet operational requirements and achieve unified action.

*For more information on assessment, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

b. **Military Response.** Normally, the JFC or a Service component commander receives authorization from the supported CCDR before using any forces and facilities in a foreign country for protection and evacuation. However, if a JFC or Service component commander receives a request from the COM or responsible US diplomatic representative to provide assistance, and the delay in obtaining authorization from the CCDR or SecDef would jeopardize the safety of US citizens, the JFC or Service component commander should respond to the extent deemed necessary, appropriate, and militarily feasible and notify the supported and supporting CCDRs of actions taken.

c. **Force Options and Considerations**

(1) **Force options** to conduct a NEO may **depend on the operational environment** in which the NEO is to be conducted. Many of the CCDR's components are capable of conducting a NEO in a permissive environment. However, a NEO in an uncertain or hostile environment may require formation and deployment of a JTF. An exception to this is the forward-deployed amphibious ready group (ARG)/Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), which is trained and certified to conduct NEOs. Additional information and planning considerations on employing amphibious forces in NEOs are found in JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*. A sea base may also be established to support a NEO. The sea base can include the ARG/MEU or consist of other forces, both US and multinational, as needed, to accomplish the mission. For a large-scale NEO, forces from other components and supporting CCDRs are normally required.

(2) Special operations forces (SOF), civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations forces may be part of force packages under consideration. SOF, CA, and psychological operations forces are specifically trained in the planning and execution of a NEO; preparation of the operational environment; operations in the information environment; and coordination with HN, interagency, and multinational partners.

(3) **The HN's support capabilities may play a major role** in determining courses of action (COAs) for the conduct of NEOs. The supported CCDR should consider a flexible force option that provides both early response to a developing situation and a capability to quickly expand should the operational environment become hostile. **Evacuation forces entering foreign territory should be kept to the minimum number**



*Noncombatant evacuees enter the well deck of an amphibious warfare ship.*

**required** for self-defense, the extraction and protection of evacuees, and the accomplishment of the normal functions associated with noncombatant evacuations. The CDR may initiate a sea base to minimize the footprint ashore or to provide the capability to conduct operations in international waters, which do not require diplomatic clearance from the HN or other nations.

*For additional information on operations from a sea base, refer to Navy Warfare Publication 3-62M/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-31.7, Seabasing.*

(4) **Command of the JTF.** Military forces employed in a NEO may be composed of units from more than one Service. Once ordered to support a NEO, and following the supported CDR's decision to employ a JTF, **a JFC is designated to exercise overall C2 of military operations.**

*For additional guidance on joint force headquarters (HQ) functions, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.*

(5) **Force Sequencing.** Force sequencing is the phased introduction of forces into and out of the operational area. **Force sequencing provides the commander with the option to provide a flexible and rapid response to a NEO** through employment of forward-deployed forces, which may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to be deployed from an intermediate staging base (ISB). Effective force sequencing requires detailed knowledge of available Service, joint, and multinational military capabilities. Force sequencing is frequently discussed in terms of the time-phased force and deployment

data, which contains time-phased force data, movement data, and non-unit-related cargo and personnel data for the operation plan (OPLAN) or, in some cases, the concept plan.

d. **Multinational Forces (MNFs).** In planning for a NEO, the COM, CCDR, and JFC may consider the possibility of operating with MNFs. When the NEO is to evacuate US citizens and nationals, and designated other persons abroad, SECSTATE may recommend the President approve the use of an MNF. Approval for US participation in, or use of, an MNF NEO comes only from the President. Under an emergency situation involving the safety of human life or the protection of property, offers of voluntary service from other nations may be accepted by the COM prior to approval. Allies and partner nations often perform NEOs for each other, and possibly without notice, as the United Kingdom did for the United States in Sierra Leone in 1999-2000.

(1) Many situations that would cause the United States to initiate a NEO would likely cause other nations to react similarly. **It may be diplomatically or politically or militarily expedient to employ an MNF in conducting the operation.** These may be either HN forces cooperating in the evacuation or third-nation forces whose citizens are also threatened.

(2) The use of an MNF in a potential NEO should be a planning consideration, preferably before the crisis develops. The JFC's staff should inform the JFC of any non-DOD mission partner capabilities and COAs that can assist in achieving mission success. Detailed multinational planning, training, and exercising are important factors in ensuring a successful operation. If not previously coordinated, obtaining unity of effort within an MNF may cause serious challenges in a NEO.

(3) Although the United States may elect not to operate with MNFs directly, coordination with other nations involved in NEOs is essential. The JFC should consider an exchange of liaison officers (LNOs) with all other nations conducting NEOs in the same geographic area to facilitate coordination. Consequently, CCDRs should conduct pre-NEO coordination with partner nations. Routine pre-NEO coordination of potential mission planning activities with partner nations may help to form more habitual and productive relationships. This may facilitate coordination when the NEO occurs in time-sensitive or complex situations.

*For additional information on MNFs, refer to AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.*

## CHAPTER II ROLES, COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION

### 1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of principal people and organizations, whether governmental, civil, international, or military, with whom the JFC may interact while planning or executing a NEO. Additionally, specific roles and responsibilities these organizations may have for repatriation operations are found later in this chapter and Chapter III, “Command and Control.”

*For further information on roles and responsibilities of other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

### 2. Department of State

a. DOD and DOS personnel at all levels need to coordinate to successfully execute the NEO. While the protection of US citizens being evacuated remains paramount, NEOs are most likely conducted in an environment where diplomatic and/or political concerns and constraints are key considerations. In most cases, the United States may not be actively engaged militarily against the forces posing a threat to the noncombatant evacuees. Military action may, therefore, be limited by the situation. Diplomatic and political constraints may also be imposed on the introduction of military forces into a nation prior to an evacuation operation. The JFC fully supports the COM’s plans and cooperates with DOS and embassy personnel without compromising mission requirements. DOS and embassy personnel keep the JFC fully apprised of on-scene conditions, including diplomatic and political developments that may impact international agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, the ISB, and the safe haven.

b. **Washington Liaison Group (WLG).** The WLG consists of members of DOS, DOD, and other relevant USG departments and agencies, chaired by a representative of DOS. **The WLG coordinates and implements plans for the protection and emergency evacuation of persons abroad for whom SECSTATE or SecDef are responsible.** The members on the WLG are the points of contact (POCs) for their departments on all matters pertaining to emergency evacuation planning, implementation of plans, and coordination of repatriation activities with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The WLG may invite representatives of other USG departments and agencies and the National Guard Bureau to participate in its meetings or attend as observers. The WLG:

(1) Convenes a liaison group and provides terms of reference.

(2) Coordinates and advises on the evacuation planning and protection of US citizens, US nationals, TCNs, and designated other persons to US diplomatic and consular posts and military commands in country.

(3) Monitors the activities of an established liaison group and provides direction as required through appropriate channels.

(4) Periodically reviews protection and evacuation capabilities relative to the number of US citizens, US nationals, and designated other persons throughout the world for whose protection in an emergency the USG is responsible.

(5) Coordinates DOD and DOS operations specific to the evacuation and/or in-place protection of US citizens, US nationals, and designated other persons abroad. Upon activation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Crisis Coordination Center and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff crisis response elements within the National Military Command Center during an emergency or actual evacuation, the WLG discharges their responsibilities for coordination of the operations of DOD and DOS through these elements together with the respective task force or working group within the DOS Operations Center.

c. **Liaison Groups.** SECSTATE and SecDef may establish a liaison group collocated with CCMDs as necessary to coordinate and synchronize emergency and evacuation planning by their departments in the field. If established, the liaison group is chaired by a DOS representative, who receives instructions from SECSTATE. Membership includes representatives of the appropriate CCDR and any subordinate component commands as desired. Military members of each liaison group receive their instructions from SecDef through the appropriate CCDR. The liaison group may invite representatives of other USG departments and agencies to participate in its meetings when appropriate and useful. Each liaison group should perform the following functions:

(1) Provide support to officials at diplomatic and consular posts and military commands within its AOR by:

(a) Liaising among the WLG, DOS Operations Center, and the posts.

(b) Ensuring coordination exists between the various posts and between the posts and appropriate military commands.

(c) Assisting posts and appropriate military commands in planning for the evacuation and/or in-place protection of US citizens, US nationals, TCNs, and designated other persons in an emergency.

(d) Reviewing the emergency evacuation plans prepared by posts and forward them to DOS for approval and distribution to ensure the information contained therein is adequate to meet the requirements of DOS and DOD, post plans and US and allied military OPLANs do not conflict, and the plans of all posts in the area are coordinated when necessary.

(2) Refer unresolved issues to the WLG.

d. **Emergency Action Committee (EAC).** The EAC, established by the COM at a foreign service post, directs and coordinates the post's response to contingencies. It also drafts the post's emergency action plan (EAP). The EAC is the focal point for DOS and DOD evacuation site interface. The EAC briefs, coordinates, and plans for the evacuation or protection of US noncombatant evacuees and designated personnel, whether by regular commercial, chartered, or US military transportation. The EAC is normally composed of representatives of each USG and foreign agency present at the post or under the authority of the COM and would most likely include the senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT) and/or the chief of the military mission.

### 3. United States Embassy Representatives

Joint forces should have an understanding of the embassy representatives and staff. Planners should consider that, before executing a NEO, there may be minimal manning in the embassy staff. Simultaneously, the crisis driving the NEO may have dramatically increased the workload on an already reduced staff. This may challenge the embassy's ability to coordinate with a JFC's planning element. Planners normally rely heavily on DOS liaisons for DOS considerations; however, these liaisons may not have real-time information or on-scene perspective. Therefore, joint forces involved in NEOs should familiarize themselves with the duties of the following positions normally found at US embassies and/or missions.

a. **COM.** The COM is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country or to the international organization to which they are accredited. The COM recommends and implements national policy regarding the foreign country or international organization and oversees the activities and operations of USG executive branch employees in the mission. If assigned, the US ambassador is the COM. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the US ambassador. If a US ambassador is not assigned, the COM is the most senior DOS representative at the post. The COM has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises.

b. **Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).** The DCM is selected from the ranks of career Foreign Service officers, through a rigorous selection process, to be the principal deputy to the COM.

c. **Consular Officer.** Consular officers provide consular protection and services to US citizens abroad. The consular section provides a complete range of services to US citizens in the HN, to include replacement and emergency US passports; notary services; welfare and whereabouts checks on missing, injured, or detained persons; citizenship adjudication overseas; and consular reports of US citizen deaths abroad. The consular section also adjudicates visas for all non-US citizens who wish to visit or live in the United States. In a NEO, the consular section plays a significant role in evacuee processing and is normally the primary embassy section for any NEO. **The consular officer provides the requisite number of personnel needed to screen documents of all potential evacuees during a NEO and provides instructions to any evacuation control center (ECC) personnel needed to staff processing stations.** Prior NEO experience shows that the size

of a typical consular section has a direct correlation to the number of evacuees that can be processed per day. In nations where thousands, or tens of thousands, have to be evacuated in a short period, the US embassy does not have adequate in-house consular capabilities to perform these functions. The US embassy may have to request support from DOS to obtain additional consular personnel to assist in processing and task-organizing embassy personnel to fulfill requirements. The consular officer also has the statutory responsibility to enforce the “no double standard” policy, which requires that the same or similar security threat information, shared with the official US community, should also be made available to private US citizens and US nationals, to the extent that the underlying threat also applies to them.

d. **SDO/DATT.** The SDO/DATT serves under the authority of the COM and is the principal military advisor to the COM on defense issues. The SDO/DATT plans, coordinates, and supports US defense activities in the HN, including security cooperation (SC) programs under the oversight of the CCDR. They also serve as the chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO) and exercise authority, direction, and control over the defense attaché office (DAO) and the SCO. The SDO/DATT, in coordination with the supported CCDR, serves under the joint oversight and administrative management of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security through the directors of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

(1) **SCO.** The SCO includes all DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SC or security assistance management functions. SCOs may be referred to as military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, or defense attaché personnel who have been designated to perform SC functions. Military units conducting SC activities in an HN normally work closely with, and coordinate with, the SCO, but their lines of authority are through their Service components and the supported CCDR, not through the SDO/DATT to the COM. The term SCO does not include units or formations that conduct SC, including security assistance activities, such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, technical assistance field teams, or operational units conducting SC activities.

(2) **DAO.** The DAO is a DOD organization operated by the DIA and established as part of a US diplomatic mission. In some cases, SC, including security assistance functions and responsibilities, may be transferred between the SCO and the DAO.

*For additional information on DOD operations at US embassies, see JP 3-20, Joint Doctrine for Security Cooperation, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.*

e. **Chief of Station (COS).** As the senior intelligence advisor to the COM, the COS is an excellent source of information on the country and the current situation. As the senior intelligence advisor, the COS should provide an updated threat description for the proposed NEO. The COS operates under the direction, supervision, and coordination of the COM, unless otherwise directed by US law or presidentially approved guidance.

f. **Management Officer.** The management officer is a Foreign Service officer, responsible for the logistical and administrative activities at the embassy. The management officer is the head of the management section and reports to the DCM. Although some agencies at the embassy may maintain their own independent administrative sections, there is close coordination between these staffs and the management officer. At a small post with no security officer assigned, the management officer assumes the functions of the security officer and exercises operational supervisory control of the Marine security guard (MSG) detachment. Because of frequent dealings with HN business people, the management officer is an excellent source of information on the local population. The management officer normally oversees several sections. The general services section is responsible for all leased housing, embassy logistics, and motor pool. The facilities maintenance section is responsible for maintenance of all government-owned properties, some leased properties, and the chancery building. The information management section runs the post communications center, processes and tracks all classified pouch material, and oversees the information technology used by the embassy. The information management officer is the POC concerning the communication capabilities available at the post. The finance management section handles the monetary aspects of embassy business, including embassy payroll, cash collection, and the budget. Lastly, the human resources section is responsible for embassy employee human resource management.

g. **Political Officer and/or Economic Officer.** Normally, these are Foreign Service officers who report on political and economic developments, negotiate with the host government, and represent the views and policies of the USG to their contacts and the public. The political and economic sections maintain regular contact with host government officials, labor leaders, the business community (including banks, utilities, and other similar businesses), and other influential citizens of the HN. Additionally, they maintain relationships with other diplomats and their embassies. The political officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.

h. **Foreign Service Medical Specialist (FSMS).** Medical personnel at embassies and consulates may include a regional medical officer who is a US-licensed physician and/or a medical provider who is a US-licensed nurse practitioner or physician's assistant, collectively referred to as FSMSs. FSMSs are qualified for general practice; trained to set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations; and may also advise the JFC on indigenous diseases and proper preventative procedures for forces executing the NEO. Some DOS locations may also have locally employed medical staff, while others may have no medical personnel at all.

i. **Regional Security Officer (RSO).** The RSO is a special agent with the Diplomatic Security Service (the security and law enforcement arm of DOS) responsible for the security functions of all US diplomatic facilities in a given nation or a group of adjacent countries. The RSO oversees and manages all aspects of security for the COM and embassy (e.g., physical security, technical security, counterintelligence [CI], procedural security) and is the COM's primary advisor on all security-related matters. The RSO is also the principal liaison with HN law enforcement and security services, to include responsibility for the personnel recovery (PR) program at the post. More often than not,

each RSO has local nationals on their staffs for the purpose of providing investigative, host-government liaison, and translation services. The RSO exercises operational supervisory control of the MSG detachment and is responsible for the proper utilization, support, and safety of the MSGs. The RSO oversees the personnel of the Office of Mobile Security Deployments, if present at the post. The Office of Mobile Security Deployments consists of DOS employees of the Diplomatic Security Service who respond to crises in foreign nations. The Office of Mobile Security Deployments' special agents are trained to respond to increased threats or critical security needs at an embassy, provide additional security, and provide immediate response to a security-related incident.

j. **Public Affairs Officer (PAO).** The PAO is the COM's advisor concerning public affairs (PA) and overseer of US cultural center operations. The PAO is responsible for all press releases and press inquiries for information directed to the embassy. The PAO usually speaks at press conferences when the COM is unable to attend. The PAO (or designated individual) is typically the official USG spokesperson for the embassy. During a NEO, the PAO may be able to support military PA personnel by providing guidance on HN sensitivities; sharing key US embassy messaging; helping to synchronize messaging between the embassy, DOD, and DOS; and by helping to coordinate the release of any information on the NEO to the public. The COM or the designated representative approves all PA announcements.

k. **Country Team.** The interdepartmental country team consists of key members of the US diplomatic mission or embassy that work directly with the HN government. Its purpose is to unify the coordination and implementation of US national policy within each foreign country under direction of the COM. The country team meets regularly to advise the COM on matters of interest to the United States and reviews current developments in the country.

(1) The country team members usually include those shown in Figure II-1.

(2) The country team identifies potential sources of conflict and threats to US interests and addresses problems by introducing programs designed to assist the economy, enhance medical care, and improve the infrastructure of the country.

l. **United States Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment.** An MSG detachment has a detachment commander and a minimum of seven MSGs, with the maximum number dictated by need. The Marine detachment commander is normally a member of the EAC and is responsible to the RSO (or management officer if no RSO is assigned) for internal security and protection of classified material and US personnel assigned to the embassy. Administrative control of detachment Marines is through the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group (MCESG) region commanding officer. This detachment is part of the embassy security force and is not subsumed under JFC control. The Marine detachment commander executes such instructions and orders, either written or oral, as the COM or the RSO issues within the parameters and assigned duties of the current MOA between DOS and the United States Marine Corps. The Marine detachment commander reports directly to the RSO in the absence of the COM on operational matters and on any matter adversely affecting the detachment or the security of the mission.



**Figure II-1. Members of the Country Team**

m. **DOD Force Protection Detachments (FPDs).** The primary mission of DOD FPDs is to detect and warn of threats to DOD personnel (military, civilian, and dependents) and resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent DOD CI presence. FPDs serve as force protection multipliers for the US embassy country team in support of the DOD presence in those overseas locations.

n. **Mission Disaster Response Officer (MDRO).** The MDRO, appointed by the COM, is the focal point for the post’s disaster-related information, planning, and activities. The MDRO may be a member of the EAC and prepares and maintains annex J (Assistance to Host Country in a Major Accident or Disaster) of the EAP. The MDRO is familiar with HN disaster authorities and capabilities and other potential humanitarian assistance partners. The MDRO continually liaises with the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to facilitate the free flow of information related to evolving disaster situations that may result in a NEO.

#### 4. Other United States Government Departments and Agencies

The JFC may need to coordinate with organizations outside DOS. Other USG departments and agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs include the following:

a. **USAID.** USAID is an independent US agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from SECSTATE. USAID works in tandem with DOS to support US foreign policy, and it is the principal US agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared foreign disasters worldwide.

*For additional information on USAID, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

b. **DHHS.** By law (Title 42, United States Code, Section 1313) and Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended, DHHS is the

lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the US port of entry. Their plans rely on state and local governments to carry out the operational responsibilities of repatriation. In wartime, a DHHS repatriation plan is implemented as governed by Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended. In nonemergency conditions, the embassy and DOS coordinate DHHS assistance rendered to evacuees.

**c. Department of Justice.** The Department of Justice maintains a world-wide database of biometric data that could be used to positively identify and support security screening of individuals seeking evacuation, if necessary. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Next Generation Identification (NGI) is a national law enforcement biometric and criminal history system maintained by the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division. NGI provides automated fingerprint, iris, palm, and face search capabilities; latent print matching capabilities; electronic image storage; and electronic exchange of biometrics files to more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies and other authorized interagency partners. NGI is the largest criminal fingerprint database in the world, housing the fingerprints and criminal histories of more than 90 million subjects. The FBI's extensive resources assist in vetting non-US evacuees prior to approval of travel to the United States.

**d. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).** The DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) is the central DHS-wide system, managed by the Office of Biometric Identity Management, for the storage and processing of biometric and associated biographical information for national security; law enforcement; immigration and border management; intelligence; background investigations for national security positions and certain positions of public trust; and associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, or other administrative uses. IDENT stores and processes biometric data—digital fingerprints and facial images—and links biometrics with biographical information to establish and verify identities presented at the point of encounter. IDENT maintains more than 230 million biometric files of individuals seeking entry to the United States, which DOD leverages to enhance employment of identity activities.

**(1) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).** The USCIS is part of DHS. If the United States is designated as the safe haven, the USCIS may meet evacuees at the port of entry. USCIS representatives in country can assist in the positive identification of any foreign nationals to be evacuated through the use of Department of Justice biometric devices. Responsibilities of the USCIS include the following:

- (a) Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as immigrants to the United States.
- (b) Adjudicate immigrant visa petitions.
- (c) Adjudicate naturalization petitions.

(d) Adjudicate asylum and refugee applications.

(2) **United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP).** CBP's mission is to safeguard America's borders, thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the nation's global economic competitiveness through sustainment of legitimate trade and travel. An important strategic objective is to counter terrorism and transnational crime. Its traditional border enforcement missions are designed to prevent illegal entry and immigration into the United States and prevent the importation into the United States of illegal or prohibited substances and items such as illicit drugs and counterfeit merchandise.

**MEMORANDUM ON THE DESIGNATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
HOMELAND SECURITY AS LEAD FEDERAL DEPARTMENT FOR  
FACILITATING THE ENTRY OF VULNERABLE AFGHANS INTO THE  
UNITED STATES**

**AUGUST 29, 2021**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND  
AGENCIES**

**SUBJECT: Designation of the Department of Homeland Security as  
Lead Federal Department for Facilitating the Entry of Vulnerable  
Afghans into the United States**

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (Management of Domestic Incidents), and as further complemented by other Presidential policy directives, the President has directed the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary) to lead the coordination of ongoing efforts across the Federal Government to resettle vulnerable Afghans, including those who worked on behalf of the United States. This process includes but is not limited to initial immigration processing, COVID-19 testing, separation of COVID-positive individuals for anticipated quarantine, and resettlement support for evacuees who are neither American citizens nor lawful permanent residents and who will be temporarily accommodated at select US military bases before relocating to communities across the country.

The President has further directed the Secretary to establish a United Coordination Group. The Secretary will identify a Senior Response Official, subject to the oversight, direction, and guidance of the Secretary, who shall lead and coordinate the Unified Coordination Group. The Senior Response Official will employ the National Response Framework to enhance unity of effort; develop strategic objectives and priorities; coordinate with senior Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials, as well as representatives of private sector and nongovernmental entities; elevate and resolve national-level resource

and policy issues through the National Security Memorandum-2 process; and lead communications efforts with affected parties and the public.

All relevant Federal departments and agencies are directed to provide their full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, consistent with their own responsibilities for addressing the situation, and shall cooperate with the Secretary and the Senior Response Official to ensure a unified Federal response. The President's expectation is clear: the Department of Homeland Security shall serve as the lead Federal agency, coordinating the effort with other Federal agencies with the full support of the entire Cabinet.

Nothing in this memorandum abrogates, alters, or impedes the ability of Federal departments and agencies of Federal officials to perform their responsibilities under law.

**Jake Sullivan**  
**National Security Advisor of the United States**

e. **General Services Administration (GSA).** GSA provides substantial capacity for domestic contracting, which could support a large-scale repatriation effort to the United States. This is especially useful for providing domestic, temporary safe havens. GSA, with DOS and DOD support and applicable resourcing, could provide a responsive, scalable, and appropriate domestic contract capacity for housing, medical, and administrative facilities during repatriation efforts.

## **5. Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and United States Military Commanders**

a. **SecDef.** SecDef advises and assists SECSTATE and the heads of other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of US citizens in overseas areas. SecDef has primary responsibility for the protection and evacuation of all US civilians, noncombatants, and designated other persons at the United States Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).** When authorized by SecDef, the CJCS coordinates the deployment and employment of US forces in support of a NEO and monitors US force participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatant evacuees. The CJCS also recommends transportation movement priorities to SecDef and the use of United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide the appropriate transportation resources in support of DOS requests. In addition, the CJCS coordinates with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and CCDRs on evacuee personnel accounting actions.

c. **Secretary of the Army (SECARMY).** SECARMY provides augmentation support to the joint reception coordination center (JRCC), when requested, and monitors

all Department of the Army noncombatant evacuees when evacuated to a safe haven. SECARMY serves as the executive agent for DOD biometrics in accordance with (IAW) DODD 8521.01E, *DOD Biometrics*.

d. **Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV).** SECNAV provides augmentation support to the JRCC, when requested, including appropriate Marine Corps and, if transferred from DHS to the Department of the Navy, United States Coast Guard (USCG) forces. Further, SECNAV monitors all Department of the Navy noncombatant evacuees when evacuated to a safe haven.

e. **Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF).** SECAF, IAW the mission and priorities assigned by Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM), provides air transportation, as well as aeromedical evacuation (AE), to support medical NEO requirements. Also, SECAF provides augmentation support to the JRCC, when requested, and monitors all Department of the Air Force noncombatant evacuees when evacuated to a safe haven. SECAF serves as the executive agent for DOD digital and multimedia forensics laboratory services IAW DODD 5505.13E, *DOD Executive Agent (EA) for the DOD Cyber Crime Center (DC3)*.

f. **CCDR's Responsibility.** IAW DOD policy, CCDRs must prepare, maintain, exercise, and execute plans for the protection and evacuation of US civilians and noncombatant evacuees abroad. Plans include the evacuation of military personnel who are not in the consular and/or embassy plans. Plans also include identification of emergency-essential civilians operating in support of combat units who are not to be evacuated. There will likely be some contracted capabilities supporting DOD that must remain in place during a NEO, such as security guards; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ground stations; networks or communications; limited life support; or transportation. When conditions of potential hazard warrant, the CCDR recommends evacuation of DOD civilians and noncombatant evacuees to the CJCS, and the CCDR may direct that DOD personnel under his/her control be evacuated from a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven when authorized by SecDef in coordination with SECSTATE.

g. **Special Responsibilities of Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM).** CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for receiving evacuees in the continental United States, Alaska, and the US territories within the Caribbean during repatriation. CDRUSINDOPACOM is responsible for receiving evacuees in Hawaii and US territories within the Pacific during repatriation. Within United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command, a joint repatriation processing center may be established, as required. Other CCMDs conducting repatriation operations establish and operate a JRCC and manage all of the DOD noncombatant evacuees' needs within their respective AORs as specified in their CCMD noncombatant evacuee repatriation plans. The receiving CCMD ensures proper coordination and information sharing with officials and agencies of the respective states/territories. The JRCC maintains oversight of the entire DOD repatriation operation and keeps DOD and other USG departments and agencies informed about repatriation matters. Additionally, the repatriating CCMD may need to foster understanding of their supporting capabilities and

capacities, both systemic and nodal; lessons from recent large-scale repatriation reflect the need for deliberate metering of the pace of repatriation to ensure effective evacuee transport, quartering, and processing.

**h. Special Responsibilities of Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).** As a member of the WLG, the SOF representative coordinates with DOS, the CCDRs, and the Services to ensure the adequacy and timeliness of special operations planning, responding forces, required capabilities, and coordination in support of NEOs. CDRUSSOCOM is also responsible for management of the Integrated Survey Program, which supports Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency planning. The COM and JFC would incorporate the Integrated Survey Program into their planning.

**i. CDRUSTRANSCOM.** USTRANSCOM, through its Service component commands, can either access organic lift or leverage its ability to obtain commercial lift by using existing services contracts, as appropriate. Additionally, USTRANSCOM has visibility over unused legs of contracted missions that can be obtained quickly and converted to round trip at minimal cost, thereby flowing evacuation missions with other scheduled commercial missions. At a minimum, the strategic lift requirements for evacuation of civilians and noncombatant evacuees are coordinated with USTRANSCOM.

**j. USCG.** The Commandant, USCG, may be tasked to support a NEO. USCG vessels and aircraft are options in cases where overt DOD presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile situation. When requested, the USCG can liaise with DOD and interagency partners to assess and determine the safety and viability of using commercial vessels for a NEO.

**k. Marine Corps Security Force Regiment (MCSFR).** The MCSFR has three fleet antiterrorism security team (FAST) companies totaling 18 platoons of one officer and 45 enlisted Marines and one United States Navy (USN) corpsman each. These FAST platoons can rapidly deploy to augment embassy security. The FAST platoons also provide the CCDR and COM with a low-visibility reinforcement capability. MCSFR and its assets are under operational control (OPCON) of the respective fleet commander, if currently deployed. If not deployed, all MCSFR assets fall under Marine Forces Command.

**l. MCESG.** The Commanding Officer of MCESG reports to the Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, exercising command, less operational supervision, of Marines assigned to MSG detachments. MCESG region commands report to the Commanding Officer of MCESG.

(1) The MSG commander exercises command, less operational supervision, of Marines assigned to the MSG detachments in their respective regions. The MCESG region HQ ensures the continued training, operational readiness, personnel administration, and logistical support, as well as the morale, welfare, and discipline, of Marines assigned for duty to MSG detachments to support DOS in the protection of mission personnel and prevent the compromise of national security information and equipment at designated diplomatic and consular facilities.

(2) The MCESG Commanding Officer's command includes the Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU). The MSAU is a task-organized, worldwide-deployable element capable of deploying at extreme short notice to augment security at designated diplomatic facilities. The MSAU detachment commander reports directly to the RSO in the absence of a designated commander.

m. **Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).** The DMDC is a component of the DOD field activity, Department of Defense Human Resources Activity. The DMDC has three responsibilities associated with a NEO conducted by DOD: the centralized procurement and distribution of noncombatant evacuation operation tracking system (NTS) terminals to CCMDs, the maintenance of the DMDC NTS website during the conduct of a NEO, and the integration of the NTS information technology system with other DOD or DOS information technology systems in advance of or during the conduct of a NEO.

n. **DOD Comptroller.** The DOD Comptroller establishes financial arrangements with DOS and issues instructions to the DOD components for obtaining reimbursement for the costs of protecting and evacuating personnel for whom DOD is not responsible. When DOS incurs expenses for personnel for whom DOD is responsible, the DOD Comptroller completes arrangements for the reimbursement of costs.

o. **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).** NGA is a combat support agency (CSA), as well as a national intelligence organization, and can provide timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in support of NEOs. As the functional manager for GEOINT, the Director of NGA leads the National System for Geospatial Intelligence to collect, process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate GEOINT to a wide range of consumers involved in NEOs. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support teams (NSTs) provide a forward presence and support GEOINT operations at National System for Geospatial partner sites. Each NST provides on-site GEOINT capabilities, expertise, data, and products and directs representational authority to the mission partner, along a continuum of support. The NST chief or senior NGA representative is designated by the NGA Director as the senior representative to the mission partner's commander or director and is the primary POC for all GEOINT support provided by NGA at the CCMD.

p. **DIA.** DIA provides military intelligence in support of US military planning and operations. DIA's core mission capabilities are to collect, process, exploit, and analyze foreign military and defense-related information and then produce and disseminate timely and relevant all-source analysis.

*For information on NGA capabilities, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.*

## 6. Host Nation

a. **Diplomatic and Legal Considerations.** Coordination and interaction with the HN governments may be required to determine, among other things, legal authority to conduct a NEO; overflight rights; staging base access; safe haven availability; the duties and

obligations of neutral states; ROE; operational limitations due to HN laws and status of international agreements (e.g., status-of-forces agreements [SOFAs], memorandums of understanding [MOUs]); requests for, and/or approval of, NEO-related intelligence collection activities; and the legal status of evacuation force personnel. The outcome of this effort delimits the legal framework within which the evacuation force may execute its mission. Notwithstanding the results of this effort, the commander always retains the inherent right and obligation of unit self-defense.

*See Appendix B, “Legal Considerations,” for further guidance.*

**b. Actions.** The response and activities of the HN during a NEO will likely be determined by the existing operational environment. The HN may assist the NEO by providing security outside the embassy property, around evacuation sites, and along evacuation routes. Continuous liaison and coordination between the embassy RSO and local police/military commanders will likely be required to ensure this support is established and maintained. The HN may also be capable and willing to provide interpreters and intelligence, logistic, and communications support to the embassy staff and evacuation force. Other host-nation support (HNS) such as traffic control, airspace control, and port operations will likely be vital to NEO execution relieving the burden on the evacuation force.

### 7. Nongovernmental and International Organizations

**a.** NGOs are organizations that may be in country providing humanitarian assistance or relief when an evacuation takes place. They may also voluntarily assist dislocated civilians during all or selected stages of NEO. The JFC should remain cognizant of the fact that personnel working for these organizations cannot be ordered to depart. However, they may be able to provide valuable up-to-date information as to the location of US citizens. Some of these agencies may be reluctant to openly cooperate with US forces to preserve their perceived neutrality among the HN population. Other organizations may openly oppose US objectives. An early determination of their position in relation to US policy is essential and can inform JFCs with appropriate COAs. NGOs are independent organizations that are subject to complementary, and sometimes competing, interests that may conflict with USG efforts. NGO efforts may directly contravene US policy and add complexity to a NEO. NEO planners should develop relationships with NGO partners to best align and synchronize efforts in a responsible and efficient manner.

**b. Regional Organizations.** Regional organizations or international organizations may provide assistance to refugees during a US evacuation from a foreign country.

*See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for more information on coordination with NGOs and international organizations. It also provides a discussion on relationships between the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs and international organizations.*

## 8. Multinational Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

a. **Initiation.** Multinational evacuations involve multiple nation diplomatic initiatives—with MNFs conducting a NEO in a supporting role. To conduct a NEO with an MNF, each participating nation is required to affirm its participation. However, military-to-military engagement can be conducted to facilitate unilateral national NEOs, so long as no binding agreements (formal or informal) are initiated—because binding agreements fall under the auspices of DOS. Should a decision be made to conduct a multinational NEO, an initiating directive (ID) should be issued to enable detailed operation planning to commence. The ID establishes the authority and parameters for the NEO. An ID normally includes guidance regarding the situation, objectives, mission, participating nations, and timing. Specific guidance on conducting NEOs within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is provided in AJP-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*.

b. **Liaison.** An MNF LNO and reconnaissance team (e.g., forward command element [FCE]) should be deployed to act as a link between the multinational force commander (MNFC) and the HOM(s) and gather information. In addition to information gathering, the early deployment of LNOs to the HN should be considered to:

(1) Brief the HOM(s) on NEO procedures, the likely forces involved, and other military considerations.

(2) Coordinate with the military attachés and staffs, the diplomatic mission staffs, HN military, and the military personnel or forces of other nations deployed in the operational area.

(3) Review the evacuation plans and coordinate and synchronize with military plans.

(4) Commence NEO planning to include initiating the commander's estimate and OPLAN on behalf of the MNFC and the tactical planning for the MNF components.

(5) Compile local information not otherwise available.

(6) Test or provide a communications system at the diplomatic mission.

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## CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL

*“A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign [an operation] exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little.”*

**Carl von Clausewitz  
(1780-1831)**

### 1. Introduction

a. The Under Secretary of State for Management, at the request of the COM, can authorize the ordered or authorized departure of USG personnel and dependents other than uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and designated emergency-essential DOD civilians who are not under the authority of the COM. While the COM cannot order the departure of private US citizens and designated other persons, the COM can offer them USG evacuation assistance. Normally, an evacuation starts IAW the embassy’s EAP, using scheduled airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation.


b. Military assistance is provided in a variety of circumstances, not just when requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission. When SECSTATE requests military assistance from DOD, approval and the military response are directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS to the appropriate CCDR, who initiates military operations. When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or appear imminent, the COM may invoke such elements of the EAP as the situation warrants, including requesting assistance of the appropriate military commander, while simultaneously informing DOS.

c. The President should be advised by SecDef (or a designated representative) when forces are pre-positioned to support a possible evacuation, before the execution of a NEO, and as necessary thereafter.

### 2. Authorities and Relationships

a. Within the HN, the COM, although not in the military chain of command, is the lead federal official for protection and evacuation of all US noncombatant evacuees, including DOD dependents. The JFC ensures DOD actions relating to the evacuation of DOD dependents and DOD civilian employees and their families are consistent with the direction of the COM. The authority of the COM to order evacuation does not extend to personnel of the Services not under COM authority, except as agreed upon between DOS and DOD. Figure III-1 depicts the chain of command for a NEO.

b. **Decisions during Planning.** Due to time constraints and the unusual command relationship with respect to NEOs, operation planning and decision making are based on a foundation of common understanding of perspectives (diplomatic and/or military)



**Figure III-1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations/Repatriation Operations Organization Chain of Command**

concerning the situation, mission, objectives, procedures, and free exchange of information. In cases when significant differences between the JFC and COM become obstacles to the success of the operation, they are referred to their respective superiors for resolution.

c. **Consultation between the COM and JFC.** In the course of planning and executing a NEO, the COM obtains and considers the opinions and professional judgment of the JFC. This requirement, however, in no way limits the COM's overall responsibility.

d. **Direction to Personnel.** All necessary orders from the COM or the JFC to corresponding personnel are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate chain of command. In the event communications cannot be established with higher authority or if the situation deteriorates to one of combat operations rather than a NEO (regardless of the environment) and US lives are at risk, the responsible military commander takes whatever action is necessary to protect the lives of US personnel, informs the COM of actions taken, and requests guidance through the DOD chain of command.

### 3. Command and Control

a. Guidance provided by higher authority normally covers areas of key concern to the President and SecDef and provides the supported CCDR with an overview of the diplomatic and political context within which the NEO is being considered. The scope and objective of US involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response are often provided in general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate COAs. The CJCS warning order defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any planning constraints. The warning order also identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution or requests the CCDR develops as part of the commander's COA.

b. **CJCS.** The CJCS:

(1) Coordinates the deployment, employment, and withdrawal/retrograde of US forces and equipment in support of the NEO.

(2) Appoints the CJCS representative of the WLG to coordinate the execution of NEO responsibilities.

(3) Monitors CCMD and Service readiness for and participation in protection and evacuation operations.

(4) Recommends to SecDef transportation movement priorities for USTRANSCOM to provide the appropriate transportation resources in support of DOS requests.

(5) As a member of the WLG, coordinates with DOS, Office of the Secretary of Defense, CCDRs, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Services, as required in the recommended designation of temporary safe havens and ISBs.

(6) When conditions of potential hazard warrant, recommends to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness and Force Management) that the movement of DOD civilians and noncombatant evacuees into affected nations be suspended.

(7) Periodically evaluates overseas command procedures for NEOs, particularly during scheduled CJCS exercises.

(8) Develops operational oversight guidance for a CCDR's employment of the NTS in a NEO.

(9) Establishes a standard procedure for the employment of the NTS in support of a NEO.

(10) Establishes standard procedures, working groups, and other control mechanisms for standardized C2 systems, communications, and information technology processes across CCMDs, interagency partners, and MNFs, as applicable.

**c. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.** SECARMY, SECNAV, and SECAF:

(1) Appoint a member to the WLG.

(2) Provide augmentation support to the JRCC, when requested.

(3) Provide support to their respective Service personnel and dependents. SECNAV provides support to the United States Marine Corps and USCG, with the appropriate command relationship. SECAF provides support to the United States Space Force.

(4) Equip their forces with NTS and other automated system(s) to provide accountability, visibility, and support for evacuees during all phases of evacuation, and ensures adequate numbers of personnel are trained to operate the system(s).

(5) Measure and report on the readiness of their forces and the supporting infrastructure.

(6) Additionally, SECNAV provides the designation and training of port LNOs.

**d. CCDRs with Geographic Responsibilities.** The responsibilities of the CCDRs with geographic responsibilities, as appropriate, are to:

(1) Coordinate emergency and evacuation planning and execution on a regional basis IAW DOS and DOD MOA.

(2) Prepare, maintain, exercise, and execute plans for the protection and evacuation of US civilians and noncombatant evacuees (to include both their departure from the overseas area and their reception at a safe haven) IAW DOS and DOD MOA.

(3) Assist the COM in the preparation of embassy EAPs. Ensure those plans comply with the following criteria:

(a) Adequate provisions are made for the protection and evacuation of all DOD civilians and noncombatant evacuees and, when appropriate, military combatants.

(b) Assumptions based on the use of DOD resources are militarily acceptable.

(c) References to US military facilities are accurate.

(d) Plans provide required information should assistance by the US military be requested.

(e) Plans are properly distributed to subordinate and adjacent military commands.

(f) Plans are reviewed annually and periodically evaluated for procedures and effectiveness.

(4) Measure and report on the readiness of CDR-assigned forces and the supporting infrastructure, as specified in DODD 7730.65, *Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*, to execute evacuations.

(5) When conditions of potential hazard warrant, recommend to SecDef that movement of DOD civilians and noncombatant evacuees into nations or areas be suspended. Also, recommend evacuation of DOD civilians and noncombatant evacuees if conditions warrant.

(6) If time precludes adequate communication with DOS or DOD and upon request of the COM, provide assistance for the protection and evacuation of civilians and noncombatant evacuees. If timely communication with the COM or the senior DOS representative is not possible, take proper actions necessary to secure the safety of participating personnel, as well as other US personnel and foreign nationals who request assistance.

(7) Appoint the military members to the liaison group, if established.

(8) Prepare and maintain plans for the evacuation of military personnel not included in consular and/or embassy plans, and these plans also identify the emergency-essential civilians who will not be evacuated.

(9) Ensure plans are prepared for evacuation of military personnel not included in the embassy, staff, and DOD key and emergency-essential civilians operating in support of combat units who will be evacuated after the NEO is executed.

(10) Upon completion of an evacuation involving DOD resources or personnel, provide SecDef with an after action report containing a summary of the activities and recommendations for improving future operations.

(11) Determine lift requirements. If they exceed theater capabilities, coordinate the request for airlift and sealift support through USTRANSCOM.

(12) Maintain geospatial-intelligence base for contingency operations (GIBCO). The GIBCO program is composed of two different components: Geospatial-Intelligence Base, which contains NGA geospatial data that covers the entire country, and NEO and contingency operations, which identifies NGA data over NEO site cities.

(13) Generate a request for forces as a part of the global force management processes, when requirements exceed the capabilities of assigned or allocated theater personnel.

*See JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for additional guidance on global force management.*

(14) Designate a JFC, as required.

(15) Coordinate with DOS for overflight and access agreements within their AOR to support en route activities and provide transportation and other force and asset requirements as requested by the supported CDR.

(16) Ensure the required quantities of NTS terminals are on hand and operational and the staff are properly trained in all aspects of the NTS to support the anticipated volume of evacuees efficiency.



*During Operation SILVER WAKE, American citizens board a helicopter from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit on a field inside the United States Embassy housing compound in Tirana, Albania, on March 15, 1997.*

(17) Coordinate with DOS and supported embassies to identify support required at evacuation sites and temporary safe havens; in cases where DOS needs assistance, provide contracting support to facilitate life support and ground transportation of evacuees.

(18) Submit satellite communications (SATCOM) requirements as soon as possible in the satellite database IAW Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6250.01, *Department of Defense Satellite Communications*.

(19) Coordinate for reception and repatriation of evacuees at safe havens and/or continental United States.

(20) Ensure plans are prepared to report casualties IAW Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1300.18, *Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures*.

(21) Ensure NTS connectivity requirement during a NEO is addressed in each component's communications plan and over-the-horizon communications connectivity is available at the NEO site and all forward component command centers.

**e. United States Special Operations Command.** The responsibilities of CDRUSSOCOM are:

(1) Prepare theater special operations command plans to support all country evacuation plans with emphasis on evacuations under duress. Theater special operations command plans are prepared to provide SOF in support of theater NEOs.

(2) Direct SOF to provide theater and global response forces for US citizens unable to evacuate during crisis or conflict.

(3) Appoint the SOF representative to the WLG.

(4) Ensure the NTS connectivity requirement during a NEO is addressed in each CDR's SOF communications plan and employ mobile SATCOM systems that enable connectivity at the NEO site.

**f. USTRANSCOM.** The responsibilities of CDRUSTRANSCOM include providing air, sea, and land transportation; terminal operations; and patient movement (PM) IAW DODI 5158.06, *Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) Planning and Operations*. NEO requirements moving by USTRANSCOM assets must be validated by both the supported CDR and CDRUSTRANSCOM prior to assigning lift. Additionally, following receipt and concurrence of a supported CDR request for Joint Enabling Capabilities Command support, CDRUSTRANSCOM can provide mission-tailored, joint packages of planning, communications, and PA capabilities.

**g. CSAs.** Many capabilities required for NEO reside in CSAs. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages many classes of supplies that are critical to

NEO such as Class I (subsistence), Class III (fuel), and Class VIII (medical). When requested and approved, DLA can provide a deployable team to assist the CCDR in planning and executing a NEO.

#### 4. Joint Task Force Organization

a. The supported CCDR has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission. As such, the supported CCDR could decide to assign the NEO mission to a Service component or establish a JTF. If a JTF is formed, it should be established and organized IAW JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*, and JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*. The JFC is responsible for all phases of the operation, to include the ISB and temporary safe haven (if located outside the United States and within the joint operations area [JOA]). An ISB or temporary safe haven outside the JTF JOA falls under the responsibility of the supported CCDR. The NEO JTF typically supports and transports the evacuees to ISBs and safe havens outside the JOA.

b. **Composition.** The JTF's composition is delineated in the establishing directive. The JFC exercises OPCON over assigned forces and OPCON or tactical control (TACON) over attached forces through designated component commanders. Other forces may operate in support of or under TACON of the JFC, as directed by the CCDR.

c. **JTF HQ Organization.** The JFC organizes the JTF staff. The JTF HQ composition, location, and facilities may have a major influence on what the JFC and staff can accomplish. An afloat JTF HQ may have limitations such as space availability or bandwidth issues that could affect staffing levels and equipment capabilities. A JTF HQ located in a neighboring country may not have restrictions on space or amount of equipment. However, such a JTF HQ may encounter restrictions resulting from increased distances, diplomatic/political sensitivities (of the neighboring country), and other types of limitations.

#### OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE

In 1996, the United States (US) military assisted in safeguarding and evacuating Americans from Liberia when that nation's civil war reignited into factional fighting and general violence. During the first week of April 1996, as a result of intense street fighting during the ongoing civil war, about 500 people sought refuge on American Embassy grounds and another 20,000 in a nearby American housing area. On 6 April, the President approved the US ambassador's request for security, resupply, and evacuation support.

Elements of the GUAM Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)), were ordered to the vicinity of Monrovia, Liberia. Upon arrival, the 22nd MEU(SOC) commanding officer assumed command of Joint Task Force-Assured Response (JTF-AR), which included Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps forces.

Between 9 April and 18 June 1996, JTF-AR evacuated 2,444 people (485 Americans and 1,959 citizens of 68 other nations). Initially, Navy-Marine Corps forces provided embassy security and evacuated 309 noncombatants, including 49 US citizens. The bulk of noncombatants were evacuated by Air Force forces from Special Operations Command Europe. On 9 April, less than 72 hours after the decision to deploy US forces, the first MH-53 helicopter landed in Monrovia to begin operations. Air Force KC-135 tankers and C-130 transports were put on alert in Europe to support 24-hour operations, while other mobility aircraft began to deliver critical medical supplies, food, water, fuel, and communications gear.

Those evacuated continued on US helicopters through Freetown, Sierra Leone, then on MC-130s to Dakar, Senegal, all under the cover of AC-130 gunships. Throughout the rest of the week, the evacuation continued, as well as airlift of critical supplies, to sustain the effort. By 14 April, the evacuation was essentially complete; however, security and sustainment operations continued through 3 August.

While still conducting this operation, elements of JTF-AR were ordered to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct similar operations. A special-purpose Marine air-ground task force, embarked on the United States Ship *Ponce* (LPD 15) and with 10 days' notice, relieved the *GUAM ARG* and assumed the duties of Commander, JTF-AR.

Various Sources

## 5. Multinational Command and Control

a. Since the military is in a supporting role during a NEO, it is important to note that, within the HN, the applicable HOMs, as the senior national government representatives, are the overall responsible authorities for the evacuation. The JFC retains responsibility for the conduct of all military operations in support of an evacuation and for the security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the operational area in consultation and coordination with the HOMs. During a multinational NEO, the MNF conducts operations in response to ID guidance—the HOM(s) does not exercise military command over the MNF. In cases when significant differences between the MNFC and an HOM become an obstacle to success of the operation, they seek resolution from their respective superiors.

b. The primary objective of the MNFC is to support the HOMs' plans and cooperate with the diplomatic missions without compromising military mission requirements. The diplomatic missions can keep the MNF apprised of the on-scene conditions and can be influential for coordinating actions that may affect the NEO. These actions may include political or diplomatic constraints on the joint force, legal issues, agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, an ISB, and a temporary safe haven, if established.

c. Depending on the magnitude and anticipated duration of a NEO, the MNFC may request designation of a **coordinated lead diplomatic mission** within the HN. Such a request would need to be discussed and agreed upon within the national foreign ministries. A designated, coordinated lead diplomatic mission should have sufficient personnel and C2 capability to serve as a focal point for coordinating NEO efforts among the MNF and other diplomatic missions included for evacuation. The intent of creating a coordinated lead diplomatic mission is to foster a degree of unity of effort and lessen the liaison burden on the MNF.

d. **Organization**

(1) **General Composition.** The MNF is a task-organized, tailored force whose composition is determined mostly by the needs of the entry/withdrawal and supporting operations within the overall NEO. Typically, the MNF consists of an MNF HQ and functional components.

(2) **Operational Elements.** The MNF normally task-organizes to form an **advance HQ, main body, and evacuation force.** The advance HQ coordinates with the ambassador(s) and diplomatic mission staff(s) for information and assistance. The advance HQ reports to the MNFC. The MNF main body HQ joins the advance HQ as operations continue, and it coordinates and directs the MNF components during the NEO. The LNOs continue to coordinate directly with the diplomatic missions and other agencies as required. In most instances, the evacuation force is established from a designated MNF component, with other MNF components in a supporting role. For example, if the environment is permissive or uncertain with noncombatant evacuees departing primarily by air, the joint force air component commander may be designated the evacuation force commander.

(3) **Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Coordination Center (NEOCC).** Depending on the magnitude and duration of the multinational NEO, the MNFC might consider establishing an NEOCC within the MNF HQ. The NEOCC is a centralized focal point providing a conduit for information exchanges between the various diplomatic missions and the MNF.

## CHAPTER IV PLANNING

*“A NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] is an operation for which the force, depending on the operating environment, might need to assume more risk to lessen the risk to the evacuees and mission as a whole.”*

*Operational Law Handbook, 2020*

### 1. United States Embassy and Consulate Plans

a. **EAPs.** US embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs that account for the safety, security, and potential evacuation of embassy staff and families and US citizens traveling or working abroad and to coordinate for HNS and US military support. The COM prepares and maintains EAPs, one section of which addresses the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals and emergencies that require augmented military security. The CCDR reviews, plans, and organizes a responsive military capability to support EAPs. EAPs are not tactical OPLANs in the sense that military planners think of, but they are the reference materials that support the formulation of an OPLAN. The CCDR should review the adequacy of the EAP to support military operations. The EAP may also help the CCDR better understand some of the implications of integrating potential partner and non-partner capabilities to meet operational requirements to achieve unified action. A copy of the current EAP should be on file and maintained at the appropriate CCMD HQ. EAPs include, but are not limited to, the information shown in Figure IV-1.

#### Contents of Emergency Action Plans

- Possible decision point framework, which includes operating assumptions, risk indicators, and consolidated actions to consider
- Location of evacuation sites (assembly areas, helicopter landing zones, airports, and seaports)
- Anticipated ordered departure numbers from post
- Location of command centers and off-site safe areas
- Key personnel (including contact information and assigned emergency management roles)
- Description of the post's communications system, emergency notification system, transportation fleet, and consular American liaison network
- Quantity of class I (subsistence) supplies on hand at the post
- Quantity of class III (fuel)
- Availability of class VIII (medical supplies)

Figure IV-1. Contents of Emergency Action Plans

b. **Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH).** Along with the DOS EPH, the *Foreign Affairs Manual* and associated foreign affairs handbooks are consolidated sources of guidance for foreign service posts to plan and deal with certain emergency situations. The EPH serves as the principal reference for posts in preparing and revising the EAP. Every foreign service post is required to have an operative EAP designed to provide procedures to deal with foreseeable contingencies. This EAP provides guidance to be addressed by the COM and the emergency team for planning an evacuation operation.

## 2. Military Planning—Combatant Command Plans

Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JFC receives the warning order from the CCDR and lasts until the evacuation force deploys to either an ISB or the evacuation site. Prior coordination with the staffs of the CCDR and embassy can significantly improve planning for the JFC. The CCDR and staff can provide the subordinate JFC with information to begin planning, such as the general OPLANs.

*For more information on planning, see Appendix H, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Checklist.”*

## 3. Operational Environment Considerations

a. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander for the NEO. Understanding the operational environment in which the NEO is to be conducted requires a holistic view that encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); and the electromagnetic operational environment. Included within these are the PMESII systems and any relevant network considerations for the country in which the evacuation is to occur.

b. Some key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning are situational awareness; a correct appraisal and understanding of the changing diplomatic, political, social, cultural, and military environment in which the evacuation force will operate; time constraints and risk; and preparation of the evacuation force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile. Since the operational environment could change as the NEO progresses, planners should develop alternative plans for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. As discussed in Chapter I, “Overview,” the impact of introducing US forces into an unstable environment could be further destabilizing, and as a result, a primary planning limitation may be direction from DOS to maintain a small footprint. Planners should, therefore, consider that because of the operational environment, there may be a limitation on the level of forces or military activity within the country. A sea base may be needed to reduce the footprint ashore.

(1) **Permissive Environment.** A permissive environment is an operational environment in which HN military and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. Under this condition, no resistance to evacuation operations is expected, and thus, the operation would

require little or no assembly of combat forces in country. Evacuees may or may not have been processed and assembled at designated assembly areas, evacuation points, and sites. In such an environment, a JTF can expect HN concurrence and possible support. The JTF's primary concerns may be logistic functions involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, and coordination with DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation. While a minimum number of security forces may be used, prudent preparations should be in place to enable the force conducting the NEO to respond to threats as required.

(2) **Uncertain Environment.** An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to the NEO, do not have total effective control of the HN territory and population in the intended operational area. Because of the uncertainty, the JFC may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security units or a reaction force, either collocated with the evacuation force, or on a sea base, or at an ISB. Approved ROE are disseminated early to ensure the joint force has knowledge of and is sufficiently trained and proficient in application of the ROE. Planning for NEOs conducted in an uncertain environment must always include the possibility for escalation to a hostile environment. The primary concerns associated with a permissive environment remain unchanged.

(3) **Hostile Environment.** A hostile environment is an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. Noncombatant evacuees and civilians may be evacuated under conditions ranging from civil disorder, to terrorist action, to full-scale combat. Under such conditions, the JTF must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. The JFC may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force or position a large reaction force, either with the evacuation force or at an ISB. In addition to normal functions associated with noncombatant evacuations (embarkation, transportation, medical, and services), the JTF may be required to conduct a forcible entry operation, establish defensive perimeters, escort convoys, participate in PR operations, and perform the screening of evacuees normally accomplished by DOS officials.

c. Evacuation planners should use the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process to analyze, correlate, and fuse information pertaining to all relevant aspects of the operational environment (e.g., PMESII systems, relevant networks). The process should also be used, if necessary, to analyze adversary capabilities, identify potential enemy COAs, and assess the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. Appendix G, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Considerations," contains more information on planning considerations for JIPOE in a NEO.

*Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for additional information related to operational environments. Refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks, for further information on network analysis.*

d. The analysis of civil considerations within the operational environment should follow the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) framework. Rigorous staff efforts for developing ASCOPE considerations early in the planning process are important, and coordination and discussions with DOS, the COM, and the embassy staff are critical.

*Refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, for more information on ASCOPE.*

### 4. Intelligence Support

a. A GIBCO contains specific maps, charts, imagery, and other geospatial products to support evacuation planning and operations. A GIBCO is placed in the NEO package for each country, city, or region. NGA produces GIBCOs, which give users flexibility through the use of Web browser technology for navigation and display of geospatial data. Applications of the GIBCO are broad, including the capability to become familiar with a foreign environment; plan, coordinate, and execute noncombatant evacuations, contingency operations, missions in urban areas, and search and rescue operations; as a desk-side reference; and as a means of access to geospatial data and navigation aids where networks or infrastructure have been damaged or do not exist. GIBCO and NEO data sets are tailored to each customer's request. The DVD [digital video disc]-based product can hold an entire country or an intensified coverage down to a single facility. GIBCO data can be obtained from NGA classified and unclassified websites.

b. DIA maintains various databases that provide details on diplomatic facilities and associated areas for use in evacuation planning and execution. Additionally, DIA maintains biometrically enabled watchlists that can be used to help vet evacuees and identify threats to the safe execution of a NEO.

c. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity produces expeditionary intelligence products that include, but are not limited to, GEOINT of expeditionary points of entry, such as beach, helicopter and airborne landing zones (LZs), route and mobility studies, and human geography layers. These products support expeditionary operations, to include noncombatant and civilian evacuation planning and execution.

d. USTRANSCOM J-2 [Intelligence Directorate] maintains the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-Transportation websites on the SIPRNET [SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network], JWICS [Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System], and STONEGHOST networks, which provide detailed transportation infrastructure, as well as access, basing, and overflight assessments.

e. Each CCDR's joint intelligence operations center maintains websites and databases that provide varying degrees of intelligence support for particular nations.

f. During a crisis, the most current situational information available would be found on the DOS website ([www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)) for the country of interest. If a special link to the evacuation has not yet been established, click on A-Z country pages, then search the alphabetized listing of countries and other areas.

g. Unclassified maps and basic information for over 200 nations and territories may be found in the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, USAID web page, and the United Nations Statistical Division, as well as other global organizations, by using commercial search engines.

h. Additionally, support to JFCs should include forward-deploying, CCMD-based intelligence community representatives and subject matter experts to support intelligence operations and facilitate access to parent agencies. CSAs may deploy personnel as part of national intelligence support to work with the NEO, consistent with other military operations. After assessing capabilities and requirements and evaluating unfulfilled needs, CDRs should submit a request for forces, specifically stating manning and capability shortfalls. The request for forces process may be used to request additional national intelligence community augmentation to support the NEO. The request should specifically identify the skills required from each CSA. Special capabilities can also be requested to close gaps.

i. **Integrated Survey Program.** The integrated survey program provides current, detailed, tactical-planning data to support operations. Products are specifically tailored packages that reflect unevaluated operational information, as well as intelligence data for use by DOD and DOS. Detailed site surveys are conducted in support of specific CJCS concept plans and charter or SecDef-approved execute order. Teams survey and produce detailed planning data and supply the necessary information to support operational planners for NEOs, counterterrorism operations, and rescue missions. The EAP and integrated survey program products complement each other, with the latter containing a higher degree of detail to support planners (e.g., drawings, photos, and videos for points of entry, assembly areas, routes, airfields, ports, and other important areas).

*For additional information on intelligence community support, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.*

## 5. Notification Procedures

a. To develop a realistic evacuation plan, the JTF staff should know how long it will take to assemble the evacuees once the decision to evacuate has been made. Messaging to US citizens may be done through the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program, where US citizens, who are registered with the US embassy, receive e-mail notifications. Alerts and travel advisories may also be disseminated via the DOS website, social media platforms, television, radio, and other similar electronic means. Communications with potential evacuees may be via the American Liaison Network, which can be used to communicate to the US population through citizen liaison volunteers using telephones, cellular phones (both voice and texting), faxes, e-mails, social media outlets, and direct personal contact. There are two types of official messages sent to registered US citizens in country:

(1) **Routine Information.** A routine information message is used to disseminate information about routine topics such as voter registration, income tax season, new passport procedures, and other administrative/non-security issues of interest to the local US citizen community.

(2) **Alert.** An alert message is used to provide safety and security information to US citizens. Examples include alerting US citizens to criminal activity, demonstrations, strikes and protests, dangerous weather conditions, health threats of a short-term or localized nature, terrorist events and threats, suspicious packages, natural disasters, extraordinary measures by local authorities such as martial law, post closures, authorized/ordered departures and/or closures to the public, upcoming holidays (if there is a specific threat), and major events.

b. An American Liaison Network coordinator, if assigned, prepares lists of citizen liaison volunteers and other contacts to cover areas of assigned responsibilities. The citizen liaison volunteers prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers, e-mails, and addresses of US citizens residing in their assigned areas. The consular section transmits several types of alerts to US citizens electronically, but there may be instances during crises where local infrastructure fails or inhibits the delivery of timely messages. If necessary, these messages for the local US community may be relayed from the embassy or consulate to citizen liaison volunteers for dissemination by any means available. During an evacuation, each citizen liaison volunteer receives and distributes messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation and other relevant information.

c. **Shortwave Radio and Commercial Telephone.** Frequently, US citizens and foreign nationals reside outside the large population centers. Embassy contact with these individuals may be restricted to shortwave radio, which is not secure. Shortwave radio should be used to notify these individuals only if better means are not available.



*Emergency action plans vary, depending upon the embassy's physical characteristics (such as landing zones, evacuation gates, and walls), proximity to populated areas, and its security configuration.*

d. **Recall.** In some cases, a recall system for embassy or consulate personnel is the embassy emergency and evacuation radio system. It is usually fast, reliable, and efficient.

e. **Runners.** In the event of a severe communications outage, personnel acting as runners may be the only way to pass information.


f. **Other Forms of Notification.** Several other forms of communication to get information to potential evacuees could include establishing a website or using an existing USG website (such as the DOS website), social media, American Forces Network, and “over-the-top” messaging applications (e.g., WhatsApp), especially encrypted applications. Only the minimum unclassified information necessary should be posted and should be used if no better means are available.

g. DOS applies the USG’s “no-double-standard” policy to important security threat information. Generally, if information is shared with the official US community, the same or similar information should also be made available to private US citizens and nationals, to the extent that the underlying threat also applies to them. It is DOS policy to make available to private US citizens, on a reimbursable basis, any USG-facilitated evacuation option planned for the official USG community, when appropriate and feasible, on a space-available basis.

**6. Notification Phases**

a. Understanding the phases in which potential evacuees are notified is essential in developing a sensible evacuation plan. Figure IV-2 delineates typical notification phases.

b. **Drawdown.** The options for drawdown are authorized departure and ordered departure. Departure may be authorized or ordered when it is of national interest or if there is imminent danger to the life of the employee or the lives of the dependents of the employee. When a drawdown is necessary to protect the lives of US citizens, the COM may act on their own authority. In all other circumstances, however, prior approval from



**Figure IV-2. Notification Phases**

DOS must be obtained. The embassy, referred to as the post, prepares a list of personnel to remain at the post in an emergency situation. The list of employees to remain includes those needed to manage an eventual evacuation of US citizens. Before this happens, DOD issues an order to stop forward movement of military dependents, nonessential DOD civilian employees and their families, families of essential DOD civilian employees, and DOD dependents schools' staff and faculty, as appropriate.

### (1) Authorized Departure

(a) The COM requests authorized departure status from DOS. Employees who wish to leave the post obtain approval from the COM. Family members who wish to leave the post as an official evacuee also obtain approval from the COM. Family members who wish to leave the post not as an official evacuee may do so at any time. When the authorized departure status is terminated, the official evacuees return to the post.

(b) Voluntary departure of command-sponsored military dependents, nonessential DOD civilian employees and their families, families of essential DOD civilian employees, and DOD dependents schools' staff and faculty to an announced safe haven is encouraged and authorized at government expense, with return also at government expense. These government-authorized expenses do not apply to local US citizens who do not have service agreements for return transportation to the United States at government expense.

### (2) Ordered Departure

(a) When the COM determines a situation has deteriorated to a point that family members and certain employees should leave the post for their safety, orders are issued for them to leave. When the ordered departure status is terminated, official evacuees return to the post.

(b) Mandatory departure of some or all categories of personnel and dependents (such as military dependents, nonessential DOD civilian employees, DOD dependents schools and their families, families of essential DOD civilian employees, and staff and faculty) to designated safe havens is directed by DOS, with implementation of the theater evacuation plan. Historically, DOS accomplishes most ordered departures using commercial transportation (scheduled or chartered), without the use of military personnel or assistance. However, DOS may request a DOD-assisted NEO (using DOD organic or chartered transportation) based on the nature of the threat or the lack of availability of alternative forms of transportation.

c. **Evacuation.** The decision to evacuate personnel assumes that the decision to draw down, at least in part, has been made. When feasible, notification of potential evacuees involves communicating via electronically transmitted alerts and the American Liaison Network. As a rule, written messages are more reliable than oral messages and should be used whenever possible. There are four notification phases for an evacuation (see Appendix D, "Sample Notice Form," for an example of a security alert):

(1) **Shelter in Place.** When a country's political or security environment has deteriorated and it is perceived that US citizens are threatened, but an evacuation is either not required or is temporarily impossible, US citizens are requested to "shelter in place" and are given preliminary instructions for preparing to evacuate the country. The embassy activates its EAC. The embassy's personnel review the evacuation plans, options, and support requirements, and the COM may consider requesting military assistance. All military dependents, nonessential DOD civilian employees and their families, families of essential DOD civilian employees, and DOD dependents schools' staff and faculty are required to shelter in place and take appropriate precautions to limit harm since immediate movement involves unacceptable risks. The CDR may direct the deployment of a liaison team, activate crisis response teams, and assign a subordinate JFC to assist with coordination of resources, as appropriate.

(2) **Leave Commercial.** Due to the gravity of the situation, nonessential US citizens may be told to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If commercial transport is not available or adequate, the US embassy may coordinate for increased commercial flights or contract flights to assist US citizens departing voluntarily. The following other actions may take place: the embassy's internal security force may be reinforced by additional MSGs and/or DOS security personnel, or a JTF may be formed to assist in the evacuation. The COM might also request the deployment of a small JTF liaison team to the embassy to assist in evacuation planning and in anticipation of the requirement for military assistance to conduct the evacuation.

(3) **Evacuation.** When the political or security environment is believed to have deteriorated to the point that the safety of US citizens is threatened, the COM (with DOS approval) orders the departure of the personnel listed in subparagraph 8.c., "Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance," keeping only essential personnel of the country team. The embassy assembles, documents, and begins assisting in the movement of US citizens, HN nationals, and TCNs to designated safe haven sites. Per DOS policy, safe haven in the United States is not available for either TCNs or foreign service nationals. Requests for exceptions are sent to SECSTATE for a decision. A mix of commercial charter, private, or military transport might be necessary, depending on the availability of scheduled commercial transportation. At some point in this phase, the COM might request military assistance, either because the transportation means are inadequate or because of the severity of the threat to the evacuees. Once requested, the CDR, upon direction from SecDef through the CJCS, commences military evacuation operations. These may range from simple transportation support to the deployment of a JTF.

### THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS

**The United States Government (USG) will consider evacuating third-country nationals (TCNs) and host-country nationals (HCNs) on a case-by-case and space available/reimbursable basis when doing so serves United States (US) interests. In doing so, the United States will coordinate with allies to share the burden of evacuations to the extent possible, and will keep other nations informed of US plans.**

Many countries rely on the United States to evacuate their nationals during a crisis. Current procedures have not resulted in effective planning for the evacuation of TCNs and HCNs or coordination with other countries who may be able to provide evacuation assistance. This lack of coordination complicates evacuation planning, increases costs to the USG, and endangers successful evacuation of American citizens.

Current policy on evacuation of TCN is outlined in the Department of State's (DOS's) *Emergency Planning Handbook*, 12 FAH [*Foreign Affairs Handbook*] 1512(g). Essentially this provision states that in the event of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), the USG will consider extending—on a humanitarian, space available but reimbursable basis—evacuation assistance to foreign nationals.

In practice, we have repeatedly assisted virtually all governments requesting assistance in evacuating their nationals from countries in which a NEO has become necessary. Military planning is hindered by underestimating potential evacuees.

DOS refrains from entering into formal agreements with other governments on the evacuation of their nationals. We have two long-standing agreements with the Canadians and British to consult with each other with respect to evacuation planning. All foreign governments (including Canadian and British) are urged to plan for their own nationals' evacuation and not to depend on USG resources.

*Adapted from the Memorandum of Agreement Between the  
Departments of State and Defense on the Protection and Evacuation of  
US Citizens and Nationals and Designated Other Persons from  
Threatened Areas Overseas*

(4) **Embassy or Post Closing.** The situation may deteriorate to the point that the embassy must close and all remaining US citizens and embassy employees must be evacuated. This does not include private US citizens and their dependents who desire to remain in the country. A list of personnel who cannot be ordered to depart a country is provided in subparagraph 8.c., "Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance." Military assistance might not be required until this phase of the evacuation. JTF operations could range from removing the remainder of the country team to full-scale evacuation operations.

## 7. Evacuee Identification

a. The first question most often asked by both diplomatic and military planners is, "Who are the potential evacuees?" The COM may direct some to evacuate and some may volunteer to leave. Understanding how evacuees are organized, notified, and moved to assembly areas helps in determining the number and assembly time estimates.

**b. Report of Potential Evacuees.** The report of potential evacuees is also known as the F-77 report. Each embassy or consulate is required to submit to DOS an annual F-77 report, between 1 January and 1 February, of the estimated number of potential evacuees.

(1) F-77 reports are the planning tool of DOS; however, they are only yearly estimates. The F-77 report is based upon US citizens registering themselves with the embassy or consulate when they are in the country. Many fail to register. The general level of interest in the potential for an evacuation increases the accuracy of the report. The estimate may also vary due to seasonally dependent tourism.

(2) Experience indicates the evacuee totals on most F-77 reports are generally too low. If the country populace suddenly perceives a threat, panic ensues and evacuee numbers increase dramatically.

**c. Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance**

(1) The following categories of personnel are eligible for evacuation assistance and can be ordered to depart and may not return until DOS and the COM agree to it:

(a) All USG personnel in country under COM authority at the time of the order, and their eligible family members, are subject to the drawdown. This includes all temporary duty (TDY) personnel, including TDY foreign service nationals;

(b) Peace Corps direct-hire staff, as USG employees under COM authority;

(c) US-hired interns, whether paid or unpaid. Interns should be considered nonemergency employees and included in departure and drawdown plans; and

(d) Foreign service nationals and TCNs in country on TDY are included in drawdown arrangements.

(2) During a NEO, DOS establishes the priority of evacuated personnel based on US law, US policy, and conditions in the operational environment. The following categories of personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance but cannot be ordered to depart and may return at their own discretion and at their expense:

(a) Members of household (MOHs) of a US direct-hire employee. MOHs are defined in 3 FAM [Foreign Affairs Manual]-4180, *Members of Households (MOHs)*, as those persons who accompany or join an employee assigned abroad and whom the employee has declared to the COM are part of their household, who will reside on post with the employee, and who are other than legitimate domestic staff. MOHs who are US citizens should be provided the same evacuation assistance as private American citizens. MOHs who are not US citizens should also be rendered evacuation assistance, either to the United States if documented for entry or otherwise eligible to enter as determined by the post with assistance from CIS [DHS's Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services]

as necessary or to a third country if documented or otherwise determined to be eligible for entry. The MOHs are personally responsible for their travel costs.

(b) Locally employed staff, including foreign service nationals and TCN employees. The USG does not evacuate locally hired foreign service national employees. Where there is a clear threat to the welfare of such an employee due to their employment with USG, contact the hiring bureau's executive office to coordinate with human resources/office of overseas employment. TCNs may be considered for advanced homeward passage (to country of origin or place of local hire) or evacuation travel on a case-by-case basis. Safe haven in the United States is not available for either TCNs or foreign service nationals.

(c) As private American citizens, Fulbright grantees do not fall under COM authority and cannot be ordered to depart, but as USG-sponsored grantees, they should be strongly urged to follow procedures, security, and safety advice established by the COM. If grantees refuse to leave, their status and all benefits, including stipends, may be removed, and they will be required to accept personal responsibility, in a signed statement, for remaining in country. The PAO/Fulbright Commission should facilitate the departure of any grantees and/or dependents who wish to leave the country and notify the DOS Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the status of grantees. Announcements ordering the departure of USG dependents and/or nonemergency personnel require an evaluation of the Fulbright program's viability in country.

(d) Peace Corps volunteers do not fall under COM authority and cannot be ordered to depart.

(e) TCN. The USG is not obligated to provide specific evacuation assistance to any third countries. If posts are approached by third countries for evacuation assistance, such requests should be referred to the regional bureau and appropriate DOS offices.

(3) As a general rule, the priorities for evacuation assistance are:

(a) Priority I: US citizens,

(b) Priority II: Dependents of US citizens,

(c) Priority III: Eligible TCN and foreign service national employees of USG,

(d) Priority IV: Eligible non-US citizens who are seriously ill or injured or whose lives are in imminent peril (but who do not qualify for a higher priority), and

(e) Priority V: Other eligible persons.

(4) Planners should keep in mind that facilities to process US citizens may become overwhelmed if the points of departure do not have the required processing

facilities to handle non-US citizens and the volume of people. To the maximum degree possible, non-US citizens should fly on commercial aircraft to major international airports. When military airfields/military aircraft are used and non-US citizens are a part of the evacuation, initiate reception planning with DOS and the HN if another country is designated as a safe haven, or if evacuating to the United States, DHS should be notified as far in advance as possible.

## **8. Coordination with Senior In-Country Military Officials**

a. The JFC should establish and maintain close liaison with the SDO/DATT. The SDO/DATT is able to assist in the coordination of JTF activities with the embassy and to assist the JFC in obtaining the COM's evaluation of the situation. Additionally, the SDO/DATT is able to provide information on the general scope of in-country activities for all DOD non-CCMD elements, including missions, locations, organizations, and unique security requirements.

b. As part of the planning process, the JFC prepares a commander's estimate covering the various options deemed feasible and any pros and cons relating to each, including diplomatic/political constraints. The CJCS or CCDR warning order normally provides the JFC with a concise statement of the US national interests at stake in the NEO, to include:

- (1) The safety and welfare of US citizens.
- (2) The continued stability of the local government.
- (3) The maintenance of a firm posture against terrorism.
- (4) A demonstration of support for international commitments.
- (5) The probable environment in which the NEO is to be conducted.

c. The COM summarizes the objectives and constraints relevant to the JTF's assistance, the nuances involved, and any constraints on the use of force that might be appropriate. While these may be obvious to those intimately involved with the situation, the JFC is better prepared to assist if the reasons have been clearly explained.

## **9. Embassy Security and Operations**

a. Security outside the embassy is the responsibility of the HN, while security of the COM and embassy grounds is the responsibility of the RSO. In some cases, US embassies do not have armed security forces. The RSO typically oversees a contingent of local guards along with DOS security personnel and may have an MSG detachment to accomplish this mission.

b. Local guards or HN security personnel control the perimeter of each embassy. These personnel may or may not be armed. The quality of the local guard force varies by country, but most local guard forces are likely staffed with personnel who have proven

their loyalty to the embassy's staff. These local guards can be very useful in assisting US forces assigned to perimeter security duty. Accordingly, planning for numbers to be evacuated should include this additional group. In addition, in the event these guards desire to be evacuated at the last minute, consideration must be made for replacement security.

c. The MSG detachment personnel receive their orders from the RSO, while JTF personnel receive their orders from the JFC. These command relationships can create challenges, especially when MSG personnel and JTF personnel work together during the evacuation operation. It is vital that the JTF staff work out missions and command relationships before the operation. The JFC should understand the COM's security plan and have knowledge of the country team plan to integrate and synchronize actions.

d. The embassy evacuation plans may not provide for the embassy site to be a primary assembly area or evacuation site. However, experience shows that during times of crisis large numbers of US citizens, citizens of the HN, and TCNs go to the US embassy. These people are frightened and may want to leave the country but may not have been included in the notification plan or could not reach the designated assembly area or evacuation site. Separate plans should be developed to deal with these crowds, both as a threat to the embassy and as evacuees.

e. Local citizens wishing to volunteer information may arrive at the embassy perimeter without prior notice and are called walk-ins. Embassies have standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the treatment of walk-ins designed to ensure quick and secure access to the appropriate embassy officers. JTFs should familiarize themselves with these SOPs.

f. MSGs control access into critical facilities where classified material is processed and stored. MSGs have reaction plans to defend these facilities and destroy or evacuate sensitive material or equipment, if necessary.

### **10. Intermediate Staging Base Considerations**

a. The JFC may determine that an ISB is needed to support the NEO. Selecting an ISB is a time-sensitive issue. DOS informs the CCDR of the location and availability of countries for establishment of possible ISBs.

b. The JFC should ensure the ISB meets operational requirements and advise DOS of these requirements. The considerations for selecting an ISB are as follows:

(1) Be capable of handling the aircraft or ships used in the evacuation.

(2) Possess effective communication with JTF and CCMD HQ, advance party, ECC, temporary safe haven, ISB, and the embassy.

(3) Have adequate facilities for billeting, messing, provision of emergency medical treatment, and sanitation for the evacuation force and evacuees, if used as the temporary safe haven.

- (4) Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft.
- (5) Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical supplies (i.e., cold storage for pharmaceuticals); and ammunition.
- (6) Be close to major medical facilities, if possible.
- (7) Be located to provide maximum possible operations security (OPSEC).
- (8) Have overflight and access rights IAW the *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*.
- (9) Have a PA contingency plan for planned or “no-notice” media presence.
- (10) Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the evacuation can transit without refueling.
- (11) Have adequate local and area security forces to protect US personnel and equipment. This protection could be accomplished either by the HN or by security forces from the deployed ISB support element.

## 11. Repatriation Considerations

a. Repatriation is the procedure whereby US citizens are officially processed back into the United States following evacuation from overseas. Repatriation is not a part of, but subsequent to, a NEO. The ideal case for an evacuation is normally to have the safe haven in the United States, in which repatriation occurs. Because there may be a seamless transition between the NEO and the repatriation, NEO planners should have an understanding of repatriation considerations.

b. Repatriation planning considerations include:

(1) Any coordination requirements among CCDRs, DOS, DHHS, and other USG departments and agencies. CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM are responsible for receiving noncombatant evacuees to the United States and/or US territories within their respective AORs.

(2) Suitability and capacity of the airfield and/or port for the aircraft or ships being used for the repatriation to the United States.

(3) Coordination of the flow and transportation of evacuees to the ports or airfields for debarkation.

(4) Point of debarkation or arrival in the United States for the evacuees.

(5) Funding or special allowances for Service members and their family members.

(6) Evacuee family assistance during repatriation (housing, food and drinking water, personal hygiene, toiletries, and others).

(7) Media and PA.

(8) Medical issues with evacuees (includes any US restriction of movement/quarantine requirements).

(9) Evacuee pets.

(10) Required documentation per Department of Defense Form (DD) 2585, *Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet*.

(11) Adequate security for the evacuees during the repatriation.

(12) Adequate support for the Automated Repatriation Reporting System.

(13) Shared understanding of the types and extent of interagency partners' refugee support provided at overseas vetting sites and US relocation sites, including security, force protection, liaison and coordination, and disposition of specific individuals.

## 12. Other Planning Considerations

As planners develop the plan for the NEO, additional consideration should include:

a. **NEO Transition and Termination Criteria.** The JFC and the COM should determine when to transition to other operations or to terminate a NEO within the context of the JFC's joint campaign and the COM's requirements for support in an evacuation, as applicable. The criteria as to when the NEO is complete should be understood. The situation may deteriorate to the point that combat or other operations are required and a transition to those operations occurs.

b. **Prioritization of Multiple or Simultaneous NEOs.** Situations could occur in which multiple NEOs in different areas within one nation, several nations, or more than one AOR may be necessary. Prioritization may be required to execute multiple and simultaneous NEOs by DOS, DOD, and the CCMD(s). Planning considerations with respect to resources and capabilities may become considerably more complex in such a scenario. The CCDR needs to synchronize plans with non-DOD mission partners during campaign planning to maximize unified action. This situation is further exacerbated in the event of a multinational NEO, which requires intricate planning to determine prioritization of limited resources and facilities.

c. **Interpreters.** NEO planners should determine the requirement for interpreters and their source, as necessary, in the evacuation. Dedicated and competent interpreters may be available and should be sought, but lessons from recent operations show the need for pre-operation, unit-level identification and deliberate leveraging of unit members with basic language skills. The evacuation force may need to bring its own interpreters if the

requirements cannot be met in the HN. Sourcing solutions could be available through the embassy, HN government, or contracting with the local community and other non-DOD mission partners where habitual relationships may exist. The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command can provide linguist services through the Department of Defense Language Interpretation and Translation Enterprise, on behalf of SECARMY who serves as the DOD executive agent for the Contract Linguist Program. Contracting for interpretation or translation in support of a NEO should not be assumed to be sourced from the evacuee population, as they may have overriding personal concerns that prevent their quick integration and support of DOD. Planners should not view this population as a ready linguist force.

#### **d. Communication and Information Sharing**

(1) Unified action involves multiple USG departments and agencies, NGOs, private organizations, and multinational partners. The ability to plan, synchronize, collaborate, and execute the entire range of NEO mission-related activities is enhanced by the ability of all mission partners to share and exchange critical information in a single language and at a mission-specific classification and releasability level. These attributes are addressed through network federation and actions within a collaborative environment.

(a) Standing bilateral and multi-lateral networks based on diplomatic relationships may help to provide mission partner information sharing and support the early evacuation planning and training with partner nations.

(b) Prior to the commencement of the NEO, the JFC may need to establish a communications network that enables enhanced information sharing with specific mission partners who have agreed to participate in the evacuation operation. To provide for equal peer-to-peer information sharing in a USG-led joint force NEO, network contributions made by the US military and USG and international organizations, as well as multinational participants, should be configured to best enable a trusted, protected, and equal sharing of information to support the evacuation.

(2) In addition to the typical network systems associated with other operations, the NTS, which is specific to evacuations, plays a critical role in evacuee processing by tracking and sharing information on evacuee movement. NTS terminals should be located at all DOD-operated evacuation sites, to include ECCs, aerial and sea ports of embarkation, aerial and sea ports of debarkation, and temporary safe havens. Planning considerations for the NTS include operator training, availability of a sufficient number of NTS terminals, and required associated personnel to be NTS operators to adequately support the NEO.

(3) The JFC should plan communications paths between the evacuation site(s), temporary safe havens, and debarkation sites and DOD's authoritative biometric data repository for individuals whose biometric data were collected as a part of the NEO. This repository is maintained by SECARMY and can be useful in identifying and helping to screen individuals. Employing this capability requires biometric collection sets and access to support identity analysis.

*For more information on communications, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

e. Medical, dental, veterinary, PR, mortuary affairs, PA, information activities, and CBRN planning considerations can be found in Chapter V, “Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures.”

f. Safe haven planning considerations can be found in Chapter VII, “Safe Haven and Repatriation Operations.”

g. Planners should also examine any ROE and legal considerations during the NEO planning. Appendix A, “Rules of Engagement,” contains more information on ROE, and Appendix B, “Legal Considerations,” contains additional information for legal planning.

h. Contractors authorized to accompany the force and some designated contractors not authorized to accompany the force will be visible in the SPOT-ES [Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker-Enterprise Suite]. Planners should access data through this system to augment visibility of contractors, especially US contractors who are eligible for evacuation.

### 13. Multinational Planning Considerations

a. Since many evacuations involve other nations, the potential use of an MNF in a NEO should be a planning consideration. Detailed multinational planning and training (to include exercises) are important factors in ensuring a successful operation. An ID is important to start detailed planning, since it establishes the authority and parameters for the NEO and includes guidance regarding the situation, objectives, mission, participating nations, and timing. Unity of effort within an MNF should be established as early in the operation as possible, especially in a time-sensitive NEO.

b. A multinational NEO may be conducted in four phases: **preparatory operations, preliminary operations, evacuation operations, and withdrawal and redeployment.** These phases are usually sequential but may have significant overlap.

(1) **Preparatory Operations.** Activities during this phase include gathering intelligence, generating the MNF, training and rehearsals, logistic buildup, and other administrative preparations.

(2) **Preliminary Operations.** During this phase, the MNF likely deploys to a secure ISB(s), which may be known as forward mounting bases; identifies evacuation points; and assists in the establishment of the ECC as required. If the NEO is conducted in a hostile environment, this phase may include forcible entry operations or operations to shape the operational environment.

(3) **Evacuation Operations.** The main effort during this phase is the safe and swift evacuation of evacuees enabled by a rapid insertion of the MNF. The MNF should secure vital areas; support reception centers, ECCs, and embarkation points; support the evacuation; and provide force protection.

(4) **Withdrawal and Redeployment.** The objective of a NEO is the safe evacuation of all noncombatant evacuees to designated safe havens and the withdrawal of the MNF. Thereafter, redeployment to home station or to other tasks normally occurs.

c. When developing the plan for a multinational NEO, planners should:

(1) Review all available evacuation contingency plans, to include the post's drawdown and evacuation response plan in the EAP.

(2) Perform a commander's estimate. Planning considerations for a multinational NEO are contained in AJP-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*.

(3) Obtain, through direct liaison(s), the unique operational limitations (e.g., regarding the use of force), security plans, procedures for "walk-ins," and plans for the protection/evacuation/destruction of classified material from the COM(s) relevant to the MNF's assistance.

(4) Develop/modify an OPLAN through the appropriate multinational planning process.

**d. Logistics Planning**



*Evacuees board a Royal Thai Navy Landing Craft, Utility in a noncombatant evacuation operation, conducted by United States Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Royal Thai Marines, and members of the Japanese Defense Force at Hat Yao, Kingdom of Thailand during Exercise COBRA GOLD.*

(1) **Support.** NEOs, by their very nature, normally occur in nations where there is seldom a logistic support structure established by one or any of the partner nations. Therefore, **the only guarantee of sufficient logistic support is if the MNF provides its own or makes solid short-notice, in-country support arrangements.** A logistic estimate must be conducted to ascertain requirements. Although not an exhaustive list, some of the support arrangements that could be established are as follows:

(a) If a legitimate government exists, and there is sufficient time to negotiate an agreement, the implementation of HNS under an umbrella MOU can be arranged.

(b) In cases where an HNS agreement is not practical, resources may still be obtained locally. In-country resources, in the form of local contracts, can be made between the MNF and individual civilian providers, rather than the national government acting as a guarantor of support. Evaluate contractor capabilities at commercial hubs near the NEO site. Due to natural disasters or contingency operations, there may be limited commercial capabilities at NEO locations. Additionally, purchasing local commercial resources during a natural disaster or contingency may not be possible or cause additional hardship for local communities.

(2) **Organization.** Partner nations are normally expected to provide all the personnel and equipment required to conduct their portion of the NEO. Further, nations may be required to transfer some level of authority over their national logistic force contributions, at an agreed time, for a specified period. In an extensive NEO, the MNFC may establish a multinational logistic command, which may consist of an operational element and a multinational joint logistic center, as its core.

*Refer to AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, for more information on planning considerations for multinational NEOs.*

#### **14. Assessment and After Action Report Considerations**

a. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint forces during military operations and determines the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. A NEO presents a unique challenge in assessment. If done correctly, the duration of a NEO is not long enough to actually observe indicators of performance and adapt the operation, especially since the NEO is conducted to evacuate personnel out of harm's way and not create an effect on the enemy.

b. **Measures of Performance.** Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature but can also reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Within a NEO, this translates to the actual conduct of the NEO and getting as many personnel evacuated as soon as possible. Inasmuch as a NEO is conducted to evacuate personnel from a threatened area, the time allowed is not up to the evacuation force. The event or incident that precipitated the evacuation controls the timeline allowed for evacuation. The time available for the conduct of a NEO is unpredictable.

(1) An assessment of a NEO is complex. The documentation during planning and observations during execution lends a great deal to a thorough after action report on the NEO. For a NEO, the after action report suffices as the assessment of the operation.

(2) When the planning for a NEO begins, it is important to document all steps and observations during the planning process; no detail should go unnoticed. As planning progresses and the situation in the evacuation area worsens, the timeline for the conduct of the NEO may become obvious and the decision to conduct the NEO will come from a higher authority.

(3) Every NEO is unique and situation-dependent. Only through accurate documentation can the joint force learn how to execute the next NEO in a more efficient and effective manner. Success may be measured by a wide variety of ways, such as the number of personnel evacuated to a safe haven or the safe evacuation of at-risk personnel due to illness or injury.

*For further information on assessment, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

### **c. Assessment Metrics**

(1) Assessment of operations and activities is key to the commander's decision cycle. Assessing the joint force's use and leveraging of information in preparation for a NEO is invaluable for insight on the operational area in which the NEO is to be conducted.

(2) Staff estimates are continually updated based on changes in the situation. Maintaining a running staff estimate for each joint function that may impact the NEO is essential.

(3) Other factors that may complicate the assessment of information activities prior to a NEO include:

(a) Intelligence assets may not have the ability to directly gather the necessary data on a relevant actor in a timely manner.

(b) Logistical challenges related to capturing accurate data, particularly in hostile or uncertain environments.

(c) Rapidly changing conditions that affect the accuracy and volume of data that is able to be collected.

(d) Requirement for resource-intensive continual and cyclical assessments prior to the NEO execution.

**d. Integrating assessment into planning and execution from the outset.** Integrating assessment into the planning effort is essential for a NEO. Identifying and understanding the decision points of a NEO are key to success or failure. The assessment

process, which includes detailed JIPOE products, is designed to improve the understanding of the operational environment, including understanding of the causal links between friendly operations, activities, and investments and changes in the operational environment; creating conditions favorable to mission accomplishment; and identifying actionable opportunities and risk mitigation measures to improve the likelihood of mission success.

*For more information on risk, see Appendix F, “Operational Risk and Safety.”*

## CHAPTER V EMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION OPERATION PROCEDURES

*“To the extent feasible and practical, DOD [Department of Defense] will use similar support systems and processes regardless of the nature of the evacuation (authorized or ordered, regardless of whether NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] has been declared).”*

**Department of Defense Directive 3025.14, *Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad***

### 1. Evacuation Plan Implementation

a. While the military may play a key role in planning and conducting the operation, it is most often viewed as the last resort in a series of evacuation options. It is important for the JFC and staff to understand this role when preparing a plan for the evacuation. It might be quite natural to assume that the evacuation is a unilateral military operation and prepare the evacuation plan in a vacuum, ignoring the COM’s requirements and perspective for the NEO. The military and DOS representatives conduct extensive coordination to develop a feasible and supportable military plan that supports the COM’s requirements and objectives.

b. **Evacuation Site Operations.** Operations at the evacuation site are clearly delineated between those performed by DOS personnel and those performed by the JTF. However, in cases of emergency, the JTF should be prepared to perform functions that are normally executed by embassy staff. This includes an awareness of movement plans using commercial and private aircraft, ships, and vehicles and all COAs being considered by the COM.

c. **Authority to Invoke.** Once SECSTATE approves an evacuation, the COM has the authority to implement the plan in a crisis. DOS, acting on the advice of the COM, determines when US citizens and foreign nationals are to be evacuated. When unexpected violence flares up or appears imminent and communications with DOS are cut off, the COM may invoke such elements of the plan and initiate such actions as the situation warrants.

### 2. Intermediate Staging Base

a. An ISB is a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the HN. Use of an ISB during deployment provides the JFC many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station and the likelihood of hostilities increase. The ISB may be located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under US control. Ideally, the ISB also functions as a temporary safe haven, if one is required. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces such as additional airlift for



*Briefing of the evacuation plan to joint task force personnel at an evacuation control center.*

unforeseen movement requirements and/or combat forces (e.g., air units capable of offensive attacks and airborne infantry units) in the event that a forcible entry is required.

b. **Advantages.** The items shown in Figure V-1 can be accomplished at the ISB.

c. **Coordination.** When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, DOS coordinates with the government of that country. If the ISB is an established US base

### Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base

- The joint force commander can finalize evacuation plans.
- The joint task force staff can gather additional information, including intelligence.
- The joint task force can conduct rehearsals and briefings.
- Units have the opportunity to redistribute and finalize loads.
- Personnel can recuperate after a long trip from their deploying base.
- A reaction force or additional security personnel can pre-stage for contingency operations.
- It can function as the temporary safe haven for the operation.

**Figure V-1. Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base**

in a foreign country, using the ISB as a staging point for launching forces into another country can pose significant diplomatic/political issues. Since ISBs are typically airfields or seaports, the supported CCDR should query USTRANSCOM for available transportation infrastructure on-hand information related to facilities and sites being considered as likely ISBs.

d. **Composition.** The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is required and what is already on site at the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern facility requires substantially less than one at a lesser developed location. Some considerations for the ISB force are as follows:

- (1) Maintenance and service personnel for aircraft and/or ships.
- (2) Liaison with the embassy and civilian agencies (police, military, customs, and others, as required).
- (3) Translators.
- (4) Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, passenger staging areas, sanitation, and biometric enrollment.
- (5) Contracts for local services and supplies.
- (6) Local security.
- (7) Air traffic control and airfield management.
- (8) Movement control.
- (9) HN medical infrastructure.
- (10) Overflight rights.

### 3. Advance Party

a. As early as possible in the planning, the JFC forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. The advance party may consist of two elements: the FCE and the evacuation site party. In a permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE should be inserted before the evacuation site party arrives. In a hostile environment, the COM's decision may be to insert the entire evacuation force to immediately commence the operation. **The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and HN authorities (when authorized by DOS) and establishes a communication link among the JFC, supported CCDR, and DOS. Additionally, the supported CCDR may want direct representation with the COM during a NEO. The evacuation site party conducts reconnaissance to determine and establish assembly**

**areas and evacuation sites.** If the JFC elects not to deploy an evacuation site party, the FCE is responsible for all of the duties normally assigned to the evacuation site party.

**b. Preparation and Planning.** Deployment of the advance party depends on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and diplomatic/political considerations. The least conspicuous method is for the advance party to arrive in the HN in civilian clothes on civilian aircraft. This is possible only if the necessary passport and visa arrangements can be made and the environment is permissive. An uncertain or hostile environment may require forcible entry. Use of military aircraft enables the advance party to carry additional equipment that may be needed in setting up the evacuation site and establishing communication and liaison. The following advance party tasks should be accomplished during this phase:

(1) Request permission from the COM for the advance party to enter the country. The number of FCE members recommended and the insertion method should be specified.

(2) Deploy as soon as possible, and in advance of the main body, to allow maximum time for coordination and to determine external support requirements.

(3) Develop and brief a communication plan for the advance party.

(4) Acquire and review appropriate maps and GEOINT.

(5) Review the embassy's EAP and the EAP checklists, examples of which are provided in Appendix C, "Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists."

(6) Assemble and inspect required equipment.

(7) Develop and brief a PR plan for the advance party.

(8) Obtain visitor visas for all members of the advance party.

(9) Due to possible sensitivity of the political situation in the HN, determine whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes.

(10) Consider weapon and ammunition requirements, to include nonlethal weapons and munitions, based on the threat assessment and limitations imposed by the COM.

(11) Examine the need for specialized equipment (e.g., ordnance to assist DOS officials in destruction of classified equipment and documents) or sufficient SATCOM systems to establish communications with the JTF or CCMD HQ.

(12) Determine the medical requirements.

(13) Identify interpreter requirements.

(14) In coordination with the embassy, request overflight and landing rights for appropriate nations IAW the *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*.

(15) Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO; obtain assistance to create requests for information to fill gaps created by missing data.

(16) Assess news media interest in the situation and activities of the JTF and its involvement in the evacuation.

(17) Develop location/staging area to segregate medical evacuees from general evacuees, if practical.

(18) Be prepared to report casualties IAW DODI 1300.18, *Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures*.

c. **FCE.** The FCE coordinates with the COM and members of the country team for information and assistance. The FCE normally submits situation reports to the JFC. When the main body enters the country, the FCE rejoins the evacuation force and continues operations with the JTF HQ.

d. **FCE Functions and Personnel.** The JFC, in coordination with the COM or the COM's designated representative, determines the size and composition of the FCE. The FCE size is often limited by the physical constraints of the US embassy and other factors, so FCE members may need to perform multiple functions as required. The FCE may include the following personnel with their associated responsibilities or functions:

(1) **Officer in Charge (OIC).** Provides direct liaison with the senior DOS official at the embassy to ensure orders of the JFC and the desires of DOS are accomplished.

(2) **Personnel Officer**

(a) Coordinate as required with medical team and mortuary affairs personnel to identify casualties.

(b) Ensure casualties are reported IAW DODI 1300.18, *Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures*.

(3) **Intelligence Officer**

(a) Provides a conduit for intelligence directly from the embassy and evacuation sites.

(b) Coordinates with the DAO, COS, and RSO to provide the evacuation force updated intelligence estimates. The DAO can facilitate access to the daily embassy situation reports and other intelligence.

(c) Obtains information and intelligence products, including GIBCO, to satisfy JTF intelligence requirements from the country team and other embassy sources.

(d) Considers the following when conducting JIPOE and developing priority intelligence requirements and other intelligence requirements:

1. Current weather conditions, climatological, tidal, astronomical, and lunar phase data.

2. Assets, characteristics, and capabilities of ports, airfields, beaches, LZs, drop zones (DZs), and key facilities of the HN government for communications, utilities, and health services.

3. Identification of adversary and hostile forces and threat systems, including local government forces, rebel groups, dissident forces, student groups, and unorganized mob action, with the focus on their location and potential to become organized. Collection must be IAW US law and policy.

4. Identification of any third parties that may attempt to hinder evacuation operations.

5. Identification of friendly third parties that could assist the NEO.

6. Potential for hostile infiltration of evacuees.

7. Imagery and other GEOINT products of required areas (if available).

8. JTF-provided data on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance products that may include full-motion video, signals intelligence, electro-optical/infrared, biometric signatures, and identity intelligence.

9. Liaison with intelligence representatives of other US, third-country, and HN agencies as appropriate.

10. Need for interpreters to assist with debriefings or conduct liaison with foreign nationals as required.

(e) Provides pertinent medical intelligence in support of the NEO to medical staff.

(f) Provides pertinent engineering obstacle intelligence in support of NEO movement and logistics.

#### **(4) Operations Officer**

(a) Briefs DOS representatives on the capabilities of the advance party and the JTF.

(b) Answers operational questions concerning the evacuation plan. Briefs the OIC concerning any information the embassy presents that may affect the evacuation plan.

(c) Ensures support is provided to manifest noncombatant evacuees using the DOD NTS or other appropriate tracking means.

(d) Assesses the requirement for deployment of combat forces.

(e) Defines and identifies strategic and/or theater lift requirements.

(f) Coordinates pet policy with DOS representative so veterinary support can be planned, if required.

**(5) Logistics Officer**

(a) Synchronizes and aligns logistics operations with DOS, HN, CCMDs, joint forces, other USG departments and agencies, and multinational partners.

(b) Coordinates HN transportation needed by the advance party and JTF.

(c) In coordination with the contracting officer, arranges for supplies the JTF needs but cannot bring (e.g., water [to include drinking water], fuel, medical supplies, and rations).

(d) In consultation with the contracting officer, coordinates nonorganic JTF heavy equipment and materials handling equipment support.

(e) Provides on-site logistic assistance to facilitate the evacuation.

(f) In consultation with the contracting officer, coordinates and/or executes contractual HNS agreements and maintains awareness of other non-DOD capabilities and resources. May be augmented by the contracting officer or field ordering officer/paying agent to enable obligation of government funds on-site as requirements and commercial capabilities are identified.

(g) Reviews strategic and/or theater lift requests for logistic constraints and feasibility.

**(6) Security Officer**

(a) Coordinates with the SDO/DATT, RSO, and/or MSG on security matters.

(b) Determines and advises the OIC on security requirements before and during the NEO.

**(7) Communications Detachment**

(a) Sets up and operates necessary communications equipment.

(b) Determines areas of compatibility and interoperability between the advance element, JFC, COM, HN military, and multinational and forward-deployed interagency partners.

(c) Identifies and addresses frequency problems.

(d) Determines if HN communications equipment is similar to, or compatible with, US equipment.

(e) Establishes C2 communications with HN military forces, multinational partners, and interagency partners in support of mission execution, if required.

(f) Ensures required single-channel communications equipment is planned for and deployed (high frequency, very high frequency, ultrahigh frequency, and SATCOM). Ensures the NTS airtime requirement is identified in the SATCOM communications plan.

(g) Develops an understanding of the operation of the HN's phone system. Existing domestic telephone lines and cellular networks can be used to back up the military communication systems. Although telephone lines are not secure, manual encryption devices may be used to pass classified message traffic and should be planned for to support the operation. Telephone lines may be the most reliable form of communication, especially to remote evacuation sites. Communications personnel should verify the serviceability of these lines, record numbers, and ascertain dialing procedures for possible use during execution of the NEO.

(h) Establishes reliable and redundant communication links and procedures among the diplomatic mission, supported CCDR, and JFC. Communications must be established between the embassy and JFC, so diplomatic and politically sensitive situations can be controlled.

(i) Identifies sensitive equipment and/or material that needs to be evacuated or destroyed.

(j) Ensures the exchange of biometric file, match reports, and supporting analysis (identity intelligence) is planned for and supported.

**(8) Medical Team**

(a) Advises the OIC of medical considerations that affect the NEO, to include recommendations for emergent and urgent PM transport.

(b) Provides immediate medical assistance as required.

(c) Determines characteristics of the evacuation that are related to the cause and spread of disease such as terrain, soil, climate, animals, plants, sanitary standards of the native population, and endemic and epidemic diseases present.

(d) Determines the need for special preventive medicine units.

(e) If authorized by the embassy, determines veterinary requirements to prepare pets for movement.

**(9) Air Support Coordinator**

(a) Coordinates all aircraft support.

(b) Determines air traffic control requirements.

(c) Provides advice concerning the number and type of aircraft required, the technical aspects of LZs and DZs (including the type of security required), fixed-wing landing strips, and air evacuation routes.

(d) Selects LZs.

(e) Provides interface for air-to-ground operations.

(f) Surveys air facilities for possible use to support follow-on forces for conduct of defensive combat operations.

(g) Completes performance planning for aircraft type (e.g., weight, fuel, weather, flight times, aircraft range), which provides planners with information on number of passengers and baggage that can be carried and other similar information. This information can be inserted into the planning process at any point and indicates anything from how many aircraft and of what type should be requested to how long the operation will take using a specific type or mix of aircraft types.

(h) Provides subject matter expertise on antiaircraft threat capabilities.

(i) Factors in crew/rest cycle and maintenance requirements impacting the mission of a longer duration.

(j) Directs configuration of aircraft and medical personnel assigned as crew based on litter-bound casualties and patients. This information could impact the number of flights required due to extra space requirements of litters.

(k) Manages manifests of crew and passengers to maintain accountability.

(l) Prepares risk assessment for the ISBs, LZs, marshaling areas, and in-flight hazards. Planners should share aircraft-specific information concerning safety with the safety officer.

(m) Prepares area and situation specific crew briefing materials.

(n) Coordinates with PR planners and addresses any crew gaps.

(o) Provides crews with the most up-to-date situation report possible, based on coordination with intelligence staff elements.

(p) Collects weather data/visibility information that may affect flight; provide this information to staff planners and flight crews.

**(10) Amphibious Advance Force**

(a) Coordinate ship-to-shore movement of the amphibious advance force to maintain unit integrity.

(b) Determine control requirements for movement by surface and air (helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft) of the amphibious advance force.

(c) Select suitable landing area, conduct beach survey, and survey port/pier facilities.

(d) Provide subject matter expertise on naval forces.

(e) Prepare risk assessment for ISB, LZ, marshaling areas, channel and beach hazards, and flight hazards.

(f) Prepare area and situation specific crew briefing materials.

(g) Coordinate support ship location with the naval gunfire LNO.

*Refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.*

**(11) Air and Naval Gunfire LNO and/or Fire Support Officer**

(a) Identifies and confirms prospective targets to support the NEO.

(b) Provides supporting arms coordination as required.

**(12) PAO**

- (a) Advises and assists the OIC on matters concerning the news media.
- (b) Serves as a liaison between the OIC and COM for PA.
- (c) Works with the embassy PAO to publicize evacuation efforts in an effort to provide an accurate account of the operation. This is always accomplished in close coordination with the embassy's staff and within the guidelines of approved DOD PA policy.
- (d) Provides clear, concise, and timely information through the CCMD PA staff to senior DOD PA agencies. Provides information to the PAOs at the safe havens concerning media opportunities prior to the arrival of evacuees.
- (e) Provides security review of products prior to release to ensure OPSEC is not compromised.
- (f) Establishes an effective command information program.

**(13) Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Officer**

- (a) Serves as liaison between the OIC and the supporting military information support (MIS) organization commanders/OICs.
- (b) Coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes with other information activities, and monitors execution of MISO to support the NEO.
- (c) Coordinates with the JTF PAO, embassy PAO, and embassy information officer to ensure themes and messages are congruent with the information synchronization effort.
- (d) Writes MISO concept of support for the NEO and refines preapproved MISO program prior to NEO execution.
- (e) As required, obtains the COM's approval for MISO products and execution of the MISO plan. If a hostile environment exists, the approval authority for MISO products and execution is SecDef, unless authority has been delegated to the supported CCDR IAW CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

**(14) CA Officer**

- (a) Conducts an initial assessment of the civil component of the operational area to validate information and assumptions of the civil-military operations (CMO) estimate and advise the OIC of CMO-related issues affecting the NEO. CMO estimates may be developed during the JIPOE process.
- (b) Advises the OIC on how to minimize population interference with evacuation operations.

(c) Executes civil-military integration by coordinating and synchronizing with the civil component and conducting close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities.

(d) Assists the JTF in accomplishing its mission by mobilizing existing-civil or indigenous networks to support the NEO.

(e) Assists DOS in the identification of US citizens and others to be evacuated.

(f) Assists embassy personnel in receiving, screening, processing, and debriefing evacuees.

(g) Writes CA concept of support for the NEO.

**(15) Legal Advisor**

(a) Advises the OIC on legal issues that arise during preparation for and execution of the NEO.

(b) Conducts legal reviews of ROE and guidance pertaining to the use of force, riot control agents (RCAs), and nonlethal weapons; assists in the drafting of these documents, as appropriate. Advises on relevant legal authorities (i.e., SOFAs and other international agreements, HN laws, and US law and policy), as they pertain to issues arising during NEOs, such as search and seizure, weapons confiscation, and temporary refuge/asylum requests. As necessary/requested, briefs NEO participants on applicable law.

(c) Conducts liaison with embassy and local officials on legal issues, as required.

(d) Coordinates plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States with appropriate embassy personnel.

**(16) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician**

(a) Advises the OIC and embassy staff on bomb identification measures.

(b) Inspects the embassy and potential ECC sites.

**(17) Religious Support Team (RST)/Religious Ministry Team (RMT)**

(a) Advises the FCE OIC on religious support/religious ministry requirements of evacuees that may impact the evacuation process.

(b) Advises the FCE OIC on HN religious issues that may impact the evacuation process.

(c) Provides immediate religious support/religious ministry to military personnel and their dependents, and other authorized recipients, as required.

(d) Provides liaison to HN religious leaders and/or government cultural/religious affairs officials for assistance to the evacuation.

(e) Provides liaison to religion-based NGOs for assistance to the evacuation.

(18) **PR Officer**

(a) Advises the OIC and embassy staff on all matters relating to PR.

(b) Coordinates with the CCMD's joint PR center.

(c) Coordinates with HN government, partner nations, and others to determine PR capabilities that may be used during PR events.

(d) Develops and coordinates PR plans for the OIC, embassy staff, and the joint PR center.

e. **FCE Tasks.** FCE tasks are shown in Figure V-2.

f. **Evacuation Site Party.** The evacuation site party identifies and, where possible, establishes the assembly areas, evacuation sites, and the ECC site. When the evacuation force enters the country and the evacuation commences, the evacuation site party becomes the operations center and/or section of the ECC. Additional information explaining ECC operations can be found in Chapter VI, "Evacuee Processing."

g. **Evacuation Site Party Composition.** The composition of the evacuation site party is determined by the JFC; however, the size may be limited by the COM. It may consist of the following personnel:

(1) HQ commandant or OIC.

(2) Operations officer.

(3) Intelligence officer.

(4) Communications/information technology officer.

(5) Electromagnetic spectrum operations officer.

(6) Personnel officer.

(7) Logistics officer.

### Forward Command Element Tasks

- Initiate liaison with the diplomatic mission:
  - Brief Department of State representatives on the capabilities and missions of the advance party and the joint task force.
  - Establish a forward command post that can be expanded to the joint task force headquarters staff.
- Provide a continuing presence for planning and ensure a complementary role with Department of State personnel.
- Determine whether the operational environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
- Advise the joint force commander regarding the size and composition of forces required. If specified in the initiating directive, determine whether the joint task force is appropriate for the mission.
- Advise the joint force commander regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival of the evacuation force.
- Determine existing political and sociological considerations.
- Determine attitude of the local population.
- Establish communications between the forward command element and the joint force commander:
  - Make the communications link to joint force commander available to the senior Department of State representative.
  - Maintain continuous communications for exchange of planning and intelligence information.

**Figure V-2. Forward Command Element Tasks**

- (8) Security officer.
- (9) CA officer.
- (10) Information management officer.
- (11) PA officer.
- (12) Legal advisor.
- (13) Air support coordinator.
- (14) Medical officer.
- (15) RST/RMT.

- (16) Engineer officer.
- (17) PR officer.
- (18) Identity management officer.

**h. Evacuation Site Party Tasks**

- (1) Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body.
- (2) Provide direct liaison with the chief of the embassy consular office.
- (3) Maintain liaison with civilian or HN government agencies involved in the evacuation.
- (4) Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches, LZs and/or DZs, airports, and ports; obtain photographs, where possible.
- (5) The air support coordinator should be fully aware of the requirements of potential pickup and delivery sites to account for aircraft configurations.
  - (a) Recommend and/or confirm assembly areas, evacuation sites, and LZs and/or DZs. If required to move assembly area operations, coordinate approval with the COM.
  - (b) Prepare initial evacuation site defensive plan and evacuation security requirements.
  - (c) Plan and coordinate emergency AE operations with a PM requirements center for evacuees with medical conditions requiring movement to a higher level of care.
  - (d) Plan and coordinate operations of assembly areas and evacuation areas with DOS representatives.
- (6) Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites, to include the following:
  - (a) Clear minor obstacles.
  - (b) Plan and layout assembly areas and evacuation sites.
  - (c) Plan and provide for initial terminal guidance at beaches and LZs and/or DZs.
- (7) Collect essential planning information that includes the following:
  - (a) Assessment of hostage threat.

- (b) Number and categories of evacuees.
  - (c) Medical status of evacuees.
  - (d) Safe havens (intermediate, temporary, final) determined by DOS.
  - (e) Diplomatic/political/legal constraints.
  - (f) Number of HN personnel and TCNs to be evacuated.
- (8) Assist DOS personnel with news media.
- (9) Establish and maintain communications with the JFC, the FCE, and embassy.
- (10) Coordinate additional security requirements the HN police, military, or other security forces may be able to provide.
- (11) In a permissive environment, coordinate for overflight rights. In uncertain or hostile environments, consider the need for OPSEC and airspace coordination prior to coordinating overflight rights. In an uncertain or hostile environment, considerations associated with the impact and risk to commercial air traffic should be considered IAW Federal Aviation Regulations.
- (12) Plan and coordinate health care needs of the evacuee population. Determine endemic disease and environmental threats to the population at risk, mission, and operational commander. Plan for the health care needs of evacuees in transit to safe havens in concert with joint, other USG, international, and multinational organizations as necessary.
- (13) If pet evacuation is authorized by DOS, establish pet holding facility and care area.

i. **Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell.** A CCDR may elect to stand up a deployable JTF augmentation cell, a liaison and augmentation capability that can be deployed in advance of a JTF advance party. The deployable JTF augmentation cell can serve as both the JFC's advance party and the CCDR's liaison until the JTF advance party is deployed and operational.

#### 4. Joint Task Force Main Body Organization and Missions

a. A JTF main body deploys to conduct the on-scene evacuation process. After insertion of the main body, each element prepares for its part in the operation. As the advance party rejoins the main body, the main body may consist of an HQ, evacuee processing element, marshalling element, security element, and logistic element. Depending on the operation, other elements may also be added. The size of the main body

depends on the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation. Figure V-3 depicts a notional JTF main body organization.

b. **JTF HQ.** The JTF HQ coordinates and directs the evacuation. The FCE joins the evacuation force and continues operations as part of the JTF HQ. A liaison team is formed to coordinate activities with the embassy, supported CCDR, and other agencies, as required. Depending on the magnitude, duration, and operational environment of the evacuation, the JTF HQ may consider establishing a joint, interagency, and multinational evacuation coordination element to coordinate the overall evacuation operation. This element is a focal point providing a theater-wide common operational picture; a conduit for resolving friction between CCMDs; and a conduit for information exchanges between the various diplomatic missions, subordinate unified commands, interagency partners, and MNFs. Effective liaison with the embassy is normally made by personnel from the FCE. An administrative team is formed from the evacuation site party and other personnel. The administrative team organizes the ECC and is responsible for the smooth operation of the ECC processing center.

c. **Evacuee Processing Element.** The processing element contains those personnel in the ECC that conduct the processing of the evacuees. Processing center operations are discussed in Chapter VI, “Evacuee Processing.”

d. **Security Element.** Security forces are used as necessary at the evacuation sites, ECC perimeter, LZs, aircraft, staging and/or parking areas, and embarkation areas for landing craft. Depending on how the JTF commander organizes the evacuation force, the security element could be subdivided or even separated into an internal security unit, external security unit, maneuver security unit, and a quick reaction force or reserve. The internal unit could provide the security within the force and its facilities such as the ECC, staging areas, assembly areas, and others. The external unit could provide security focused more outward toward the protection of evacuees. The maneuver security unit could provide protection for the marshaling element’s search teams and others required to move




Figure V-3. Notional Joint Task Force Main Body

or transit in the operational area. Lastly, the security forces could also provide a quick reaction force or reserve if a marshalling team or other unit encounters difficulty or requires assistance. To determine the size of the security force, consider the following:

- (1) Hostile threat to evacuation operations.
- (2) Anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in and around the evacuation objective area.
- (3) Crowd control requirements and the availability of nonlethal weapons and other intermediate force capabilities at each site.
- (4) Number of evacuees.
- (5) Number of marshalling and search teams required to search for evacuees.
- (6) Number of evacuation sites.
- (7) Size of the ECC.
- (8) Transportation available to cover the assigned areas.
- (9) Personal security of the COM.
- (10) Type of resources used to evacuate personnel.
- (11) Urban terrain surrounding evacuation entry points and marshalling areas to understand the potential threat points and create standoff for the security elements.

e. **Marshalling Element.** The marshalling element moves to and secures predesignated assembly areas, brings evacuees to the assembly areas, and escorts them to the ECC. The size of the marshalling force depends on the number of sites and evacuees.

(1) **Marshalling Team.** One marshalling team controls an assembly area and evacuates the citizens in that area. The marshalling team should be large enough to organize into two sections that consist of search squads and security squads. Search squads may not be needed if the embassy's evacuation plan has been successfully implemented and all evacuees have been notified. If it has been determined that all evacuees have been informed, then search squads should not leave the assembly area except in emergency cases.

(a) The search squads locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area. Each search squad should have an interpreter and, if possible, a guide. A lost squad in an uncertain or hostile environment can create significant issues for the evacuation force. Interpreters may be required to assist the search squads in moving from the assembly areas and to locate evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect.

(b) A security squad, which could be provided from the security element or be internal to the marshaling element, provides security to the team during movement and in the assembly area.

(c) Planners consider marshaling team C2 requirements. MIS units (both Army and Marine Corps), military police units, military linguists, contract interpreters, and HN and partner nation forces are all examples of forces or units that may be able to provide additional capability.

(2) **Marshalling Force Operations.** The marshalling team locates evacuees and moves them to assembly areas and eventually to the ECC. The marshalling team may have several search squads under the control and direction of the team's OIC. The following should be considered during marshalling operations:

(a) Sufficient transportation for the search and/or security squads and evacuees. Evacuees may be transported by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or wheeled vehicles. Other considerations include:

1. The use of local drivers, if available, because of their experience and familiarity with the local road network.

2. Availability of sufficient mechanics for emergency repairs.

3. Briefing of military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

(b) **Movement control** requires actions to:

1. Identify environmental factors that hamper movement (e.g., flooding, weather effects on ground lines of communications).

2. Identify primary and alternate routes and checkpoints.

3. Provide local road maps to each driver.

4. Provide convoy control and security.

5. Identify safe houses or areas if vehicles break down or become separated or lost.

6. Provide adequate communications equipment is available for convoys.

7. Identify local areas to be avoided that are controlled by anti-US elements/population.

(c) Assembly area operations include:

1. Establishment of perimeter security, even in a permissive environment.

2. Procurement of sufficient transportation available to move evacuees to the ECC. Vehicles belonging to the evacuees may be used to transport personnel to the ECC.

3. Coordination of staggered movement schedules between several assembly areas and the movement schedule of evacuees to the ECC.

(d) **Search squad operations** include actions to:

1. Obtain a list of potential evacuees from the consular officer.

2. Obtain copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee.

3. Provide the waiver of evacuation opportunity (see Appendix D, “Sample Notice Form”) for evacuees who refuse to leave.

4. Brief each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the embassy, positive identification requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be transported.

5. Record the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee, and conduct biometric enrollment. Biometric enrollment is used to positively identify all evacuees, including those lacking other forms of identification. The use of biometric enrollment may disclose other factors that would disqualify the individual for evacuation.

6. Escort evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC (evacuees may drive their vehicles directly to the ECC, and search personnel should note the individual’s name and intent).

7. Identify evacuees not on the list provided by the embassy.

f. **Logistic Element.** Limit logistic support to the minimum-essential support needed for the evacuation. Consider the following factors to decide logistic support for the JTF:

(1) Characteristics of the evacuation area.

(a) Resources available:

1. Leverage HN and other non-DOD resources and/or existing and potential facilities for support to the JTF such as facilities for the storage and distribution of supplies (including medical supplies), transportation means, airfields and fuel points, and medical facilities.

2. Fuel; water (potable); food, to include specialty food items based on religion and ages of evacuees (e.g., baby formula); and consumables/sundry items (e.g., baby wipes, diapers).

- (b) Climate, weather, and terrain.
- (c) Number of evacuees and their needs.
- (2) Potential threats to the evacuation.
  - (a) Adversary and/or enemy strength and activity.
  - (b) Disposition and location.
- (3) Strength and composition of the JTF.
  - (a) Total troop strength.
  - (b) Composition of the JTF in terms of land, air, and maritime combat forces, combat support, and combat service support units.
  - (c) Logistic support capabilities of each component and separate unit.
- (4) Time constraints and duration of operation.
- (5) Logistic support required by the embassy and evacuees.
- (6) Availability and suitability of HNS as an alternative to deploying US military logistic support.
- (7) Prearranged HNS and/or inter-Service support agreements, as appropriate.
- (8) Capabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to provide rapid evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties.
- (9) Identification of areas for cover and concealment.

## 5. General Considerations

a. **Medical.** During evacuation operations, it may be difficult to insert and establish the medical support function for the JTF because of time and operational constraints. Comprehensive and detailed casualty and medical support planning should be implemented to cover immediate medical and surgical treatment needs. Special units organized for this purpose may save lives and permit a more expeditious evacuation. Depending on the size and scope of the evacuation operation, there may be the potential for large numbers of both military and civilian casualties. The JFC's medical staff should identify tailored medical packages to monitor, track, and treat disease and injuries and to identify and mitigate potential environmental health threats.

(1) **Global Patient Movement Integration Cell (GPMIC).** The GPMIC is a joint activity reporting directly to the USTRANSCOM Surgeon, who serves as DOD's manager for the development of policy and standardization of procedures and information support systems for global PM. The USTRANSCOM Surgeon implements policy and standardization for the regulation, clinical standards, and safe movement of uniformed Services and other authorized, or designated, patients. The USTRANSCOM Surgeon orchestrates and maintains global oversight of the United States Transportation Command patient movement requirements centers (TPMRCs) (e.g., East, West, Americas) in coordination with the CDR and international organizations as required. The GPMIC synchronizes current and future operational PM plans to identify available assets and validate transport to bed plans.

(2) **TPMRC.** NEO planners should coordinate PM with the relevant TPMRC (e.g., East, West, Americas) for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of all injured and ill evacuees. The TPMRC manages the validation and regulation of PM within their respective theaters and coordinates with the GPMIC. The TPMRC is responsible for theater-wide PM and coordinates with medical treatment facilities to identify the proper treatment and transportation required. It also communicates the "transport-to-bed" plan to the theater Service transportation component or other agencies responsible for executing the mission.

(3) **AE.** The rapid evacuation of patients during contingencies is necessary to prevent undue suffering and preserve military strength. AE provides time-sensitive en route care of regulated and unregulated casualties to and between medical treatment facilities using organic and/or contracted aircraft with medical aircrew trained explicitly for the mission. AE forces can operate as far forward as aircraft are able to conduct air operations, across the full range of military operations, and in all operating environments. Specialty medical teams may be assigned to work with the AE aircrew to support patients requiring more intensive en route care. Refer to JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*, and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-42.5, *Aeromedical Evacuation*, for additional information on AE.

(4) **Sea-Based MEDEVAC.** The ship-to-shore movement capability and the ability to shelter, feed, and administer medical care provides maritime forces with unique capabilities when conducting NEO. Ships in close proximity to the NEO can provide various levels of medical support until equivalent capability can be established or if priority care is needed. Additionally, specialty medical teams can quickly augment medical facilities onboard USN ships to provide a wider range of medical care. Consideration should be given for USN medical support requirements and standards for civilians in the operational area, when not prescribed by higher authority.

*Refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, for more information.*

(5) Other considerations for medical staffs planning NEOs include the following:

(a) Preparing for common medical complaints such as nausea, dehydration, and diarrhea. Most frequently, sick evacuees are children.

(b) Identifying clinicians and support staff requirements based on anticipated medical needs of each unique mission. The medical planner should be prepared to efficiently communicate risk to force and risk to mission given a particular staff level and should have contingencies planned in the case that requested staffing is not available.

(c) Establishing liaison with local hospitals or medical centers and ambulance service.

(d) Designating a separate area close to the disembarkation point to perform medical assessments, dispense medication or vaccines, and conduct patient staging and/or quarantine operations.

(e) Providing medical staff with distinctive clothing or markings to aid in identification.

(f) Anticipating medicinal requests for both adult and pediatric populations that may include common drugs such as antibiotics, antidiarrheals, pain relievers, antibacterial creams, eye and ear drops, cough and cold formulas, high blood pressure medications, and insulin.

(g) Providing special planning and requirements to move and evacuate personnel hospitalized in HN medical facilities.

(h) Establishing guidelines for AE missions that may require movement of urgent or priority patients in an aircraft that is not completely filled. Due to patients' severe conditions, the aircraft is normally not delayed for nonmedical evacuees to be moved to the airfield to fill the aircraft to maximum capacity.

(i) Providing preventive environmental health services in some locales to minimize acquiring diseases while waiting in relatively unprotected circumstances.

(j) Identifying primary casualty receiving and treatment ships that may provide medical treatment resources offshore.

(k) Planning during predeployment for medical logistics, to include coordination with the most appropriate theater lead agent for medical materiel for the affected theater, to ensure proper medical supplies and a resupply process.

(l) Identifying receiving facilities and the process for country clearances as evacuees transit the AE system.

(m) Preparing for operations in an area where a pandemic may be prevalent with stressed medical infrastructure.

(n) Giving increased priority to aeromedical missions from locations not staffed or equipped for extended care of critical patients.

**b. Veterinary Support**

(1) If DOS allows pet evacuations, considerations may include means of movement, kennel requirements, identification microchips, gaining country quarantine requirements, vaccination requirements, outgoing physical examinations, health certificates, and rabies certificates.

(2) If other than operational rations are used for troop and evacuee feeding, considerations may include sanitation inspection for food processing and water bottling facilities, as well as food inspection at delivery and storage.

**c. PR.** If the NEO environment becomes increasingly uncertain or hostile, the JFC should establish a joint PR center to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area. While primarily organized to recover US military or DOD civilians and DOD contractors authorized to accompany the force, authority may also be granted by the President or SecDef to recover other US or foreign nationals who have become isolated during the NEO.

*For further guidance on planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing a PR mission, refer to JP 3-50, Joint Personnel Recovery.*

**d. Mortuary Affairs.** Mortuary affairs personnel ensure proper and dignified treatment of human remains. The JTF should plan for mortuary affairs for both military personnel and evacuees. Even in a permissive environment, deaths among elderly, critically ill, or newborn evacuees may be encountered. However, DOS coordination is required to obtain mortuary affairs services for those persons not automatically covered under DODD 1300.22, *Mortuary Affairs Policy*. Mortuary affairs should have close and early coordination with DOS to ensure proper handling of human remains IAW the wishes of the person authorized to direct disposition of non-DOD affiliated personnel and/or non-US citizens. The decision to transport human remains is dependent on but not limited to the specifics of the situation, to include the tactical environment, weather, and capacity of receiving ships and aircraft. Primary casualty receiving and treatment ships have limited morgue facilities. Human remains should not be transferred before all evacuees have been safely transported. Mortuary affairs personnel should keep PA personnel apprised of next of kin notifications, casualty statistics, and relevant updates as they occur.

*For guidance and information pertaining to the search, recovery, evacuation, and identification of the dead or temporary burial of human remains in theaters of operations, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.*

*For more information on handling of potentially infectious human remains, see United States Army Public Health Center's Technical Guide 195A, Safety and Health Guidance for Mortuary Affairs Operations: Infectious Materials.*

e. **Communication Synchronization.** The JFC and/or the JTF commander should ensure information and communication products are synchronized at all levels. Communication planning and integration is important in PA, information activities, and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

(1) **PA.** The JFC ensures accurate and timely release of information about the operation is made to the media to the maximum extent possible, consistent with DOD-approved PA guidance, OPSEC, and the safety of personnel involved. Speed of media transmission makes it probable that a worldwide audience has immediate access to information about the conduct of the operation and its participants. To ensure the media do not provide intelligence to hostile persons or organizations, the PAO working with embassy personnel needs to manage PA through accurate and timely releases concerning the NEO. During NEOs, the JTF PAO needs to ensure all PA announcements have been approved by the COM or the designated representative. Additional PAO responsibilities include the following:

(a) Advise the JFC on all aspects of PA.

(b) Develop a PA plan that coordinates all public (media and general public) and command (internal) information functions, including social media, JTF print bulletins and newsletters, videos, Web pages, press releases, and media advisories.

(c) Review all materials and serve as public release authority after approved by the COM or the designated representative.

(d) Establish procedures IAW guidance promulgated by higher authority.

(e) As required, obtain appropriate clearances for press releases.

(f) Distribute information pertaining to the JTF and its operations IAW established command security policies.

(g) Serve as liaison and escort for civilian visitors and media representatives. In anticipation of, and prior to operations:

1. Update the information plan daily.

2. Determine PA personnel and equipment requirements.

3. Maintain a current list of legitimate media representatives in country to coordinate release of information during a crisis.

4. Coordinate embedded media activities.

(h) Determine and disseminate JFC guidance on the release of public information.

(i) Establish a media operations center near the proposed command post, emergency operations center, or ECC.

(j) During operations:

1. Establish a press conference schedule and conduct press briefings.
2. Provide rapid response to media queries.
3. Disseminate relevant information and news to internal audience daily.

*For further guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.*

(2) **Information Activities.** The crisis that causes a NEO may result in fragmented HN security forces that may change decision-making systems (e.g., from centralized to decentralized or to completely isolated units without any direction). This adds complexity to the information, and planners should consider that rogue or isolated leaders with key capabilities can act beyond the command of central HN authorities. During a NEO, there may not be an identified adversary, and the use of some information activities may not be appropriate or relevant. However, NEO planners should consider the ways in which adversaries and/or threat groups could interfere with the operations through misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda. The fluid situation often present during a NEO and the frequent occurrence of NEOs with other military operations necessitate the coordination of the appropriate information activities through the information planning cell. OPSEC cannot be overemphasized, especially in a hostile or uncertain environment. It greatly contributes to the protection of forces and the personnel being evacuated.

*For more information, see JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.*

(a) **MISO.** MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. As the situation deteriorates, a preapproved MISO program provides CCDRs the policy guidance, authority, and an integrated approach to support a NEO. In addition to influencing foreign audiences, psychological operations forces manage MISO and can be employed to provide accurate information and guidance during a NEO. MISO can greatly facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostile environments, and support the efforts of other information activities, specifically PA, military deception (MILDEC), and OPSEC. Planners, in coordination with the JFC and Joint Staff, ensure appropriate MISO program authorities are incorporated in planning documents, operation orders, and implement orders to ensure required authorities are provided to the JFC. Plans typically contain MISO program guidance for NEO. JFCs should begin MISO planning as early as possible to ensure approval for execution in support of operations. MISO resources and capabilities provide the commander with a means of influencing hostile and potentially hostile personnel (combatant and civilian) through employment of appropriate media and using the appropriate language(s) and

symbols and/or terms of reference. If the JFC desires to employ MISO, that decision should be coordinated with the COM and appropriate members of the country team. DOS personnel should be able to provide JTF psychological operations personnel with valuable information about the target audience and any programs similar to MISO they may have been using in preparation for the NEO or the crisis that precipitated the NEO requirement. MISO efforts can support the following objectives:

1. Reduce interference with US and multinational NEOs.
2. Decrease effectiveness of misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda against the US and multinational forces.
3. Reduce interference with US and multinational operations.

*For further guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, and CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, for preapproved MISO program for NEOs.*

(b) **MILDEC.** Use of MILDEC to support a NEO can help mislead adversary military or other threat decision makers as to friendly capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The MILDEC officer in the information planning cell incorporates/deconflicts information activities in the deception plan.

*For further guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.*

(3) **DSPD.** DSPD can be used to complement PA and information activities during a NEO in a hostile or uncertain environment. PA activities should be planned and coordinated with any other DSPD activities to ensure unity of effort and maximum effectiveness. DSPD can entail the use of a military information support team (MIST) to support a US embassy within an HN. The MIST prepares information products, based on the guidance of the country team, to communicate country-specific themes and messages. Planners should consider that MISTs typically deployed to US embassies do not deploy with tactical MISO equipment and cannot execute tactical MISO, such as loudspeaker operations. Planners may need to plan for additional tactical psychological operations forces to conduct tactical missions in support of evacuation operations. It could also involve the deployment of a joint PA support element to a contingency location where the representatives work out of the US embassy and coordinate military PA activities with embassy goals and objectives. DSPD requires coordination among interagency partners and DOD components.

f. **Information Sharing.** Generally, the best approach to information sharing with NGOs and international organizations is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to accomplish the mission. However, classified information is only shared with or released to individuals with the appropriate security

clearance and need to know based on policy and guidance pertaining to the specific operation being conducted. Ensure compliance with National Disclosure Policy-1, *National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.

g. **CBRN.** Evacuation operations in a CBRN environment require procedures to gain awareness and understanding of CBRN hazards; to provide CBRN-related protection to all personnel; and to mitigate the impact of CBRN contaminants on evacuees, NEO personnel, and equipment. The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Joint Medical Community, determines and approves CBRN respiratory and percutaneous protection capability for NEO. The JFC determines if CBRN screening, protection (e.g., provision of personal protective equipment), and decontamination of evacuees is required and consults with USTRANSCOM for any specific transportation requirements. Considerations include noting that evacuees will lack knowledge of basic CBRN hazard protection and decontamination methods and may have additional requirements due to age (very young or old), cognitive ability (special needs), or physical attributes (religiously mandated facial hair). The JFC determines if CBRN screening and decontamination of evacuees is required based on consultation with medical authorities and consults with USTRANSCOM for any specific transportation requirements.

*For additional information on operations in a CBRN environment, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.*

#### **LEBANON NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION 2006**

**The United States (US) began to evacuate some citizens from Lebanon on 16 July 2006. On 17 July, two Marine Corps CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters aided in the voluntary departure of 42 American citizens from the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The citizens were flown to Royal Air Force Base Akrotiri in Cyprus. US citizens who were flown out via helicopter were the elderly, those with small children, and those with special medical needs. Sixty more people were airlifted from the United States Embassy on July 18. The Department of Defense (DOD) hoped to evacuate approximately 300 people by air per day. Around 200 people were evacuated by air on 19 July. The *Orient Queen* (a cruise ship charter by DOD to evacuate US citizens) docked in Beirut on 18 July and left the 19th with about 900 people on board for its first round of transporting evacuees. The ship was escorted by the United States Ship (USS) *Gonzales* (DDG 66) and arrived in Cyprus on the 20th.**

**The US Sailors and Marines from the *Iwo Jima* Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) assisted in the authorized departure of American citizens from Lebanon. In addition to the *Iwo Jima* Strike Group and USS *Gonzales*, three more US ships from United States European Command also assisted (USS *Barry* [DDG 52], USS *Mount Whitney* [LCC 20], and USNS *Big Horn* [T-AO 198]). The Commander of United States Naval Forces Central Command**

indicated that people were evacuated on United States Navy ships as well as the chartered cruise ship. On 20 July, 341 Americans were evacuated out of Southern Lebanon, via a bus convoy, and taken to Beirut Harbor to board the *Orient Queen* for transport. Also on the 20th, a group of United States Marines from Interim Marine Corps Security Force (IMCSF) Bahrain arrived in Beirut to provide security for the commercial vessel *Orient Queen* as it assisted with the voluntary departures of US citizens. The IMCSF coordinated the security aboard the contracted ship and worked to ensure the safe and orderly transport of each passenger who boarded the vessel. The Marine security team, along with the help of Marines from the 24th MEU, also screened passenger luggage prior to loading it on the vessel.

A landing craft, utility (LCU) operated by Sailors assisting the 24th MEU landed in Lebanon, 20 July, to begin transporting American citizens who had chosen to depart that country. The LCU deployed from the USS *Nashville* (LPD 13) and was the first naval vessel to land in Lebanon in support of the voluntary departure of US civilians. American citizens boarded the LCUs and were transported to USS *Nashville* in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The USS *Nashville* then transported the Americans to Cyprus where they made further arrangements for follow-on transportation and accommodations. More Sailors and Marines from the USS *Iwo Jima* ESG and the 24th MEU arrived on station 21 July to assist in the authorized departure of American citizens from Lebanon.

On 21 July, the USS *Trenton* (LPD 14), the USS *Whidbey Island* (LSD 51), and the contract carrier *Rahmah* carried around 4,200 American citizens to safety. The Navy ships carried evacuees to Cyprus, and the *Rahmah* carried roughly 1,400 Americans to Mersin, Turkey. Turkey offered the seaport of Mersin as an overflow area. Once American evacuees arrived in Mersin, they were bussed to nearby Incirlik Air Base, where the Department of State had chartered air lines to transport them back to the United States.

The Defense Logistics Agency assisted with the evacuation effort by immediately shipping 24,000 individual military meals by military air to Cyprus. The agency also provided 2,000 cots and blankets and ensured fuel was available for US military aircraft and vessels involved in the evacuation.

A total of 3,994 American citizens left Lebanon on the 22nd. On 23 July, Navy and contract ships lifted 1,815 from the embattled country on the 23rd, bringing the total number of evacuees to 10,000.

United States Transportation Command arranged commercial and military aircraft to fly the evacuees. On July 22, two military flights transported 199 Americans to McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. Chartered commercial flights took evacuees to Baltimore-Washington International and Philadelphia International Airport.

On 24 July, 957 US citizens were evacuated from Lebanon to Cyprus aboard the contracted cruise ship *Orient Queen*, bringing the total to 12,870 since the crisis in Lebanon began 16 July.

On 25 July, the contract vessel *Rahmah* ended its contract period with the US effort and made its final run from Beirut to Cyprus.

On 26 July, a group of 100 US citizens were taken from southern Lebanon to the port city of Tyre by civilian vehicles, and they joined another 110 Americans leaving on a Canadian ship. About 725 Americans left Lebanon aboard the contracted vessels *Orient Queen* and the contracted vessel *Vittoria M*.

On July 26, the US military performed its final scheduled evacuation of citizens from Lebanon. The military had evacuated almost 14,000 citizens from Lebanon. The embassy estimated that the vast majority of citizens wishing to leave Lebanon had now been evacuated. The *Orient Queen*, *Vittoria M*, and the USNS [United States Naval Ship] *Swift (HSV 2)*, a high-speed vessel manned by United States Navy personnel, would continue to make runs into Beirut evacuating American citizens or delivering humanitarian supplies. The *Nashville*, *Trenton*, *Whidbey Island*, *Mount Whitney*, *Gonzalez*, *Barry*, and *Swift* remained in the region.

Various Sources

## CHAPTER VI EVACUEE PROCESSING

*“Decisions you make are always encumbered by the fact that you know there's real risk to your own people, people that you've sent into harm's way....”*

**Evacuation of Embassy Staff from Venezuela  
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, 2019**

### 1. Evacuee Processing

a. The primary duties of the JFC and/or JTF commander include maintaining order at the evacuation site and supporting the COM's efforts to care for evacuees. Regardless of location (in-country, air terminal, temporary safe haven, onboard ship), evacuee processing requires the implementation of a comprehensive plan for reception, accounting, and care of evacuees.

b. **Procedures During Processing.** At an air terminal, port, or beach, the evacuee processing should be located in a building, tent, or other appropriate place to provide shelter and safety to the evacuees. The area should be staffed with screeners, security, interpreters, local immigration (US personnel if available) and customs officials, embassy support liaison, and medical personnel. The following procedures should be considered:

(1) Use a consular officer, when available, to facilitate/expedite processing. Establish connectivity with DOS databases in conjunction with NTS.

(2) Use a PAO or designated PA representative to address media inquiries at the ECC during processing. PA personnel should escort all media and validate evacuees' permission to be filmed, photographed, or interviewed. Do not allow media into processing centers or into family areas under any circumstances unless escorted by PA personnel or those designated by PA as media escorts. PAOs should validate custodial approval of any imagery for public release, which includes children.

(3) Use military or contract personnel for biometric screening and forensic capabilities during evacuee processing. Ensure personnel selected for biometric screening and forensic capabilities have a basic understanding of the USG biometric architecture. Ensure a biometric standard for collection has been identified (e.g., fingerprints, iris scans, facial photo).

(4) Use easily recognizable markings on US personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

(5) Disarm evacuees prior to evacuation processing.

(6) Establish a policy concerning responsibility to secure evacuee valuables during processing, to include pets (if allowed).

- (7) Provide interpreters for bilingual information at control sites.
- (8) Upon initial screen, use tags for visual identification.
- (9) Establish provisions for searching women, children, and disabled and/or injured.
- (10) To the maximum extent possible, use personnel of the same sex to conduct body searches.
- (11) Have medical personnel present.
- (12) Have RST/RMT personnel present.
- (13) Establish procedures (separate desk or room) for USG employees or dependents, private US citizens, and TCNs. If required, a very important person (VIP) registration station should be made available.
- (14) Have CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) elements present to conduct screening of evacuees, liaison with HN intelligence and law enforcement officials, and perform intelligence collection in support of force protection requirements.
- (15) Organize evacuees and ensure the following:
  - (a) Establish a single POC between the evacuee group and the JFC.
  - (b) Contact civic officials to increase control and response for the evacuation.
- (16) Request additional diplomatic license plates for authorized use by JTF personnel during the operation.
- (17) Determine the need for EOD personnel (HN or US military).
- (18) Establish a veterinary support facility, if DOS allows pet evacuation.
- (19) Consider resources within the PR infrastructure that may support evacuee processing tasks and activities.

c. **Onboard Ship.** Should the environment on land preclude the use of an in-country ECC, evacuees may be processed onboard a ship. If it is a USN ship or USCG cutter, the responsibility for processing evacuees rests with the vessel's commanding officer, in coordination with DOS. In this situation, the activities of the ECC are accomplished onboard ship. Accounting and manifesting should be accomplished by using the NTS or other appropriate tracking means.

d. **Minimum Processing Requirements.** Prior to implementation of minimum evacuee processing procedures, the procedures are coordinated between the COM and the CCDR. Minimum processing requirements are used in those cases when there is a documented concern for the protection and safety of evacuees and the evacuation force. The procedures used meet the following guidelines:

(1) Force protection maintained to the greatest extent possible during expedited processing.

(2) Processing of persons with life threatening medical problems is expedited.

(3) All evacuees are screened for verification of identity and documentation as well as prioritization (biometrically screened if appropriate). Classification, priorities, and considerations for evacuees are explained in paragraph 4, “Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees.”


(4) A registration station should be established, and manifesting should be accomplished by using NTS or other appropriate tracking means. The tracking means used should be linked via appropriate data fields to the initial biometric enrollment to ensure identity throughout the NEO process.



*The evacuation control center supports the Department of State in processing evacuees accurately, securely, and in a quick and efficient manner.*

## 2. Evacuation Control Center

The ECC processes, screens, and conducts selected logistic functions associated with emergency evacuation of designated noncombatant evacuees in support of DOS. The JTF should, however, be prepared to perform functions that are DOS responsibilities, if required. Size and composition of the ECC is determined by the number of evacuees, evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation area. Of primary importance is the nature of the emergency causing the evacuation; it may be natural, political, or military-based. The limiting factor for the number of operating ECCs is the number of DOS consular officers. For example, the JTF should not plan to operate five ECCs when DOS can only man two. Figure VI-1 contains a recommended ECC flow chart. Key positions in the figure are discussed below.



**Figure VI-1. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart**

### 3. Evacuation Control Center Organization and Operations

a. The three guiding principles for any ECC are accuracy—all personnel are accounted for, security—evacuees and the evacuation force are safeguarded from all threats, and speed—processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven or the United States. All evacuees should be screened (biometrically screened if appropriate) to certify identification and to ensure documentation is accurate and all information provided is current. Representatives from the embassy’s consular affairs office should be in the ECC to determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees. The consular officer provides the requisite number of personnel needed to screen documents of all potential evacuees during the NEO and provides instructions to ECC personnel needed to staff processing stations. If evacuees arrive without escort, processing personnel should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation prior to allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. The processing center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation and consists of the following:

b. **HQ Section.** The HQ section:

- (1) Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the ECC.
- (2) Maintains liaison with local representatives of DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation.
- (3) Advises the JFC on the progress of the evacuation.
- (4) Maintains communications with all elements of the evacuation force, to include controlled land, air, and maritime conveyances; remote sites; evacuation vehicles; DOS personnel; HN security forces; and the ECC.

c. **Reception Station.** The reception station personnel collect all available information from the marshalling teams who escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling team’s log book is valuable because it may reduce the processing time. The evacuees should be moved into a holding area where the following should be accomplished:

- (1) Receive, search, biometrically enroll (as appropriate), segregate, and debrief incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives. The initial briefing should provide sufficient information to ease fears about the evacuation process. It should include the following:
  - (a) Summary of the reasons for the evacuation.
  - (b) Stations through which the evacuees will process.

- (c) Need for an inspection of personnel and baggage.
- (d) What support to expect at the temporary safe haven.
- (e) What to expect upon arrival in the United States.
- (f) What the repatriation center will provide.
- (g) Amnesty opportunity for any restricted items.
- (h) Explanation of the procedure and requirement to establish 100 percent accountability.
- (i) Pets policy.

(2) Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity where possible) based on political, cultural, social, and religious differences, where applicable, and proceed through a process to establish accountability of each evacuee. Use the NTS or other appropriate tracking means to create an evacuee roster with the following data: nationality; date of birth; evacuation classification; destination; local phone number; e-mail information; biometric enrollment number; and name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification. Biometric enrollment is accomplished at this station as the primary method of positive identification (dependent upon diplomatic conditions).

(3) Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing center. The escort should be furnished a list of names for those in their group for control purposes. VIPs and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides, if available.

(4) Inspect for restricted items. Each evacuee and all baggage should be inspected at the conclusion of the briefing. Areas used for individual inspections should be screened. Hand-held metal detectors and/or explosive detectors can expedite the inspections. All restricted items should be confiscated. Restricted items may include agricultural or food products.

(5) Inspection by medical personnel for country-specific legal drugs.

(6) All weapons brought to the reception center, excluding those of authorized USG personnel (for which those personnel are wholly responsible), are impounded at the entry point. Reception center personnel do not ship privately owned weapons. Embassy officials should be consulted about the disposition of confiscated weapons.

(7) The persons, property, papers, and families of foreign ambassadors authorized to go to the United States are exempt from search under any circumstances without specific direction from DOS. Individual registration is required for accounting and

manifesting purposes; biometric enrollment may be required pending determination from DOS officials.

(8) The persons, property, papers, and families of foreign diplomats (other than ambassadors) authorized to go to the United States are exempt from search. However, personal baggage may be searched if there is reasonable cause to believe that the baggage contains restricted items. All searches should be conducted in the presence of the diplomats or their authorized agents. Individual registration is required for accounting and manifesting purposes; biometric enrollment may be required pending determination from DOS officials.

(9) Diplomatic pouches are not searched.

(10) Based on reasonable belief, the JFC may refuse to evacuate any baggage suspected of containing weapons or explosives.

(11) Evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals should be segregated and escorted to the screening station. The screening should be voluntary but considered a prerequisite to evacuation. At the conclusion of the interviewing, the evacuees are allowed to continue the processing, set free, or placed in a detainee holding area.

d. **Registration Station.** Evacuees should complete all administrative paperwork required to evacuate. When the situation permits, risks are few, and time is available, the evacuee should complete all required forms prior to leaving the ECC. However, when the security situation requires rapid movement, only the minimum-essential processing for accountability and manifesting is accomplished. **There is no requirement for evacuees to complete all administrative paperwork as a precondition for evacuation.** Establishing initial accountability is not considered administrative paperwork. Foreign nationals are either on the list of potential evacuees provided by the embassy or secure approval from the US embassy before they can continue processing. **The COM or designated DOS representative is the final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification. If there are doubts about a person's identity, the matter is turned over to DOS, and the person should not be evacuated until cleared by DOS.** Biometrics are unique, measurable characteristics, such as fingerprints, iris images, and facial images. Combined with biographical information, they enable the establishment or verification of an individual's identity. Registration station personnel should ensure foreign nationals are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC. Military police should be available to react to any hostile incidents. Each evacuee should do the following:

(1) Prove identity by presenting a passport, dependent identification card, seaman's paper, or any other documentation that unquestionably establishes US citizenship or legal permanent residence.



*Successful evacuee processing begins with the initial briefing from senior Department of State representatives.*

(2) Provide information to the registration clerks concerning background and personal history. DOS's EPH provides Department of State Form 5528, *Evacuee Manifest and Promissory Note*. All critical information is recorded on the form, to include personal data, health and citizenship status, privacy warning, and promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC while the copies can be used as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in-processing at the temporary safe haven.

(3) Receive a copy of DD 2585, *Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet*, (see Appendix E, "Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet"), which should be completed before arrival at the repatriation center. A complete listing and explanation of all suggested NEO packet items, to include all of the documentation required for each evacuee and/or family to receive proper safe haven entitlements and process through the repatriation center expeditiously, may be found in the respective CCMD noncombatant evacuee repatriation plan.

e. **NTS.** The NTS is an automated data processing package designed to assist JFCs in maintaining visibility and accountability of noncombatant evacuees as they proceed through the evacuation pipeline. The NTS uses the paradigm of assigning a bar code to a package and then tracking the package through to its final destination. The NTS is the system of record that provides accountability of evacuees by enabling operators to maintain a database of information (bar code) for each evacuee (to include pets and baggage) as they enter, proceed through, and finally exit the evacuation process at a reception site. The NTS collects data from "smart cards" and other electronic data sources and is capable of exchanging data with other DOD systems such as the Integrated Data Environment Global Transportation Network Convergence. Automated data entry is the most efficient and

fastest way to register evacuees into NTS. Data is directly scanned from DOD common access cards, Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System/Real-Time Automated Personnel Identification System military and dependent identification cards, and passports that support smart processes. After the data is captured, a bar-coded wristband is assigned to the evacuee. In the event the evacuee has none of the above “smart cards,” data is entered manually, and operators can input data by hand into the NTS from sources such as the DD 2585, *Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet*. Processing time is, therefore, slowed down to manually enter data. Access to the NTS should be available at all DOD-operated evacuation sites, to include ECCs, aerial and sea ports of embarkation/debarkation, and temporary safe havens. Web-based access is possible. It is important that the JFC or JTF commander ensures forces conducting the evacuation have received proper training on how to operate and use the NTS, before the operation commences.

(1) Lack of adequate operator training or an insufficient number of NTS terminals and associated operators, and dependence on local servers due to limited Internet access, can potentially lead to significant delays and impact overall evacuee processing. With trained operators and in a permissive environment, the NTS with five registration stations can process approximately 5,000 evacuees in about 50 hours as a planning factor (three-minute processing time per evacuee). This assumes the registration stations are operated continuously and around the clock with different shifts of personnel. Although not required, planners may want to consider having two personnel per registration station (one scanning and one putting the bracelets on the evacuees).

(2) If a shorter timeline is necessary or a large number of evacuees are present, additional registration stations and associated NTS equipment and operators would be required and should be included in the NEO planning. Other NTS considerations include periodicity of system testing that ensures the latest software is loaded and wristbands that are sufficiently durable for anticipated conditions. Capacity requirements may be higher when there is an increased number of evacuees. Timely deployment of the NTS terminals is necessary to ensure established procedures are applied throughout the process.

(3) Considerations for holding areas and transportation to move the evacuees after registration should also be included in planning for the optimal number of registration stations. When at all practicable, NTS is used. A direct link established to NTS can deliver real-time data that provides a common operational picture to all senior leaders across DOD. If NTS is unavailable, an alternate combination of disparate means must be used to maintain accountability, such as partner agency tracking systems, commercial tracking systems, DOS semi-automated systems, and brute force/manual tracking systems.

(4) Experience demonstrates that a large NEO nodal network is unlikely to have fully functioning NTS, network access, and sufficiently trained operators at all nodes at all times. Most likely, it is an evolving but partial NTS implementation. Evacuees (to include pets and baggage) inevitably arrive at a NEO node without being registered in NTS. NTS operators should register such individuals in NTS whenever and wherever they are



*Evacuees are entered into the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Tracking System by joint force personnel.*

encountered and seek to improve the accuracy of the information contained in the NTS database.

f. **Debriefing Station.** This station is optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation. It should be staffed by personnel who are trained to debrief and screen and who are able to speak the local language or have interpreter support. Debriefing station facilities and manning should be sufficient, based on quantity of evacuees, to enable spotters (spotting and assessing evacuees at stations prior to debriefing station for potential leads and, or threats), initial screening (to identify evacuees for further debriefing), and debriefing, while minimally impacting evacuee processing rate. Debriefing facilities should be set up in a manner to enable visual and audible screening for debriefer and evacuee to ensure confidentiality and enable greater disclosure in instances where intimidation or a threat may exist. Suitable personnel include, but are not limited to, CI, HUMINT, and security with supporting interpreters. Each evacuee should be screened to determine if the evacuee has information which may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the evacuees, or other USG activities in the country. Evacuees determined to have relevant information should be directed to a debriefer. Evacuees determined to have no relevant information should be directed to the next station to expedite flow. Every effort should be made to keep family members together throughout this process, to include debriefing. Areas of interest might include the following:

- (1) Locations of other potential evacuees.
- (2) Changes in the political situation.

(3) Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might oppose the evacuation.

(4) The true intent of a threatening third party—consider the following:

- (a) Capability and likelihood of carrying out a threat.
- (b) Can the third party be influenced?
- (c) Can the potential threat be stopped or countered?

(5) Information/sources of activity, criminal behavior, or civil disorder that affect the NEO:

- (a) Evacuation routes that are being blocked off or have been closed.
- (b) Physical abuse or assault being done to deter evacuation.
- (c) Counterfeiting activities that are targeting required evacuation documentation.
- (d) Type of weapons being used by personnel interfering with evacuation.
- (e) Use of vehicles or armored vehicles to interfere with evacuation.
- (f) Public messages or fliers that gave wrong information for evacuation procedures.
- (g) Individuals, criminal groups, or organizations that are interfering with evacuation and/or involved in activities that violate international law (e.g., human trafficking, human rights abuses).

(6) Information/sources from people with unknown boxes or packages being transported for pay, favors, or gifts.

g. **Medical Station.** The medical station provides emergency medical treatment and coordinates for immunizations required by the safe haven country. As required, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for first aid and to identify medical conditions that may have an effect on the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures any seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing prior to being evacuated and alerts the medical staff at the point of debarkation that medical cases are inbound. Medical personnel should:

(1) Screen to determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment or evacuation.



*A medical station in the hangar bay of an amphibious warfare ship.*

- (2) Perform emergency treatment as required.
- (3) Isolate persons infected with contagious diseases.
- (4) Perform disease and annoyance vector control.
- (5) Ensure medical documentation is able to be retained by both the evacuee and the required entities of the USG.

**h. CBRN Medical Management.** The medical management of casualties resulting from exposure to CBRN hazards, particularly biological agents, may require significant augmentation and specialized considerations to care for the resultant casualties. AE capabilities for transport of CBRN-contaminated or contagious casualties are very limited. However, if decontamination has been conducted, most casualties are safe for AE. Exceptions may exist for those who have internalized the CBRN hazard or who are contagious. The JFC should consult with USTRANSCOM to determine whether casualty evacuation or treatment in place is appropriate. For additional information on the unique aspects of CBRN operations and CBRN medical management, including decontamination and triage, collective protection, and patient evacuation, refer to JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*, and Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-02.7/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-40A.6/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment*.

i. **Transportation Station.** Transportation personnel prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles. Some considerations are as follows:

(1) Coordinate all transportation, to include movement of personnel to the evacuation area, transportation of evacuees to designated air and maritime conveyance, and for any internal evacuation site requirements.

(2) Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard designated conveyance.

(3) Establish the manifest of all embarked personnel showing destination and identifying information by scanning evacuee's wristband using NTS or alternate means if NTS is unavailable.

(4) Organize evacuees into transportation groups (chalks), issue boarding passes for aircraft, and verify baggage tags.

(5) If NTS is not used, ensure information on the passenger manifest agrees with information provided on the evacuee register.

(6) Ensure sufficient transportation to transport evacuees and their baggage to the point of embarkation.

(7) Establish a pet holding area, if required.

j. **Comfort Station.** The comfort station is a controlled access area for evacuees while they await evacuation transportation. Comfort station personnel should make the evacuees' stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy, safety, and segregation in the case of unaccompanied females or other at-risk personnel. Some considerations are as follows:

(1) Evacuees should be segregated by transportation groups (chalks). A manned cordoned off area may be required.

(2) Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.

(3) Sufficient sanitation facilities.

(4) Senior personnel, medical personnel, and RSTs available to counsel evacuees, especially families with young children.

(5) Medical personnel should observe evacuees for any visible symptoms of illness/injury that may impede or disrupt the NEO.

(6) Male and female personal items.

#### 4. Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees

a. **General.** For organizational purposes, all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator from DOS. These categorizations are used to identify, move, and locate evacuees to facilitate an orderly evacuation. The JTF staff stays informed of changes in the projected number of potential evacuees by receiving periodic updates from the embassy's staff. These updates are provided in the form of a total number for all evacuees and number by category.

b. **Classification.** See Chapter IV, "Planning," subparagraph 8.c. "Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance," for a detailed discussion of the prioritization of evacuees. A priority designator includes a combination of a Roman numeral and capital letter indicating major and minor priorities assigned to each individual. Designated other persons for whom the United States provides evacuation assistance are classified using applicable criteria within major and minor categories. First priority will be US citizens in the following order (within each category, other priorities may exist for those with certain medical conditions that require transport to save life, limb, or eyesight):

(1) Those with current identification such as, passports, birth certificates, DOD identification cards, seaman's papers, air crew cards, and anyone designated as first priority by the COM, regardless of national affiliation. The COM is the final authority.

(2) Those with expired US passports less than 10 years old.

(3) Those with expired US passports over 10 years old.

c. **Guidelines.** Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:

(1) Evacuees are not detainees.

(2) The minimum force required should be used.

(3) Evacuation can be an unsettling experience, especially for children and families who have become separated. A separate NTS terminal with a trained operator may be designated to assist any individual who claims to be separated from their family. Individuals properly registered in NTS for evacuation can be located in a search function by recorded data, including name, passport number, relationship to other individuals, and last known location. Presenting a patient, courteous, and professional attitude does much to calm the situation and all evacuees.

(4) Depending on the situation, personal baggage may be limited.

(5) People should not be separated from their baggage.

(6) Baggage is searched for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or items declared to be restricted items. Be considerate but firm; the safety of personnel is paramount.

(7) The COM should establish a clear pet policy that details the number and type of pets allowed. Whenever possible, allow pets to accompany evacuees except in situations where lives are jeopardized or security compromised. If pets are to be evacuated, notify the theater veterinarian to ensure appropriate veterinary support throughout the NEO. Families should make every effort to secure all permits required to import pets to the safe haven. A copy of the permit, plus any health or vaccination certificates, should be attached to the crate in a waterproof bag. Additionally, special food required to cover the duration of the evacuation process should accompany the pet. If pets arrive for evacuation, a pet holding area should be established. Animals are required to accompany an owner or family, and there is a two-pet limit. Although DOD authorities have gone to great effort to make plans to evacuate pets, this may not be feasible in all evacuations, and families should make plans for their pets to stay behind or be transported commercially. The costs of any commercial transport of pets are borne by the family. If DOD can accommodate the transportation of pets through a military or chartered aircraft, families bring the following with their pets to the assembly area:

(a) Separate airline-approved pet containers for each animal except those with nursing litters. Crates with watering bowls and limited towels and/or blankets are preferred. Bedding is required to be free of dirt, straw, hay, or shavings. Do not include rawhide chew toys. Dog and cat food is available at intermediate staging areas and US repatriation sites.

(b) Movement orders and health and vaccination certificates should be attached in a waterproof bag to the outside of the crate. Written medication or special care instructions should be provided to personnel at the assembly point.

(c) Dogs and cats should wear collars with owner identification, and pet owners should have a leash or harness for their pet, as well as muzzles for agitated or aggressive animals.

(d) Pets, other than dogs or cats, should also be in airline-approved crates or containers for commercial flights. DOD pet policy is to only transport dogs and cats on military flights, which also requires the pet to be in an approved crate or container.

(8) Personnel do not accept gifts, tips, bribes, or any personal favors.

(9) All questions about an evacuee should be referred to DOS representative.

(10) Persons of higher priority may elect evacuation in a lower priority to avoid separating families. **If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of a family, the entire family accompanies the patient as nonmedical attendants** (dependent on time constraints and space availability) to avoid separating family members.

(11) Well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance service is essential.

(12) Medical personnel and RST/RMT personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in identification.

(13) When possible, patients should be given written instructions for medical care, especially care for children.

**d. Request for Political Asylum or Temporary Refuge.** International law and customs have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger. It is the policy of the United States to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to TCNs solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in imminent danger the life or safety of a person such as pursuit by a mob. The officer in command of an aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides which measures can prudently be taken to provide temporary refuge. DOD personnel are not authorized to grant political asylum to any foreign national. No information is released to the media concerning requests for political asylum until cleared by DOS. Any requests by foreign governments for the return of an individual are reported to the DOS representative. Until determination is made by DOS, safeguard those who have requested political asylum or temporary refuge. Refugees are not released against their will to a third party. The safety of JTF personnel and security of the unit are taken into consideration along with the following:

(1) Grant temporary refuge in cases where the requesting individual is in imminent danger, irrespective of whether political asylum or temporary refuge is requested.

(2) Let DOS representatives handle political asylum requests through the appropriate channels.

(3) Establish procedures to notify the CCDR of actions taken in cases of requests for political asylum.

*See Appendix B, "Legal Considerations," for additional guidance on political asylum or temporary refuge.*

## CHAPTER VII SAFE HAVEN AND REPATRIATION OPERATIONS

*“Department of Defense (DOD), upon Secretary of Defense approval of a request for assistance from Department of State, may provide, through the appropriate combatant commanders, military assistance for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of designated personnel to the United States or overseas safe haven, and may further provide support at US designated military bases or other designated POEs [points of entry] during NERP [National Emergency Repatriation Plan] activation.”*

**Federal Evacuation Support Annex to the Response  
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans, January 2021**

### 1. Temporary Safe Haven Site

a. A safe haven is a designated area(s) to which noncombatant evacuees under the USG’s responsibility may also be evacuated during an emergency. It is a location within or outside the United States to which noncombatant evacuees are authorized to travel for the purpose of temporarily remaining there until they are authorized to return to the location from which evacuated or until they are authorized to travel to their final destination. Safe havens are normally designated by DOS, in coordination with DOD. A safe haven should be in an area or country in which evacuees can be moved to quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven is in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an intermediate or temporary safe haven. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. An intermediate safe haven may be a USN ship; however, the evacuees should be removed from the ship to land-based safe havens (in the United States or a third country) as quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is required outside the United States, DOS coordinates with the government in the country where it is located. Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required. While arranging for support of evacuees is the responsibility of DOS, commanders in theater should be prepared to assist DOS in arranging for life support of evacuees at the temporary safe haven. Depending on the temporary safe haven, there could be overflow issues, in that the safe haven may not be able to handle the final number of evacuees, leading to the need for planners to develop and consider branch and alternate plans for additional safe havens in the planning process.

b. The following factors should be considered when selecting a site:

(1) OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to ensure mission success and prevent undue pressure against the HN government in which the temporary safe haven is located.

(2) Capability to communicate with the ECC, JTF HQ, and the embassy.

(3) Airfield or port capacity suitable for the aircraft or ships being used, both for the evacuation and later onward movement for the evacuees. Consideration should be given to the following:

- (a) Twenty-four-hour operations for the airfield and port.
  - (b) Availability of HN controllers to control the airfield and the requirement for JTF controllers.
  - (c) Balance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of anticipated air flow.
  - (d) Total numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation.
  - (e) Condition of aircraft parking areas.
  - (f) Length, width, and condition of runways and taxiway.
  - (g) Airfield search and rescue, security, firefighting, and logistic support.
  - (h) Airfield maintenance support.
  - (i) Capabilities of airfield facilities.
  - (j) Channel and harbor depth.
  - (k) Berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages.
  - (l) Types and capabilities of tugs.
  - (m) Availability of equipment and personnel to load and/or offload aircraft and ships, if required.
  - (n) Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic considerations.
- (4) Proximity to major transportation hubs.
- (5) Adequate billeting, rations, medical infrastructure, and potable water for evacuees and the temporary safe haven force.

c. Although the temporary safe haven operates under the authority of the host government, it may not have the goodwill of the local population. It may be a prime target for terrorism and riots. The JFC should plan for such situations and protect the evacuees and the JTF personnel.

## 2. Alternate Safe Haven Site

a. During a NEO, evacuees may prefer to reside somewhere other than the designated safe haven (normally continental United States). Most often, the request is for the family to reside overseas in the designated spouse's native country, if applicable.

b. Families who seek alternate safe havens should be cautioned that, as temporary residents in foreign safe haven locations, they do not have official status with the HN. They may enter the HN as tourists and may need visas or be required to pay taxes on their personal property. Sponsors should be advised that the SOFA is applicable to the sponsor and accompanying family members and that it is not applicable to isolated family members. Additionally, family members who choose a safe haven in a foreign country are no longer command-sponsored and may not be authorized to use exchange or medical facilities, DOD schools, base housing, or US mail services. The sponsor's request for an alternate family safe haven, therefore, must be justified and must show why the designated safe haven is not suitable for the evacuees.

## 3. Repatriation Operations

a. Repatriation is the procedure whereby US citizens and their families are officially processed back into the United States following evacuation from overseas. Evacuees are also provided various services to ensure their well-being and onward movement to their final destination. Although repatriation is not part of, but subsequent to, a NEO, the following information should be understood by the NEO JFC and other key joint force members.

### b. Responsibilities

(1) CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM are responsible for repatriating DOD noncombatant evacuees to the United States and/or US territories within their respective AORs. CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM establish and operate JRCCs and manage all of the noncombatant evacuees' needs as specified in their respective CCMD noncombatant evacuee repatriation plans. The JRCC maintains oversight of the entire DOD repatriation operation and keeps DOD and other USG departments and agencies informed about repatriation matters.

(2) The DHHS is the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the US port of entry. Their plans rely on state and local governments to carry out the operational responsibilities of repatriation. A DHHS repatriation plan as governed by Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended, is implemented. In nonemergency conditions, the embassy and DOS coordinate DHHS assistance rendered to evacuees.

### c. Coordination

(1) All CCDRs should plan for possible repatriation contingencies and coordinate with CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM, depending on where the repatriation into the United States or US territories occurs.

(2) CDRUSTRANSCOM, along with the supported CCDR and the JRCC, coordinates the flow of evacuees to ports of debarkation.

d. **Funding.** The **Services and DOD agencies** provide funding for safe haven expenses for their respective evacuees. The Service components have the authority to provide special allowances for their Service members and family members under an authorized or ordered evacuation from an overseas location. Federal employees and their family members are also authorized pay and special allowances. Financial entitlements include, but are not limited to, advance payments (when authorized by sponsor), travel, safe haven allowances, subsistence expense allowances to authorized individuals, and legal claims settlements when authorized by SecDef and/or parent organization.

e. **PA.** The **Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)** supervises the PA aspects of all repatriation operations and approves the proposed PA guidance submitted by subordinate DOD organizations and commands.

f. **Evacuee Information Documentation**

(1) **Instrument.** DD 2585, *Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet*, is the standard form used to document the movement of an evacuee from a foreign country to a designated safe haven. **DD 2585 should be provided to the evacuees and completed by them prior to their arrival at the repatriation center.** See Appendix E, “Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet.”

(2) **Purpose.** DOS uses the information for evacuation management and planning purposes. The American Red Cross requires the data for communication of evacuation information to sponsors remaining in theater. USCIS uses the information for tracking foreign nationals evacuated to the United States. DHHS uses it to facilitate delivery of personal and financial services, to recoup those costs and to identify individuals who might arrive with an illness requiring quarantine. Additionally, state and local health departments need and use the information to further implement the quarantine of an ill individual. Finally, DD 2585 provides a basic data source for the information recorded in the NTS and the Automated Repatriation Reporting System. Information in these two automated systems is routinely used to inform evacuee’s family members of their current location and final destination.

g. **Family Assistance.** DOD family centers provide assistance for DOD and/or non-DOD civilian employees and family members affected by an evacuation from an overseas country throughout the entire safe haven period. These family centers provide essential services during the repatriation operation and follow-on assistance and aid when families reach their final safe haven destinations.

h. **Pets.** Although the evacuation of pets is not authorized by Federal regulations, experience has shown that evacuees will bring their pets; therefore, repatriation centers and intermediate staging/processing locations should be prepared to take care of pets if approved by DOS. Families are financially responsible for moving their pets to and from the theater. Transportation of pets at government expense is not an entitlement. Veterinary assistance for pets should be coordinated in advance and made available at the repatriation sites as required.

i. **NEO Documents.** CCDRs and Service commanders outside the United States should identify the documents an individual would require to assist them in preparing for an evacuation during their initial assignment in-processing. The respective CCMD noncombatant evacuee repatriation plan may contain a complete listing and explanation of all suggested NEO packet items, to include all of the documentation required for each evacuee and/or family to receive proper safe haven entitlements and process through the repatriation site expeditiously.

#### 4. Organization and Functional Considerations

The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC's processing section, operates under the control of the JFC in coordination with the appropriate DOS representative. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following elements.

a. **Command Group.** The command group coordinates the overall operation and should consist of the commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned OIC, communications officer, family center staff, chaplain (with RST), LNOs, and interpreters. The family center staff provides and coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The RST/RMT personnel plan and coordinate comprehensive religious support/religious ministry for the safe haven force and evacuees. The LNOs and interpreters maintain contact with the US embassy and the host government. The command group:

- (1) Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the temporary safe haven.
- (2) Maintains liaison with local DOS representatives and other agencies that may be involved with the operation.
- (3) Advises the JFC on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations.
- (4) Establishes procedures for government officials and TCNs if not previously established by the JTF commander. This is especially true when evacuees are taken to a US military installation and access to and movement aboard the installation are controlled. Guidance should be established for TCNs aboard the installation and any requirements for exiting or accessing the installation.

(5) Establishes provisions for searching women and children, as well as disabled and injured persons.

(6) Establishes connections with NGOs who can provide assistance to evacuees.

b. **Reception Team.** This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section.

(1) **Briefing Section.** This section should brief the evacuees on their arrival in their appropriate language, if possible:

(a) Current political situation in the HN.

(b) Description and operation of the temporary safe haven.

(c) Further traveling options and arrangements.

(d) Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.

(e) Projected departure times for flights to the United States or other final destinations.

(f) Restrictions applicable to evacuees while at the temporary safe haven.

(g) Medical threat related to HN.

(h) Accountability requirements and procedures.

(i) Pet policy (when applicable).

(2) **PA Section.** Release of information on the NEO or temporary safe haven operations within each country is the responsibility of the COM or a designated representative. The temporary safe haven PAO has the same responsibilities as the JTF PAO, which are provided in Chapter V, "Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures." Temporary safe haven PAO responsibilities are as follows:

(a) Advise the temporary safe haven leadership on all aspects of PA.

(b) Coordinate and supervise all PA and PA-related command information functions, to include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information media.

(c) Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA.

(d) Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its operations to the news media per JTF policies.

(e) Escort credentialed civilian and military news media representatives.

(f) Ensure appropriate guidelines are in place for news media to protect the privacy of evacuees in billeting areas.

(g) Ensure interviews of JTF personnel and evacuees are held only with the permission of the JFC and the individual concerned.

(h) Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information to the public.

c. **Processing Team.** This team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC but should verify all information obtained from the evacuees is complete and correct.

(1) **Administrative Section.** This section registers and accounts for all evacuees and collects all information required by DOS or the JTF. The administrative section should have legal personnel advise evacuees on claims procedures and assist in relations between evacuees, safe haven personnel, and HN nationals. The following should be accomplished:

(a) Receive and register incoming evacuees, using NTS with biometrics and other appropriate information.

(b) Using NTS, maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. It should list the nationality; date of birth; NTS identification number; biometric identifier; evacuation classification; local phone number and e-mail; destination; and name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.

(c) Provide escorts for groups of personnel. VIPs and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides if available.

(d) Provide for safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait for onward transportation to the United States.

(e) Provide assistance as needed in locating separated family members.

(2) **Transportation Section.** The transportation section assists in the onward movement of evacuees to their final destination. The USG does not provide funding for the movement of persons other than USG (military and civilian) employees and family members to their final destination. See Chapter IV, "Planning," subparagraph 8.c., "Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance," for additional information. Nongovernment employees evacuated by US-funded charter, whether commercial or military, are asked to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of transportation. The following transportation functions should be considered to ensure an orderly movement:

(a) Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees to the United States and then coordinate this movement flow with the JRCC.

(b) Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the JRCC at the repatriation site.

(c) Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard aircraft, ships, or vehicles.

(d) Maintain a manifest of all embarked personnel showing destination and identifying information.

(e) Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, medically fragile, or wounded in coordination with the medical section.

(3) **Intelligence Section.** This section may debrief each evacuee if a debriefing was not conducted at the JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a temporary ISB, intelligence personnel should arrange to pass information gained from evacuees to the CCMD joint intelligence operations center to advise forces who are returning to a threat area for follow-on operations.

(4) **Medical Section.** The medical section provides support to the temporary safe haven force. Additionally, this section may need to conduct evacuee medical screening if it was not performed at the ECC. Medical services may include any or all of the following functions:

(a) Determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment.

(b) Perform emergency treatment as required or coordinate with a local hospital to perform the treatment.

(c) Advise the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine.

(d) Inspect food and water obtained from local sources.

(e) Evaluate the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases.

(f) Provide veterinary support for pet health care as required.

d. **Comfort Team.** This team provides logistic support for the operation. It is responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food and drinking water, and local transportation. A contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to coordinate services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:

(1) Billeting is ideally accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or contracted from the temporary safe haven country. However, the JTF may be required to establish a tent city. In this event, the temporary safe haven force arrives early enough to accomplish this before evacuees begin arriving. The JFC may consider contracting locally for the labor and sanitation facilities and, for large-scale or more complex requirements, should assess the need and plan for rapidly expansible contracts (e.g., Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program).

(2) Because evacuees normally leave the HN with little or no food supplies of their own, meals ready-to-eat can be used as a temporary solution. However, the temporary safe haven OIC should be prepared to establish a food service section to provide special diets to personnel involved in the evacuation.

(3) If the climate of the safe haven is substantially different from the evacuee's former residence, the team may need to provide adequate clothing.

(4) Due to the situation, evacuees may not have had the opportunity to pack personal, comfort, or hygiene items prior to arriving at the evacuation site. The following is a partial list of items the evacuees may need:

- (a) Baby formula.
- (b) Trash bags.
- (c) Baby food and/or juice.
- (d) Diapers and baby wipes.
- (e) Toilet tissue.
- (f) Feminine hygiene supplies.
- (g) Toothpaste and/or toothbrush.
- (h) Soap.
- (i) Shampoo.
- (j) Razors.
- (k) Laundry detergent.
- (l) Sheets.
- (m) Towels.

- (n) Blankets.
- (o) Wash bucket.
- (p) Pet food (dog and cat) and cat litter.
- (q) Face masks (cloth or disposable).
- (r) Hand sanitizer and sanitation wipes.

e. **Scheduling Team.** This team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees from the temporary safe haven. The scheduling team should do the following:

(1) Coordinate with the transportation section for arrangements made for leaving the temporary safe haven.

(2) Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the points of embarkation.

(3) Manifest authorized passengers aboard military or commercial charter flights using NTS or other appropriate tracking means.

f. **Security Team.** This team provides, or arranges for, adequate security at the temporary safe haven site. This team should consider how to respond to, investigate, and/or resolve domestic disputes, criminal acts, and incidents of violence between evacuees, as well as between evacuees and support personnel.

g. **RST/RMT.** This team performs or provides for comprehensive religious support/religious ministry for the temporary safe haven site.

h. **Family Support Services.** The CCDR may task a Service component that has a demonstrated capability to provide family support services to provide a team to support the temporary/intermediate safe haven.

## APPENDIX A RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

a. The ROE for a NEO reflect the limited military objective to be achieved. NEO ROE may limit the use of force to that force necessary to successfully complete the mission and provide for the self-defense of US military personnel and defense of civilian evacuees. CJCSI 3121.01, *(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*, is the basic source for standing rules of engagement (SROE)/standing rules for the use of force and specifically addresses actions to be taken by US forces conducting a NEO. The SROE reflect the limited objective of NEO and provide the baseline from which all supplemental ROE are drafted and approved.

b. Upon receipt of an ID or warning order, the JFC immediately reviews the ROE to evaluate the potential impact on evacuation operations. Normally, the JFC is told in the warning order that the SROE applies and is instructed to request specific supplemental measures as the mission dictates. Potential problems should be identified, and requests for deletion or modification of ROE are forwarded via the supported CCDR to the issuing authority. ROE are tailored to support mission accomplishment and may impact the choice of a COA. Forces participating in a NEO should be briefed on and understand applicable ROE and their rights and obligations surrounding self-defense. Briefings should be coordinated with the command legal advisor whenever possible.

c. Commanders have an inherent right and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in the self-defense of their unit and other US forces in the vicinity. ROE do not diminish this right and obligation but govern the use of force for mission accomplishment.

### (1) Self-Defense Actions

(a) The use of force in self-defense is limited to the amount of force necessary to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent to protect US lives (and those of designated TCN evacuees, as authorized and tasked), property, and equipment. Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration, and scope of force used should not exceed what is required to end that threat.

(b) May include pursuit only until the attacker is no longer a threat to US personnel (and designated TCN evacuees), property, and equipment.

(2) Subordinate commanders should ensure personnel are thoroughly trained in both the application of lethal and nonlethal weapons, as well as the need to use only necessary force. All personnel must be instructed as to the importance of good order and discipline when conducting NEOs.

(3) Commanders at all levels should exercise caution to use only the force necessary to provide for the successful defense of evacuees and complete the mission.

d. Ideally, ROE should allow for approval of requests to employ RCAs and joint fire support (such as naval surface fire support and close air support). The use of joint fires, the ability to act in defense of non-US persons, and the use of RCAs should be addressed in the ROE, as appropriate, based upon the circumstances. As stated in CJCSI 3110.07, *(U) Guidance Concerning Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides*, the use of RCAs is restricted to US bases, posts, or US-controlled portions of foreign installations where the authority to approve peacetime employment of RCAs resides with the CCDR. Use of RCAs outside of these parameters requires higher approval. See SROE for specific approval authority. Additionally, authority for the use of RCA may be obtained pursuant to Enclosure I to CJCSI 3121.01, *(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*. CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, outlines the processes for staffing and approval of MISO programs and series. Included in this instruction are planning guidance and approved programs with standing objectives for short-notice contingency operations. In addition, this instruction also provides the force with a potential target audience list and general planning guidance.

e. The use of force is normally a measure of last resort under ROE for NEOs. Such ROE often provide that, when time and circumstances permit, forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. The use of nonlethal weapons should be considered and planned for as a part of ROE. Employment of MISO assets and capabilities should be considered toward this objective.

*For more information on nonlethal weapons, refer to ATP 3-22.40/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 10-10A/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.*

## APPENDIX B LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

This appendix provides general information and guidance for handling legal matters that may arise during a NEO. The JFC and subordinate commanders of the evacuation and ISB should have a legal advisor attached to their staffs to advise on military and international legal matters.

### 1. General

a. The JFC and subordinate commanders must ensure JTF personnel abide by all applicable law and policy, to include the law of war and other relevant international law, the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, and the operation's ROE/rules for the use of force. All possible, suspected, or alleged violations should be dealt with IAW applicable DOD and Service regulations. As appropriate, the JFC may notify the embassy of a suspected violation occurrence.

b. **Role of JTF Legal Advisor.** The JTF legal advisor provides guidance to the JTF on all legal issues involved in conducting NEOs. The key emphasis is on assisting with interpretation of and compliance with applicable US laws and regulations; relevant international agreements, including any pertinent SOFAs; and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements impacting a NEO.

c. **Legal Imperatives.** When planning and conducting a NEO, commanders comply with US domestic law, international agreements, customary international law, and, in some circumstances, HN law. In view of this governing framework of laws and regulations, as well as the complexity of legal issues relating to NEOs, commanders obtain legal guidance at all phases of NEO planning and execution, particularly during the early planning stage.

d. **Legal Input for Operational Planning.** Commanders should ensure legal advisors at all levels are full participants in all aspects of NEO planning, operational guidance and decisions, and national policy directives. Additionally, OPLANs, warning orders, commander's estimates, ROE, operation orders, execute orders, and other operational documents should be systematically reviewed by the JTF legal advisor to ensure compliance with applicable law and regulations.

### 2. Specific Guidance and Terminology

a. **Foreign Diplomat.** A foreign diplomat of an embassy staff authorized to go to the United States for evacuation is entitled to special treatment IAW international law. Ideally, the individual, as well as personal effects and papers, are not to be searched, detained, or seized. Family members are also entitled to the same immunity unless they are citizens of the United States. The diplomatic pouch of a diplomatic courier from a state recognized by the United States is also immune from any search, inspection, detention, or seizure by US personnel. However, foreign diplomats may be subject to inspection, under certain circumstances, for weapons or other dangerous materials prior to boarding any vehicle,

ship, or aircraft. Refusal to submit to inspection may result in the individual being barred from boarding. Foreign diplomats and their family members must follow accountability and manifesting procedures.

b. **Political Asylum or Temporary Refuge.** JTF commanders may not grant political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any person. Commanders must understand that if temporary refuge is granted, Secretary of a Military Department approval is necessary to release the individual. All requests for asylum should be referred to the embassy or senior DOS representative available. CJCSI 3121.01, *(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*, includes a specific section addressing protection and disposition of foreign nationals in the custody of US forces.

c. **SOFA.** Any SOFA between the HN and the United States should be reviewed to determine how it applies, if at all, to the current situation involving the NEO. If time permits, it should be modified as necessary prior to the JTF arrival. If no agreement exists, the embassy may negotiate a temporary agreement with the HN, if time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement, customs, and other legal matters. DOS negotiates any SOFA changes. Given the emergency nature of the NEO, however, it is likely that no special SOFA provisions will be negotiated.

d. **Detainee Treatment.** The embassy should determine the disposition of detainees in advance of the deployment of military forces. In the absence of this determination, it is US policy to treat all detainees humanely and IAW US law, including the law of war, and applicable US policy. Anyone detained by US forces in an attempt to deter or in response to hostile action is provided with the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, until some other legal status is determined by competent authority. The embassy, with the HN, negotiates the disposition of the detainee.

e. **Claims.** The JTF legal advisor or designated claims officer develops a plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States. The plan is coordinated with the appropriate embassy staff member.

f. **International Legal Considerations**

(1) **Law of War.** Traditional legal issues associated with the law of war do not normally arise in the context of a NEO, as NEOs typically occur during times of escalating confrontation short of armed conflict. However, it should be remembered that, per DOD policy, the law of war is applicable to all military operations. The protections afforded civilians, the sick, and/or the wounded under the law of war are almost universally accepted humanitarian norms respected in many cases despite the absence of international armed conflict.

(2) **National Sovereignty.** The CCDR and subordinate commanders should ensure the NEO planners are aware of sovereignty of other foreign nations and the

operational limitations that stem from that sovereignty. NEO planners and operators should be cognizant of the potential impact of operations on relations with other nations and of all relevant international agreements, including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements.

g. **Legal Assistance.** Implementing plans should provide for preventive law programs designed to avoid sudden and overwhelming demands for emergency legal assistance when evacuation becomes imminent or is implemented. To the extent practical and authorized, legal assistance and advice are made available to eligible beneficiaries at safe haven points and collection processing points, in coordination with the US diplomatic mission.

h. **Military Justice.** Military justice is administered IAW the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*.

*Refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support, for more information on military justice.*

i. **Reporting Violations of the Law of War.** All military and US civilian employees, contractor personnel, and subcontractors assigned to or accompanying a DOD component report through their chain of command all reportable incidents, including those involving allegations of non-DOD personnel having violated the law of war, IAW DODD 2311.01, *DOD Law of War Program*, and as follows:

(1) The commander of a unit that obtains information about an alleged violation of the law of war assesses whether the allegation is based on credible information and thus constitutes a reportable incident. The unit commander immediately reports reportable incidents, by operational incident reporting procedures or other expeditious means, through the chain of command to the CCDR.

(2) The unit commander or higher authorities receiving information about a reportable incident will, when warranted, direct an assessment, investigation, inquiry, or other review IAW applicable procedures. An assessment, investigation, inquiry, or other review are scoped to deconflict with any investigation initiated by a responsible defense criminal investigative organization. Once a determination is made that US persons are not involved in a reportable incident, further US investigation is undertaken only at the direction of the appropriate CCDR.

j. **HNS**

(1) The CCDR and subordinate commanders should be aware of applicable basing rights and the status of US forces within the country when planning and executing a NEO. Advance coordination should be made to ensure necessary landing, embarkation, and transit rights are in place to support a given operation.

(2) Additionally, the changing political/diplomatic and military situation must be taken into account prior to relying on previously negotiated HNS agreements. Liaison with

DOS officials responsible for the particular NEO site must be accomplished in a timely manner.

k. **Reports to Congress.** Some operations may require consultation with, or reporting to, Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution and other relevant statutes.

**APPENDIX C**  
**SAMPLE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS**

This appendix contains sample checklists based on the DOS EPH and associated FAHs. The checklists found in an embassy EAP should be the actual checklist used for NEO.

1. Name and title of United States official in charge of the evacuation:

\_\_\_\_\_

2. United States officials remaining behind: (Attach list with names, means of contact).

3. Post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (Attach list—see DOS EPH Exhibit 120—update to show name, probable location, and means of identification and contact of officer performing each relevant function.)

4. How many military personnel will be needed to assist in screening evacuees and where will they need to be located \_\_\_\_\_

Who will assist the military?

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Is the operational environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Perimeter security needs: \_\_\_\_\_

Assembly areas and embarkation points:

\_\_\_\_\_

7. What security will the HN or controlling authority provide?

\_\_\_\_\_

8. Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available if required?

\_\_\_\_\_

9. Where are the GIBCOs located and who has custody of them? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

10. Could unauthorized and/or hostile persons forcibly or surreptitiously attempt to join the evacuation? If so, what action does the post recommend?

\_\_\_\_\_

11. What action does the post propose if someone asks for political asylum? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

12. Will the post's OIC vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacuees or should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted? \_\_\_\_\_
13. Does the COM desire the military to physically search those evacuees that cannot be validated? \_\_\_\_\_
14. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search?  
\_\_\_\_\_
15. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the post plan, give the modified priority:  
\_\_\_\_\_
16. Will food be required? \_\_\_\_\_ Total meals: \_\_\_\_\_
17. Is potable water available? \_\_\_\_\_  
Quantity of bottled water required: \_\_\_\_\_
18. Does the post anticipate that any US citizen will refuse evacuation?  
\_\_\_\_\_
19. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? \_\_\_\_\_
- a. If pets are allowed to be transported, have requirements such as customs and quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the pets will be allowed into the safe haven? \_\_\_\_\_
- b. If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with them to the evacuation processing centers? \_\_\_\_\_
20. Does the embassy anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for missing evacuees? If so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located? (Give radio call sign frequencies, if known.) \_\_\_\_\_
21. Would a search operation meet armed resistance? \_\_\_\_\_
22. Will the post need help to destroy sensitive materials or equipment? \_\_\_\_\_
23. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees (consider all likely points):  
How many sets? \_\_\_\_\_ Frequencies? \_\_\_\_\_ Additional needs? \_\_\_\_\_
24. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees?  
Embassy: \_\_\_\_\_  
Military: \_\_\_\_\_

25. Under extreme circumstances families might be separated, and there must be a method of identifying unaccompanied children with parents/guardians during repatriation periods.

26. Other items that may affect NEO:

- a. Travel restrictions, curfew, roadblocks.
- b. Local military activities.
- c. Political/diplomatic, medical, or security factors affecting evacuation.
- d. PA considerations.

27. If translators are needed, can the embassy provide? \_\_\_\_\_

28. Provide updated copies of the embassy's:

- a. EPH Section 1540 and exhibits for same.
- b. Communications annex.
- c. Logistics annex.
- d. Transportation annex.
- e. F-77 (Potential Evacuees) Report.
- f. GIBCO.

29. Give number of evacuees who are:

- a. Wounded, injured, or ill: litter \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Wounded, injured, or ill: ambulatory \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Pregnant: \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Any contagious diseases or infections present? \_\_\_\_\_

30. What medical assistance (to include special equipment such as PPE) will be required?  
\_\_\_\_\_

31. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex:

0-7 years:    male \_\_\_\_\_ female \_\_\_\_\_

8–16 years: male \_\_\_\_\_ female \_\_\_\_\_  
17–20 years: male \_\_\_\_\_ female \_\_\_\_\_  
21+years: male \_\_\_\_\_ female \_\_\_\_\_

32. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees? \_\_\_\_\_
33. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees? \_\_\_\_\_
34. Weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation:  
\_\_\_\_\_ pounds \_\_\_\_\_ cubic feet
35. Attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status, to include possible threats to transportation.

**ASSEMBLY AREA**

LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Assembly Area \_\_\_\_\_ Primary \_\_\_\_\_

Embarkation Point \_\_\_\_\_ Alternate \_\_\_\_\_

1. Location: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Grid coordinates: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Reference points: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Size: \_\_\_\_\_ Estimated capacity: \_\_\_\_\_

5. Shelter: \_\_\_\_\_

6. Cooking facilities: \_\_\_\_\_ Water: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Food stocks: \_\_\_\_\_

Estimated person/days on hand: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Latrine and shower: \_\_\_\_\_

9. Security: \_\_\_\_\_

10. Control point: \_\_\_\_\_

11. Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_ Radio call sign: \_\_\_\_\_

12. Access, chokepoints: \_\_\_\_\_

Alternates: \_\_\_\_\_

13. Nearest police station: \_\_\_\_\_

14. Nearest medical treatment facility: \_\_\_\_\_

15. Emergency power supply: \_\_\_\_\_

16. Distances to embarkation points: \_\_\_\_\_

17. If LZ, identify:

\_\_\_\_\_ Sketch attached \_\_\_\_\_ Video attached \_\_\_\_\_ Photo attached

18. Availability of fuel for surface vehicles: \_\_\_\_\_

This report prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

**LANDING ZONE**

LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Designator: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Location: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Grid/Latitude-Longitude: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Reference point(s): \_\_\_\_\_

5. Dimensions: \_\_\_\_\_

6. Surface: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Obstacles: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Recommended air approach(es): \_\_\_\_\_

9. Recommended ground approach(es): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s): \_\_\_\_\_

11. Fuel availability and source:  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

This report prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Sketch attached \_\_\_\_\_ Video attached \_\_\_\_\_ Photo attached

**AIRFIELD SURVEY**

AIRFIELD NAME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

PREPARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

CONTACT NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

Section A: General

1. Location/Airfield Center (Latitude/Longitude): \_\_\_\_\_

2. Airport controlled by military or civilian: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Fuel (Type/Availability): \_\_\_\_\_
4. Materials handling equipment/aircraft support equipment: (Type/availability):  
\_\_\_\_\_
5. What is the availability of HN certified, civilian, or military air traffic controllers?  
\_\_\_\_\_
6. Air traffic estimate (commercial and non-US military) during period in issue:  
\_\_\_\_\_

Section B: Airfield Access and Accommodations

7. Distance from assembly area to airport (Miles):
  - a. Primary: \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Secondary: \_\_\_\_\_
8. Conditions of roads leading to airport: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airport: \_\_\_\_\_
10. On-site assembly areas and capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
11. Latrine and shower facilities: \_\_\_\_\_
12. Dining facilities yes or no
  - a. If yes, capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Maximum meals per meal period: \_\_\_\_\_
13. Airfield physical security
  - a. Does the airfield have a fence?
    - (1) Type/height: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (2) Full or partial perimeter \_\_\_\_\_
    - (3) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Additional physical security measures/concerns: \_\_\_\_\_

Section C: Runways/Taxiways/Parking Aprons

14. Does an airfield suitability and restrictions report/giant report exist for the airfield in question? (If yes, attach a copy and continue to Section D; if no, complete Section C)

a. Runway \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ :

- (1) Dimensions (feet): \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Runway surface composition and condition: \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Runway \_\_\_\_\_
  - (a) Magnetic heading: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (b) Threshold latitude/longitude: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) Threshold elevation: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (d) DOD/Jeppesen Instrument Approaches (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (e) Lighting types (e.g., centerline): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (f) Obstacles: \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Runway \_\_\_\_\_
  - (a) Magnetic heading: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (b) Threshold latitude/longitude: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) Threshold elevation: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (d) DOD/Jeppesen Instrument Approaches (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (e) Lighting types (e.g., centerline): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (f) Obstacles: \_\_\_\_\_

b. Runway \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ :

- (1) Dimensions (feet): \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Runway surface composition and condition: \_\_\_\_\_

- (3) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Runway \_\_\_\_\_
  - (a) Magnetic heading: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (b) Threshold latitude/longitude: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) Threshold elevation: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (d) DOD/Jeppesen Instrument Approaches (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (e) Lighting types (e.g., centerline): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (f) Obstacles: \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Runway \_\_\_\_\_
  - (a) Magnetic heading: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (b) Threshold latitude/longitude: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (c) Threshold elevation: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (d) DOD/Jeppesen Instrument Approaches (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (e) Lighting types (e.g., centerline): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (f) Obstacles: \_\_\_\_\_

15. Taxiway information

- a. Taxiway \_\_\_\_\_:
  - (1) Width (feet): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (2) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (3) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (4) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (5) Obstacles (height and distance from centerline): \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Taxiway \_\_\_\_\_:
  - (1) Width (feet): \_\_\_\_\_

- (2) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Obstacles (height and distance from centerline): \_\_\_\_\_

c. Taxiway \_\_\_\_\_:

- (1) Width (feet): \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Obstacles (height and distance from centerline): \_\_\_\_\_

d. Taxiway \_\_\_\_\_:

- (1) Width (feet): \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Obstacles (height and distance from centerline): \_\_\_\_\_

e. Taxiway \_\_\_\_\_:

- (1) Width (feet): \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Obstacles (height and distance from centerline): \_\_\_\_\_

16. Parking Apron Information

- a. Parking Apron: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (1) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (2) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (3) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (4) Maximum on the ground: \_\_\_\_\_
  
- b. Parking Apron: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (1) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (2) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (3) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (4) Maximum on the ground: \_\_\_\_\_
  
- c. Parking Apron: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (1) Condition: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (2) Lighted (yes/no): \_\_\_\_\_
  - (3) Weight bearing capacity: \_\_\_\_\_
  - (4) Maximum on the ground: \_\_\_\_\_

Section D: Communications

- 17. Air traffic information service: \_\_\_\_\_
- 18. Clearance delivery: \_\_\_\_\_
- 19. Ground: \_\_\_\_\_
- 20. Tower: \_\_\_\_\_
- 21. Approach/departure (with sectors as needed): \_\_\_\_\_
- 22. Command post: \_\_\_\_\_
- 23. Base operations: \_\_\_\_\_

- 24. Airfield manager: \_\_\_\_\_
- 25. Weather: \_\_\_\_\_
- 26. Security: \_\_\_\_\_
- 27. Civilian fixed-base operator: \_\_\_\_\_
- 28. Navigational aids: \_\_\_\_\_
- 29. Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**SEAPORT SURVEY**

LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

- 1. Name of seaport: \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. Location (map coordinates): \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage: \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. Channel depth, depending on season: \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. Water depth at berths: \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. Tide, depending on season: \_\_\_\_\_
- 7. Pilots required or available: \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. Navigational aids: \_\_\_\_\_
- 9. Port or beach obstacles: \_\_\_\_\_
- 10. Wharf (description and capabilities): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 11. Materials handling equipment: \_\_\_\_\_
- 12. Fuel (type and availability): \_\_\_\_\_
- 13. Physical security available and in use: \_\_\_\_\_
- 14. Distance from post to seaport: \_\_\_\_\_

Appendix C

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15. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

16. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

17. On-site assembly areas and capacity: \_\_\_\_\_

18. Dining facilities and capacity: \_\_\_\_\_

19. Latrine and shower facilities: \_\_\_\_\_

20. Location of nearest medical treatment facility: \_\_\_\_\_

21. Key contacts, key personnel: \_\_\_\_\_

22. If used, craft LZs and beach landing sites for landing craft. Accommodates number and type of landing craft.  
\_\_\_\_\_

This report prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Sketch attached \_\_\_\_\_ Video attached \_\_\_\_\_ Photo attached

**APPENDIX D  
SAMPLE NOTICE FORM**

**SAMPLE SECURITY ALERT**

**Security Alert – United States Embassy (City, Country) (Release Date)**

**Location:** (Location of incident, i.e., city, landmark, neighborhood. If more than one location, provide bullet list. Please use format: “Neighborhood/Landmark, City, Country”).

**Event:** state the incident which took place/crime trend. Provide local government threat assessment or action if applicable. Please spell out: “Month, Date, Year” for all dates.

**If applicable:** United States Government personnel are advised to/prohibited from (Mission official posture).

**If applicable:** provide information about impact on embassy operations, such as early closure, closure, and limited consular appointments.

**Example:**

**On Date,** The Department of State allowed for the voluntary departure of non-emergency United States Government employees and their family members.

**Actions to Take:**

**US citizens who require assistance should contact ###-###-#### as soon as possible for further instructions.**

**Monitor local media for updates.**

**Make contingency plans to leave.**

**Review your personal security plans.**

**Have travel documents up to date and easily accessible.**

**Carry proper identification, including a US passport with a current (country) visa.**

**Have evacuation plans that do not rely on United States Government assistance.**

**Notify friends and family of your safety.**

**Expect communication disruptions; contact family and friends to let them know you are safe.**

**If safe, stock up on groceries and water and then stay home.**

**Assistance:**

**United States Embassy/Consulate (City, Country)**

**Phone number**

**E-mail address**  
**Embassy/Consulate website**

**Department of States – Consular Affairs**  
**888-###-#### or 202-###-####**

**(Country) Country Information**  
**Enroll in Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive security updates.**  
**Follow us on Facebook and Twitter.**

# APPENDIX E

## REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER PROCESSING SHEET

<b>REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER PROCESSING SHEET</b>	<i>OMB No. 0704-0334 OMB approval expires Sep 30, 2017</i>
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 20 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Executive Services Directorate, Directives Division, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-3100 (0704-0334). Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.	
<b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR COMPLETED FORM TO THE ABOVE ORGANIZATION. RETURN COMPLETED FORM TO THE REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER OR STATE DEPARTMENT EMBASSY PERSONNEL IF SAFEHAVENING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY.</b>	
<b>PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT</b>	
<p><b>AUTHORITY:</b> E.O. 12656, and E.O. 9397.</p> <p><b>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S):</b> To document the movement of an evacuee from a foreign country to an announced safe haven. Information will be used, as needed, to assist the evacuee in the process of repatriation. This information is covered under DMDC 04, Emergency Evacuation and Repatriation (<a href="http://dpclo.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNsIndex/DODwideSORNArticleView/tabid/6797/Article/6695/dmdc-04.aspx">http://dpclo.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNsIndex/DODwideSORNArticleView/tabid/6797/Article/6695/dmdc-04.aspx</a>).</p> <p><b>ROUTINE USE(S):</b> To family members of individuals who have been evacuated and about whom information is requested by a family member and/or spouse, location and final destination will be released; to the Department of State for evacuation management and planning purposes; to the American Red Cross for communication of evacuation information about spouse/family member(s) to service member still in foreign country; to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for tracking and contacting foreign nationals evacuated to the U.S.; to the Department of Health and Human Services to facilitate delivery of personal and financial services and to recoup costs of financial services and to identify individuals who might arrive with an illness requiring quarantine; to state and local health departments, to further implement the quarantine of an ill individual. The DoD "Blanket Routine Uses" found at <a href="http://dpclo.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNsIndex/BlanketRoutineUses.aspx">http://dpclo.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNsIndex/BlanketRoutineUses.aspx</a> also apply to this system.</p> <p><b>DISCLOSURE:</b> Voluntary; however, failure to furnish the information may limit your receipt of services and impede passage of information about your current whereabouts to family members. Social Security Number (SSN) is used in the documentation of payments and loans provided in the process of evacuation and may be provided to the IRS if payment is not received. The Social Security Number (SSN) may also be used in the process of verifying an individual's identity and citizenship.</p>	
<b>INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF DD FORM 2585, REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER PROCESSING SHEET</b> <i>(Read before completing this form.)</i>	
<b>GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS</b>	
<p>1. The following instructions are provided for completing the Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet. Collection of this information is authorized by 42 U.S.C. 1313, and Executive Order 9397. Providing the information requested on this form, including Social Security Number, is voluntary; however, failure to complete the form may hinder receipt of needed services and impede passage of information about current whereabouts to family members.</p> <p>2. Before entering any information on the form, carefully read the detailed instructions provided. Not all questions are applicable for everyone. For those questions that do not apply, enter N/A on the line or check the boxes in Sections III, IV, and VI.</p> <p>3. You may be asked to have available any or all of the following documentation:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">a. For official government personnel and dependents, you should have available as applicable:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(1) Official travel orders for Safehaven Status (DD Form 1610).</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(2) Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Orders.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(3) Passport, Visa and International Immigration (shot) record.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(4) Military/DoD Civilian/Dependent Identification Card.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(5) Travel documents (Transportation Request, transportation travel information or tickets, i.e., airline, train, bus, etc.).</p>	<p style="margin-left: 20px;">b. Private American citizens or foreign nationals should have:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(1) Passport and Visa (as applicable).</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(2) Travel documents (travel information, tickets, etc.).</p> <p>4. The Repatriation Processing Packet is provided to the "responsible person" either upon arrival in an overseas country, upon evacuation from the overseas country for completion enroute, or, upon arrival in the United States at the repatriation center. Processing officials at the repatriation center will be available to assist you in completing the form.</p> <p>5. The individual completing this form will be the "responsible person" for this particular family group. "Responsible person" may be a Military Member, DoD Civilian, Military or DoD Civilian Dependent, Federal employee or Federal dependent, Family Representative, Designated Escort, Private American Citizen or Third Country National. <b>THE "RESPONSIBLE PERSON" IS ONLY REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE ITEMS IN SECTIONS I - III, PAGES 5 - 8.</b></p> <p><b>6. ONLY ONE FORM IS TO BE COMPLETED FOR EACH FAMILY GROUPING.</b></p> <p><b>7. FOR PROCESSING CENTER USE ONLY.</b> Pages 9 and 10, Items 28 - 47 are completed by a representative of the Repatriation Center Processing Team Staff. Pages 5 through 8 will be completed by the "responsible person."</p>

**SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS****SECTION I - ESCORTS OF UNACCOMPANIED MINOR CHILDREN (Page 5)**

This section and Section III (Pages 5 through 8) will be completed by the "responsible person."

**SECTION II - PROCESSING CENTER**

**Item 1. Airline and Flight Number.** Enter the airline and flight number arrived on.

**Item 2. Date of Arrival.** Enter the date arrived in the United States at this processing center. Do this by entering the year first, then the month of the year, then the day of the month. Example: YYYY=1998, MM=08 (August), DD=20 (20th).

**Item 3. Repatriation Center.** Enter the location of the Repatriation Center by airport, city, and state, or by military base. Example: Raleigh/Durham Airport, Raleigh, NC or Charleston AFB, South Carolina.

**Item 4. Processing Date.** Enter the date (by year, month and day) that processing through the Repatriation Center began. In most cases it will be the same date as shown in Item 2 above.

**Item 5. Processing Time.** Enter the time processing began for this person or family. Use military time (24 hour clock). Example: 2:00 a.m.=0200, 3:00 p.m.=1500.

**SECTION III - EVACUEE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION**

**Item 6. Name.** Enter principal evacuee's last name (family name, such as "Smith"), first name ("Mary"), and middle initial ("C"). If there is no middle initial, enter NMI.

If the evacuee is an unescorted child and there is more than one child in the family, enter information for only the eldest child in Items 6 - 20. Escort information will be provided in Item 22.

**Item 7. Country Evacuated From.** Enter the original country from which you departed enroute to the United States.

**Item 8. Date of Birth.** Enter date of birth by year, month and day. Do this by entering the year first, then the month of the year, then the day of the month. Example: YYYY=1963, MM=08 (August), DD=20 (20th).

**Item 9. Place of Birth.** Enter the city, state and country in which born. Example: Baltimore, Maryland, USA or Frankfurt, Germany.

**Item 10. Country of Citizenship.** Enter the country of citizenship. (Example: USA, Canada, England, France, Germany, etc.) If you are a U.S. citizen and a citizen of one or more other countries, please write USA. If you are not a U.S. citizen, and you are a citizen of more than one country, please write the country that issued the passport you are using for travel.

**Item 11. Gender.** Place an "X" in the appropriate block to indicate whether male or female.

**Item 12. Social Security Number (SSN).** Enter the evacuee's SSN, if applicable. If there is no SSN, enter N/A.

**Item 13. Marital Status.** Place an "X" in the block that indicates marital status, if applicable.

**Item 14. Passport Number and Country of Issue.** Enter passport number, if applicable. The number can generally be found on the first page of the passport. Also, enter the name of the country that issued the passport. If you are a U.S. citizen and a citizen of one or more other countries, please use your U.S. passport information. If you are not a U.S. citizen, and you are a citizen of more than one country, please use the information on the passport you are using for travel.

**Item 15. Alien Number and Country of Issue.** Enter Alien Number, if applicable. If not applicable, enter N/A. If applicable, enter the name of the country that issued the Alien Number.

**Item 16. Classification Number(s) and Agency Code(s).** Enter the number that best identifies the evacuee's status from the classification number list (Table 1 on Page 6), and if applicable, the appropriate agency code (Table 2).

**NOTE:** Any individual can fall into more than one category, i.e., a DoD Dependent can also be a government employee. If that is the case, show all appropriate classification numbers and/or agency codes. This applies to all individuals shown on the processing form.

**Item 17. Number of Family Members With You.** Enter the appropriate number of family members in the family group.

**NOTE:** If you are escorting unaccompanied minor children, in addition to your own children, DO NOT include them in your family group.

**Item 18. Number of Animals With You.** This space is only for use by DoD employees and their family members, and private U.S. citizens with service animals. Enter in the appropriate space, next to the type of animal, the number of animals you are bringing with you back to the U.S. You must ensure that you have all the necessary paperwork, and shot records to expedite the processing of your animals through Public Health Inspection.

**FOR ITEMS 19 AND 20: If the form is being completed by an escort for (an) unaccompanied minor child(ren), the emergency contact and final destination should be those for the child(ren).**

**Item 19. Emergency Contact in U.S.**

- a. Name. Enter the name of an individual who will know how to get in touch with the evacuee should the need arise.
- b. Address. Enter the "Emergency Contact's" street, city, state and/or country, and ZIP Code.
- c. Home Telephone Number. Enter the "Emergency Contact's" home telephone number (if known or applicable), to include the area code.
- d. Work Telephone Number. Enter the "Emergency Contact's" work telephone number (if known or applicable), to include the area code.
- e. Cell Telephone Number. Enter the "Emergency Contact's" cell telephone number (if known or applicable), to include the area code.

**SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS** (Continued)

**Item 20. Final Destination.** If the evacuee's final destination will be the same residence as the "Emergency Contact" shown in Item 19 above, write "SAME." If the evacuee's final destination is going to be different than the "Emergency Contact," enter the name of the person with whom the evacuee will be staying, their telephone numbers, and complete address to include "Country," if the Safehaven location is outside the U.S.

**NOTE:** If the evacuee will be living by him/herself, enter "SELF" in the Name block, and then the address.

**Item 21.** If U.S. Department of Defense Military and Civilian Employee Dependent. This item is to be completed when the evacuee is a military or DoD civilian dependent whose sponsor remains behind. If this item is not applicable, enter N/A on the Sponsor Name line and go on to the next block. For escorted unaccompanied minor children, enter the sponsor's (parent or guardian) information to the best of your ability.

a. Branch of Service/DoD Agency. Place an "X" in the block next to the branch of Service/DoD Agency to which the sponsor belongs.

b. Name of Sponsor. Enter the name of the sponsor of the family, remaining in country, by last name, first name, and middle initial. If no middle initial, enter NMI.

c. Social Security Number. Enter the sponsor's SSN.

d. Rank/Grade. Enter the sponsor's rank (i.e., SGT, LT, etc.) and grade (i.e. E4, O3, etc.). For civilians, enter grade (i.e. GS12, WG10, etc.).

e. Organization/Address and Major Command. Enter the sponsor's organization, address, and major command, to include APO or FPO number, if applicable.

**Item 22. Final Destination and Name of Escort for Unaccompanied Minor Child(ren).**

If this form is being completed by the escort for unaccompanied minor child(ren), enter the following information about the escort.

a. Name. Enter the last name, first name, and middle initial of the escort. If no middle initial, enter NMI.

b. Address. Enter the street, city, state and/or country, and ZIP Code where the escort will be living.

c. Home Telephone Number. Enter the home telephone number where the escort can be contacted (if known or applicable), to include the area code.

d. Work Telephone Number. Enter the work telephone number where the escort can be contacted (if known or applicable), to include the area code.

e. Cell Telephone Number. Enter the cell telephone number where the escort can be contacted (if known or applicable), to include the area code.

**Item 23.a. through d. Accompanying Evacuees** (Page 7).

The data on this page pertains to each person accompanying the principal evacuee. This may be a child, spouse, sibling, or parent of the "responsible person" or an escorted unaccompanied minor child of another family.

**Item 23 (Continued).**

Complete one block of information for each person other than the principal evacuee who is listed on Pages 5 and 6. If there are more than four accompanying persons, use additional copies of Page 7.

(1) Name. Enter accompanying evacuee's last name, first name, and middle initial. If no middle initial, enter NMI.

(2) SSN. Enter the accompanying evacuee's Social Security Number, if known.

(3) Date of Birth. Enter the accompanying evacuee's date of birth by year, month and day.

(4) Gender. Place an "X" in the appropriate block indicating whether the accompanying evacuee is male or female.

(5) Relationship to Person Completing Form. Place an "X" in the appropriate block indicating whether the accompanying evacuee is the "responsible person's" spouse, child, parent, or other.

(6) Place of Birth. Enter the city, state, and country in which the accompanying evacuee was born.

(7) Country of Citizenship. Enter the country of which the accompanying evacuee is a citizen. Example: USA, Canada, England, France, Germany, etc.

(8) Passport Number and Country of Issue. Enter the accompanying evacuee's passport number and the country in which it was issued.

(9) Alien Number and Country of Issue. Enter the accompanying evacuee's alien number, if applicable, and the country which issued the number. If not applicable, enter N/A.

(10) Classification Number(s) and Agency Code(s). Enter all classification numbers (from Table 1) and agency codes (from Table 2) that apply to the accompanying evacuee.

**NOTE:** Any individual can fall into more than one category, i.e., a DoD dependent as well as a government employee.

**SECTION III (Continued) - SERVICES** (Page 8)

This section is provided for the "responsible person" to identify to the processing team any assistance the family group may require upon arrival in the U.S.

**Item 24. If No Services are Needed.** Upon reviewing the list in this section, if the family does not require any additional help, place an "X" in this block.

**Item 25. Services Needed.** If assistance is required, place an "X" in the block next to each service required.

**Item 26. Additional Remarks.** This item is provided if the "responsible person" has any questions, needs additional assistance, or has any comments to make.

**NOTE: SECTION III IS THE LAST PART OF THE FORM THAT THE EVACUEE MUST COMPLETE. THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS WILL BE COMPLETED BY THE REPATRIATION TEAM AT THE PROCESSING CENTER.**

**SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS** (Continued)

**SECTION IV - REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
(DHHS)**

This section is applicable to all evacuees other than Federal personnel and their families, i.e. private American citizens, and their families.

**Item 27. If No Services Are Required/Were Provided.** If the evacuee required no assistance upon arrival, place an "X" in this block. This block may also be marked by the "responsible person."

**Item 28. Services Provided by DHHS.**

- a. Cash Assistance.
- b. Onward Transportation. If funds were required to obtain airline, bus, train tickets, etc., this item must be completed. Under the cost heading in the first (Persons) block, enter the number of tickets. Enter the cost of each ticket in the next (Dollars) block. Multiply the number of tickets by the cost and enter the total to the right of the equal sign. Example: Onward transportation 4 X \$150.00 = \$600.00.

**NOTE:** It is possible for family members to go to different locations; therefore, an additional line was provided to cover those exceptions. If no onward transportation support was provided, enter a zero in the "Total" block.

- c. Temporary Lodging and Per Diem. If funds were required to provide lodging accommodations, this item must be completed. Enter the number of persons times the number of days they are staying at the hotel/motel, etc., times the per diem rate per day and enter the total cost to the right of the equal sign. Example: 4 people X 2 days X \$50.00 per day per diem = \$400.00.

**NOTE:** If no lodging or per diem was provided, enter a zero in the "Total" block.

- d. Miscellaneous. For any other assistance required, itemize the assistance provided in the space shown, and enter their associated costs to the right of the equal sign.

**Item 29. Total DHHS Costs.** Add up all the costs shown in this column for transportation, lodging, per diem, miscellaneous and enter that figure in the space provided.

**Item 30. Has Emergency Medical Assistance Been Provided Off-Site.** Place an "X" in either the "Yes" or the "No" block provided. If Yes, enter the name of the hospital or medical facility, if known, in the space provided for Additional Remarks (Item 31.)

**Item 31. Additional Remarks.** Enter any additional information regarding services provided, if necessary.

**SECTION V - CLOSING QUESTIONS (DHHS)**

Processing officials should complete and sign this prior to the individual(s) departing the Repatriation Center.

**Items 32 through 36. Questions.** A processing official/interviewer will complete these questions by placing an "X" in the appropriate "Yes" or "No" block.

**Item 37. Name of Interviewer.** The processing official/interviewer will sign in this space and print his or her name below.

**Item 38. Telephone Number.** The processing official/interviewer will enter the telephone number where he or she can be reached should the need arise.

**SECTION VI - ASSISTANCE PROVIDED DOD PERSONNEL**

This section should be completed by Military Support Processing Team.

**Item 39. If No Services Were Provided.** If the military individual, Federal employee and/or family members do not require any assistance, place an "X" in this block.

**Item 40. Services Provided.** If the military individual, Federal employee and/or family members require any of the services, place an "X" in the block next to the service provided.

**NOTE:** For Item b., specify for what purpose financial assistance is required. For Item e., specify what medical care is required.

**Item 41. Costs.** For each item in which funds were provided, enter the amount on the line next to the service provided. In Item b., enter the voucher number assigned for per diem payments.

**Item 42. Total Costs.** Add up all financial assistance provided to the military individual, Federal employee and/or family member and enter the total in the space provided.

**SECTION VII - PROCESSING INFORMATION**

This section should be completed by the Processing Team Officials prior to the evacuee(s) departing the Repatriation Center.

**Item 43. Exit From Processing Center Date.** Enter the date by year, month and day that the evacuees have completed their processing and are departing the Repatriation Center.

**Item 44. Exit From Processing Center Time.** Enter the time, using military (24 hour) clock.

**Item 45. Destination.** Enter the destination by city, state, and/or country that the evacuees are going to.

**Item 46. Transportation Carrier(s).** Enter the name of the airline, bus or train company that will be taking the evacuees to their final destination.

**Item 47. ETA and Date of Arrival at Destination.** Enter the estimated time and date the evacuees are expected to arrive at their final destination. Enter this by military time and by year, month and day.

**Item 48. Additional Remarks.** Enter any additional information regarding exit processing, if necessary.

<b>SECTION I - TO BE COMPLETED BY THE "RESPONSIBLE PERSON"</b>	
<p><b>ARE YOU ESCORTING UNACCOMPANIED MINOR CHILD(REN)?</b> (<i>X one</i>) <input type="checkbox"/> <b>YES</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>NO</b></p> <p>The designated escort is responsible for completing (to the best of their ability) a separate form for each family group they are escorting. If there is more than one child from the same family group, enter the information in Items 6 through 20 for the <u>eldest</u> child being escorted. Then, complete the family group information for each younger child in Items 23(a) through (d), as applicable.</p> <p><b>ADDITIONALLY, ESCORTS WILL FILL OUT A SEPARATE FORM FOR THEIR OWN FAMILY GROUP.</b></p>	
<b>SECTION II - TO BE COMPLETED BY THE "RESPONSIBLE PERSON"</b>	
1. AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NUMBER	2. DATE OF ARRIVAL (YYYYMMDD)
3. REPATRIATION CENTER	
4. PROCESSING DATE (YYYYMMDD)	5. PROCESSING TIME (Military)
<b>SECTION III - EVACUEE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION - TO BE COMPLETED BY THE "RESPONSIBLE PERSON"</b>	
6. NAME OF EVACUEE ( <i>Last, First, Middle Initial</i> )	
7. COUNTRY EVACUATED FROM	
8. DATE OF BIRTH (YYYYMMDD)	9. PLACE OF BIRTH ( <i>City, State, and Country</i> )
10. COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP	
11. GENDER ( <i>X one</i> )	12. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
<input type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE	
13. MARITAL STATUS ( <i>X one</i> )	
<input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/> MARRIED <input type="checkbox"/> WIDOWED <input type="checkbox"/> SEPARATED <input type="checkbox"/> DIVORCED	
14.a. PASSPORT NUMBER	b. COUNTRY OF ISSUE
15.a. ALIEN NUMBER	b. COUNTRY OF ISSUE

SECTION III - EVACUEE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION (Continued) (Read before completing Items 16 and 23)					
(Use these tables to complete Item 16 and Item 23 (Page 7.) Choose all that apply.)					
TABLE 1a - U.S. CITIZEN		TABLE 1b - FOREIGN NATIONAL		TABLE 2	
<b>CLASSIFICATION NUMBER</b>		<b>CLASSIFICATION NUMBER</b>		<b>AGENCY CODE</b>	
1a DoD: Service Member		8 Adult Dependent of Repatriated U.S. Citizen (Foreign spouse or other adult dependent; not U.S. citizen)		A Army	
b DoD: Service Member Dependent and/or Family Member (Command Sponsored Dependent)		9 Minor Dependent of Repatriated U.S. Citizen (Child born in foreign country, not U.S. citizen to date)		N Navy	
c DoD: Service Member Dependent and/or Family Member (Non-Command Sponsored Dependent)		10 Non-Dependent of Repatriated U.S. Citizen (Extended family member, i.e. mother-in-law, cousin, etc.)		F Air Force	
2a DoD: Civilian Employee WITH Transportation Agreement		11 Non-U.S. Civilian Employee (Works for U.S. Government)		M Marine Corps	
b DoD: Dependent of Civilian Employee WITH Transportation Agreement		12 Citizen of Country Other Than U.S.		G Coast Guard	
c DoD: Civilian Employee WITHOUT Transportation Agreement		13 Other, None of the Above (Specify)		D DoD Agency	
d DoD: Dependent of Civilian Employee WITHOUT Transportation Agreement				O Other U.S. Government Agency	
3a Non-DoD U.S. Government (USG): Employee				X Not Applicable	
b Non-DoD USG: Employee Dependent and/or Family Member					
4 Citizen Residing Abroad (Child, Student, Private Business)					
5 Tourist					
6 Citizen on Business-Related Travel					
7 U.S. Government Contractor					
16. CLASSIFICATION NUMBER(S) AND AGENCY CODE(S) (Enter all appropriate classification numbers and agency codes from Table 1 and Table 2 that are applicable to the person named in Item 6.)			17. NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS WITH YOU		
a. CLASSIFICATION NUMBER		b. AGENCY CODE	<input type="text"/> ADULTS (Include yourself)	<input type="text"/> CHILDREN (Include all children)	
c. CLASSIFICATION NUMBER		d. AGENCY CODE	18. NUMBER OF ANIMALS WITH YOU (If applicable) DoD and SERVICE ANIMALS ONLY		
e. CLASSIFICATION NUMBER		f. AGENCY CODE	<input type="text"/> DOGS	<input type="text"/> CATS	
			<input type="text"/> BIRDS	<input type="text"/> OTHER	
19. EMERGENCY CONTACT IN U.S. (For person named in Item 6 above)					
a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)			b. ADDRESS (Street, City, State/Country, ZIP Code)		
c. HOME TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)	d. WORK TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)	e. CELL TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)			
20. FINAL DESTINATION AND NAME OF POINT OF CONTACT (If same as Item 19, enter "SAME")					
a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)			b. ADDRESS (Street, City, State/Country, ZIP Code)		
c. HOME TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)	d. WORK TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)	e. CELL TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code)			
21. IF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE DEPENDENTS (For escorted unaccompanied minor children enter the sponsor's (parent/guardian) information to the best of your ability.)					
a. BRANCH OF SERVICE/DOD AGENCY (X one)					
<input type="checkbox"/> ARMY	<input type="checkbox"/> NAVY	<input type="checkbox"/> AIR FORCE	<input type="checkbox"/> MARINE CORPS	<input type="checkbox"/> COAST GUARD	<input type="checkbox"/> DOD AGENCY
b. NAME OF SPONSOR (Remaining in Country) (Last, First, Middle Initial)			c. SSN	d. RANK/GRADE	
e. ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS AND MAJOR COMMAND (Include APO#/FPO#)					
22. FINAL DESTINATION AND NAME OF ESCORT FOR UNACCOMPANIED MINOR CHILD(REN) (Complete if applicable)					
a. NAME OF ESCORT (Last, First, Middle Initial)			b. ADDRESS (Final Destination of Escort) (Street, City, State/Country, ZIP Code)		
c. HOME TELEPHONE NO. (Final Destination of Escort) (Include Area Code)	d. WORK TELEPHONE NO. (Final Destination of Escort) (Include Area Code)	e. CELL TELEPHONE NO. (Final Destination of Escort) (Include Area Code)			

SECTION III - EVACUEE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION <i>(Continued)</i>					
<b>23. ACCOMPANYING EVACUEES</b> <i>(Fill out for each accompanying person.)</i>					
a.(1) NAME <i>(Last, First, Middle Initial)</i>		(2) SSN		(3) DATE OF BIRTH <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>	
(4) GENDER <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE		(5) RELATIONSHIP TO PERSON COMPLETING FORM <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> SPOUSE <input type="checkbox"/> SON/DAUGHTER <input type="checkbox"/> PARENT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER			
(6) PLACE OF BIRTH <i>(City, State, and Country)</i>			(10) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER(S) AND AGENCY CODE(S) <i>(Enter all appropriate classification numbers and agency codes from Table 1 and Table 2 (shown on Page 6) that are applicable to the person named in Item a.(1).)</i>		
(7) COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP			(a) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(b) AGENCY CODE	
(8) PASSPORT NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(c) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(d) AGENCY CODE	
(9) ALIEN NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(e) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(f) AGENCY CODE	
b.(1) NAME <i>(Last, First, Middle Initial)</i>		(2) SSN		(3) DATE OF BIRTH <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>	
(4) GENDER <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE		(5) RELATIONSHIP TO PERSON COMPLETING FORM <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> SPOUSE <input type="checkbox"/> SON/DAUGHTER <input type="checkbox"/> PARENT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER			
(6) PLACE OF BIRTH <i>(City, State, and Country)</i>			(10) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER(S) AND AGENCY CODE(S) <i>(Enter all appropriate classification numbers and agency codes from Table 1 and Table 2 (shown on Page 6) that are applicable to the person named in Item b.(1).)</i>		
(7) COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP			(a) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(b) AGENCY CODE	
(8) PASSPORT NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(c) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(d) AGENCY CODE	
(9) ALIEN NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(e) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(f) AGENCY CODE	
c.(1) NAME <i>(Last, First, Middle Initial)</i>		(2) SSN		(3) DATE OF BIRTH <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>	
(4) GENDER <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE		(5) RELATIONSHIP TO PERSON COMPLETING FORM <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> SPOUSE <input type="checkbox"/> SON/DAUGHTER <input type="checkbox"/> PARENT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER			
(6) PLACE OF BIRTH <i>(City, State, and Country)</i>			(10) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER(S) AND AGENCY CODE(S) <i>(Enter all appropriate classification numbers and agency codes from Table 1 and Table 2 (shown on Page 6) that are applicable to the person named in Item c.(1).)</i>		
(7) COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP			(a) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(b) AGENCY CODE	
(8) PASSPORT NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(c) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(d) AGENCY CODE	
(9) ALIEN NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(e) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(f) AGENCY CODE	
d.(1) NAME <i>(Last, First, Middle Initial)</i>		(2) SSN		(3) DATE OF BIRTH <i>(YYYYMMDD)</i>	
(4) GENDER <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE		(5) RELATIONSHIP TO PERSON COMPLETING FORM <i>(X one)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> SPOUSE <input type="checkbox"/> SON/DAUGHTER <input type="checkbox"/> PARENT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER			
(6) PLACE OF BIRTH <i>(City, State, and Country)</i>			(10) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER(S) AND AGENCY CODE(S) <i>(Enter all appropriate classification numbers and agency codes from Table 1 and Table 2 (shown on Page 6) that are applicable to the person named in Item d.(1).)</i>		
(7) COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP			(a) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(b) AGENCY CODE	
(8) PASSPORT NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(c) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(d) AGENCY CODE	
(9) ALIEN NUMBER		COUNTRY OF ISSUE	(e) CLASSIFICATION NUMBER	(f) AGENCY CODE	

**NOTE: If there are more than 4 accompanying family members, use additional copies of Page 7.**

SECTION III - EVACUEE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION (SERVICES) <i>(Continued)</i>			
24. IF NO SERVICES ARE NEEDED, X THIS BLOCK			
25. SERVICES NEEDED <i>(X all that apply)</i>			
	CLOTHING		
	HOUSING	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
	MEDICAL		
	DOD INFORMATION		
	DOD LEGAL SERVICES		
	CHILD CARE		
	FEDERAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE		
	LOCATOR ASSISTANCE FOR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS		
	TRANSPORTATION TO ONWARD DESTINATION		
	FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE		
	MENTAL HEALTH		
	GENERAL INFORMATION		
	CHAPLAIN ASSISTANCE		
	FUNERAL ASSISTANCE		
	DOD RELOCATION INFORMATION		
	TRANSLATOR <i>(Indicate language)</i>		
	OTHER <i>(Specify)</i>		
26. ADDITIONAL REMARKS			
<b>STOP HERE.</b>			

SECTION IV (ITEMS 27 - 36) - TO BE COMPLETED BY REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS) STAFF				
27. IF NO SERVICES ARE REQUIRED/WERE PROVIDED, X THIS BLOCK <span style="float: right;">—————→</span>				
28. SERVICES PROVIDED BY DHHS				
(1) SERVICES	(2) COSTS		(3) TOTAL	
a. CASH ASSISTANCE	PERSONS	DOLLARS	=	0.00
	X			
b. ONWARD TRANSPORTATION	PERSONS	DOLLARS	=	0.00
	X			
c. TEMPORARY LODGING AND PER DIEM	PERSONS	DOLLARS	=	0.00
	X	DAYS	X	
d. MISCELLANEOUS <i>(Specify)</i>			=	
			=	
			=	
			=	
			29. TOTAL COSTS =	0.00
30. HAS EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BEEN PROVIDED OFF-SITE? <i>(X one)</i> <span style="float: right;">—————→</span>				
				YES
				NO
31. ADDITIONAL REMARKS				
SECTION V - CLOSING QUESTIONS - TO BE COMPLETED BY REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS) STAFF				
			<i>(X one)</i>	
			YES	NO
32. HAS REPATRIATE BEEN GIVEN A HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES WELCOME BROCHURE?				
33. DOES THIS PERSON/FAMILY NEED A LOAN FOR TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HE/SHE/THEY ARE WITHOUT RESOURCES IMMEDIATELY ACCESSIBLE TO MEET HIS/HER/THEIR NEEDS?				
34. HAVE YOU EXPLAINED TO THE REPATRIATE THAT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED IS PROTECTED UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT AND WILL BE USED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING ELIGIBILITY FOR AND ADMINISTERING THE U.S. REPATRIATION PROGRAM?				
35. HAS THE REPATRIATE SIGNED THE HHS REPAYMENT-LOAN AGREEMENT? <i>(Agreement must be attached to file.)</i>				
36. HAS THE REPATRIATE BEEN GIVEN INFORMATION/REFERRAL FOR ASSISTANCE AT THE FINAL DESTINATION?				
37. NAME OF INTERVIEWER <i>(Last, First, Middle Initial)</i>			38. TELEPHONE NUMBER <i>(Include Area Code)</i>	

SECTION VI - ASSISTANCE PROVIDED DOD PERSONNEL - TO BE COMPLETED BY REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER			
39. IF NO SERVICES WERE PROVIDED, X THIS BLOCK <span style="font-size: 2em;">→</span>			
40. SERVICES PROVIDED ( <i>X as applicable</i> )		41. COSTS	
	a. TRANSPORTATION	a. TRANSPORTATION	
	b. FINANCIAL ( <i>Advance per diem</i> )	b. FINANCIAL ( <i>Amount paid</i> ) VOUCHER NUMBER ( <i>for per diem</i> )	
	c. AMERICAN RED CROSS (ARC)	c. AMERICAN RED CROSS (ARC)	
	d. HOUSING	42. TOTAL COST	0.00
	e. MEDICAL/OTHER		
	f. LEGAL SERVICES		
	g. CHAPLAIN ASSISTANCE		
	h. FAMILY CENTER ASSISTANCE		
SECTION VII - EXIT INFORMATION - TO BE COMPLETED BY REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER			
43. EXIT FROM PROCESSING CENTER DATE (YYYYMMDD)	44. EXIT FROM PROCESSING CENTER TIME ( <i>Military</i> )	45. DESTINATION ( <i>City, State, Country</i> )	
46. TRANSPORTATION CARRIER(S)		47.a. ETA AT DESTINATION ( <i>Military Time</i> )	b. DATE OF ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION (YYYYMMDD)
48. ADDITIONAL REMARKS			

## APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL RISK AND SAFETY

### 1. Risk Management

a. **Principles.** Risk management (RM) is the process to identify, assess, and control risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Four rules can be used to guide the JFC's RM process:

- (1) Integrate RM into NEO planning.
- (2) Accept no unnecessary risks.
- (3) Make risk decisions at the proper command level.
- (4) Accept risk if benefits outweigh the potential losses.

b. **Process.** There are five steps to the joint RM process as follows:

(1) **Identify the Hazards.** This is begun during planning and continued throughout the NEO. Each operation has both general and unique hazards. Potential hazards for NEOs are discussed in paragraph 1.d., "Potential Hazards."

(2) **Assess the Hazards.** Each hazard is analyzed to determine the probability of its causing a problem and the severity of the consequences should such a problem occur. This step concludes with a risk assessment that describes the impact of the combined hazards. The result is a statement that quantifies the risk associated with the NEO—extremely high, high, medium, or low.

(3) **Implement Controls.** The commander integrates specific controls into plans, orders, SOPs, training, and rehearsals. Knowledge of these controls should extend to each joint force member.

(4) **Risk Mitigation.** The commander follows a risk-based process to prioritize the mitigation of hazardous conditions. Give a higher priority to the reduction of hazards that pose higher risk of injury, illness, or other losses over mitigation that results only in rote compliance with standards.

(5) **Supervise and Evaluate.** Finally, leadership at all levels supervise to ensure compliance with the established controls. They also reevaluate their effectiveness and make adjustments accordingly.

c. **Operational Environment.** The conditions that prompt a NEO present the joint force with difficult choices during execution. The force mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support depends upon a sound evaluation of the population and evolving threat. Further, the operational environment is likely fluid and may change

rapidly from permissive to hostile. Operating aircraft, ships, landing craft, and land vehicles under adverse weather conditions is inherently more hazardous. This situation can be exacerbated by the general unfamiliarity with the operational area by joint force personnel.

d. **Potential Hazards.** Hazards may be identified by brainstorming the possibilities within the categories of mission, adversary or enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available. The following list contains typical hazards (not an all-inclusive list) that should be considered when planning a NEO.

- (1) Accelerated deployment with short planning and preparation time.
- (2) Urban terrain—congestion, unfamiliar local customs/laws.
- (3) Temperature/humidity extremes.
- (4) Underdeveloped infrastructure—roads, ports, aircraft facilities, communications.
- (5) Water availability/contamination.
- (6) Disease vectors.
- (7) Fatigue due to jet lag or continuous operations.
- (8) HQ/command post facilities and location.
- (9) Chain of command clarity.
- (10) Local populace interference.
- (11) Terrorism/insurgency activity.
- (12) Night operations.
- (13) Rotary-wing and tiltrotor aircraft operating area characteristics—wires, LZ conditions, density altitude, forward arming, and refueling points.
- (14) Vehicle operations—speed, loading and unloading noncombatant evacuees, overloading, bridge capacities, and escorts.
- (15) Weapons/ordnance handling.
- (16) Disabled vehicles/aircraft recovery.

(17) Ship/landing craft operations—slippery spots; tiedowns; flight deck operations; excessive noise; and the need for head protection, life jackets, and vessel stability/max capacity limitations.

(18) Evacuation route characteristics—roadblock potential, trafficability, and threat exposure.

(19) Risk of friendly fire incidents.

(20) Adversary malign information activities.

e. **Reaction Force.** Because the operational environment can change quickly, a reaction force capable of protecting the NEO force elements and noncombatant evacuees from hostilities is imperative. This force should be on short-notice alert and positioned close to the operational area.

f. **Hazard Awareness.** While joint force members are informed of the hazards and mitigating controls associated with the military operation, noncombatant evacuees are likely unaware. Further, the general alertness of the noncombatant evacuees is impaired (to some degree) by stress and fatigue resulting from their sudden departure.

## 2. Safety Considerations

a. **Command Evaluation.** All commanders involved in a NEO are responsible for the safety of their personnel. The JFC and subordinate and supporting commanders share responsibility for the safety of noncombatant evacuees with the COM. This unique situation requires the commanders carefully evaluate the associated risks and consider the general unfamiliarity of joint force personnel with the operational area and the evacuees' unfamiliarity with military procedures and equipment. Thereafter, specific safety precautions should be briefed and implemented to mitigate the operational risks.

b. **Protecting the Force.** Before beginning any NEO, certain standard safety procedures should be implemented as follows:

(1) Brief joint force personnel on the safety aspects and necessary precautions that must be considered for safe operations. When more than one operation takes place in parallel, personnel should be assured that the hazards of any one operation do not inadvertently affect any of the other operations.

(2) Conduct an inspection to determine the physical condition of equipment.

(3) Ensure personnel who have been instructed and/or given written instructions do, in fact, understand these instructions; ensure certifications for all operations requiring certified operators are current.

(4) Ensure all equipment is functional.

(5) Ensure appropriate safety devices are used and worn and that safety procedures are followed.

(6) Brief all personnel on the special safety procedures to be taken when working near noncombatant evacuees.

(7) NEOs that involve operations on or near water can be particularly dangerous because of adverse weather, operational task hazards, and adversary or enemy action. The efficiency of an operation may also be seriously curtailed by carelessness of personnel who permit dangerous conditions to exist or fail to repair faulty equipment. The following special precautionary steps should be taken to prevent accidents:

(a) **Shipboard Safety.** Accidents aboard ship most frequently result from falls, falling objects, faulty electrical equipment, unsafe handling procedures, and lack of protection for the eyes and extremities. Life jackets are required during loading, transport, and unloading evolutions with landing craft. Landing craft should be equipped with swimmers qualified in lifesaving techniques. All lines on deck should be made up in such a manner that no one can get tangled in them or trip on them. Rigging must be properly stowed and frequently and properly inspected and maintained. All personnel should wear proper clothing and use correct tools and safety gear.

(b) **Bulk Petroleum Products.** Oil and grease spillage should not be permitted to accumulate on decks; spillage should be wiped up as it occurs. When fuel is being distributed, no bare lights, lighted cigarettes, or any electrical apparatus that have a tendency to spark should be permitted within 50 feet of an oil hose or fuel tank. Only spark-proof tools are used to connect or disconnect fuel lines.

(c) **Fire Prevention.** “No Smoking” signs are posted wherever potential fire hazards exist. Smoking is permitted only in designated areas.

(d) **Embarkation and Debarkation.** Personnel embarkation and debarkation at ships moored offshore should only be conducted in sea state three or below.

(e) **Protective Gear.** Personnel should wear protective headgear and hearing protection. The ship’s officers should brief embarked military personnel and noncombatant evacuees on any special safety requirements.

c. **Protecting Evacuees.** Although the COM is ultimately responsible for the safety of US citizens, the JFC shares that responsibility since the evacuees are in the custody and direct control of the joint force during the military operation. The following considerations are provided to enhance the protection and safety of evacuees:

(1) **Safety Briefing.** This brief should be part of the reception and search station brief described in Chapter VI, “Evacuee Processing.”

(2) **Manning and Expertise.** Adequate manning of the various NEO force elements and stations is key to help evacuees avoid hazardous situations. An adequate presence of embassy and joint force personnel in a supervisory role accompanied by interpreters aids communication with the evacuees, enhancing their awareness of hazardous conditions and overall safety of the various movement and loading evolutions.

d. **Accident Reporting.** Procedures for reporting ground and aviation accidents are well established within Service chains of command. However, the JFC should establish temporary procedures (i.e., accident reporting SOP) that accommodate Service procedures and keep the JFC informed. Typically, there is an initial telephonic report. Thereafter, a hard-copy report is forwarded up the chain of command. The content of each type of report should be specified in the joint force SOP.

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## APPENDIX G

### JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

#### 1. General

a. Evacuation planners should use the JIPOE process to analyze, correlate, and fuse information pertaining to all relevant aspects of the operational environment (e.g., PMESII systems, relevant networks). The process should also be used, if necessary, to analyze adversary capabilities, identify potential enemy COAs, and assess the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs.

b. The procedures for conducting JIPOE, described in JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, and the *Joint Guide for the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, support the planning process for the evacuation. This appendix provides additional guidance for conducting JIPOE in connection with evacuations.

c. The analysis of civil considerations should follow the ASCOPE framework. Rigorous staff efforts for developing ASCOPE considerations early in the planning process are important, and coordination and discussions with DOS, the COM, and the embassy staff are critical.

#### 2. Operational Area Evaluation

##### a. Areas Outside the Immediate Evacuation Location

(1) Determine which nations might serve as temporary safe havens for evacuees, will assist the operation, could be used as ISBs, and do not have imposed restrictions.

(2) Determine which nations might hinder the operation, either by enabling or supporting local threat groups or via unconventional tactics to disrupt the operation. Consider all methods and the ability to disrupt the operation from outside the operational area.

##### b. Demographic, Social, and Cultural Factors

(1) Evaluate the demographic situation, including the collection of sex and age disaggregated data and its impact, if any, on the evacuation.

(2) Evaluate the political, social, economic, legal, and religious situation.

(3) Analyze the population in general.

(4) Analyze the government, armed forces, and security forces in the operational area. Focus should be on capability and willingness to either help or hinder evacuation operations.

(5) Identify the location of groups and associated networks that might influence the evacuation. Focus should be on areas where anti-evacuation sentiment is strongest, as well as areas where sympathy for the evacuation is strongest.

(6) Identify languages spoken in the operational area.

(7) Identify the location and disposition of any friendly third parties (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, United Nations forces), which could potentially assist with evacuation operations.

(8) Identify any local population movements or events, which may affect evacuation operations, such as crowds, mass panics, riots, and protests.

**c. Legal and Diplomatic/Political Factors**

(1) Identify any legal issues that may affect the evacuation.

(2) Identify diplomatic/political factors or issues that may shape own COAs.

**d. Identify and Map Protected, Hazardous, and Key Facilities**

(1) Locate and map protected buildings such as hospitals and other medical facilities, buildings and monuments of cultural, religious, or historical importance.

(2) Locate and map areas that may pose environmental hazards to the operation such as toxic waste dumps, storage sites for hazardous materials, nuclear power plants, and chemical factories.

(3) Locate and map key facilities such as military installations, police stations, and government buildings.

**e. Evaluate Infrastructure**

(1) Identify logistics infrastructure that might support the evacuation, including non-DOD mission partner capabilities.

(2) Locate suitable sites for reception centers, evacuation points, ECCs, and embarkation sites.

(3) Identify and evaluate HN fire and rescue services.

(4) Identify and evaluate communication and information systems that can support the evacuation.

(5) Identify and evaluate routes for evacuation.

(6) Identify and evaluate means of transportation for evacuees.

(7) Assess the availability of food, drinking water, and protective equipment for evacuees.

**f. Terrain Analysis**

(1) Identify likely locations for ambushes of evacuation vehicles.

(2) Identify infiltration routes and assembly areas for potential attacks on assembly and holding points.

(3) Identify areas suited for demonstrations against the NEO.

**g. Consideration of Weather Effects**

(1) Assessment of the effects of weather on operations by hostile forces or groups. For example, insurgents and terrorists may prefer poor weather conditions (which can degrade friendly capabilities or offer concealment of movement), while casual demonstrators probably would not.

(2) Assessment of the effect of weather and transboundary challenges on the evacuation.

**h. Map Overlays**

(1) Develop relevant demographic overlays of the HN population.

(2) Develop overlays showing lines of communication, key facilities, and targets, protected areas, hazardous areas, and other relevant infrastructure.

**3. Threat Evaluation**

**a. General Considerations**

(1) Determine whether the evacuation is expected to be permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

(2) Determine when and what could cause the operational environment to change, (i.e., from permissive to hostile).

(3) Determine the operational time limitations.

**b. Evaluating Possible Threat Groupings**

(1) Identify all threat groups and associated networks who might interfere with the evacuation. These may include HN law enforcement agencies, military forces, political groups, religious factions, and the general population. In most cases, focus should be on hostile groups such as insurgents, terrorists, and radical extremists.

(2) Identify all groups and associated networks that might put up spontaneous or unstructured resistance to the evacuation. These may include groups such as students, labor unions, demonstrators, rioters, HN forces, and criminal elements.

(3) Analyze the order-of-battle for each potentially hostile group.

(a) Identify their goals and objectives, as well as how these goals and objectives may affect the evacuation.

(b) Identify areas where hostile groups live and gather in relation to evacuation objectives. Focus should be on neighborhoods near the embassies of nations participating in the NEO, and areas where evacuees live and work, including businesses owned or operated by evacuees.

(c) Determine the size, organization, equipment, and armaments of these groupings.

(4) Evaluate the tactics for each potentially hostile group.

(a) Determine resistance methods and techniques these groups could employ against the evacuation, and assess whether certain evacuees are more vulnerable to attack. These may include attacks, raids, ambushes, sniping, bombings, hijackings, hostage taking, kidnappings, and demonstrations. The focus should be on how these groups could interfere with the evacuation.

(b) Determine desired effects in the information environment and likely information activities. The focus should be on the coordinated use of media operations and other capabilities to influence local and international audiences.

(c) Identify and evaluate support functions for groups that would interfere with the evacuation such as planning, weapons, ammunition, food, water, shelter, training, or C2.

(d) Evaluate threat control of the local infrastructure such as control of workers or labor groups.

### **c. Threat Evaluation Tools**

(1) Create a coordinated register to record possible hostile and adverse activities around key routes, evacuation sites, and installations used by forces and nations participating in the evacuation.

(2) Develop an intelligence workbook and order-of-battle database to record information about potentially hostile and adverse groups.

(3) Create a link analysis (activities and association matrices) to identify which individuals are actively interfering with the evacuation, to include when and where.

(4) Create map overlays of lines of communication, key facilities, and targets to determine where interference might occur.

*For further information on evaluation tools for evaluating linkages between individuals and critical factors of threats, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.*

#### **4. Determine Threat Courses of Action**

##### **a. Development of Threat COA**

(1) Identify enemy COAs, and assess the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs.

(2) Determine threat COAs that may interfere with the evacuation at each likely interference site, based on the key facilities and target overlays used to identify the most likely points of interference with the evacuation. Examples include terrorist actions, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, delays at checkpoints, demonstrations, sniping, and raids on evacuation sites. The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems creates both protection and OPSEC issues. Alternate routes or COAs at these points should also be identified, if possible.

(3) Determine possible threat activities against the logistics infrastructure such as sabotage, disruption of services by workers and labor groups.

(4) Determine possible unstructured or unplanned interferences such as riots, criminal activity, or arson.

(5) Determine possible support activities for threat groups that could indicate intent to interfere with the evacuation.

##### **b. Overlays and Other Tools**

(1) Situation overlays or concepts of operation should be produced for each possible COA available to hostile groups that could interfere with the operation.

(2) An event overlay or “warning board” should be produced to support the production of the intelligence collection plan and assist in identifying the intended threat COA.

(3) A decision-support overlay or matrix should be developed and updated in close cooperation with the operations staff and advisors, where applicable.

c. **Wargaming.** The entire joint planning staff, to include personnel from the US embassy staff, involved interagency partners, and MNFs (when part of multinational NEO), should participate in the wargaming process. When possible, the intelligence staff should red cell all the adversarial groups, which not only includes the intentionally hostile but the spontaneous or non-political groups that could possibly interfere with the evacuation.

*Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations; JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations; and AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, for additional information related to operational environments.*

## APPENDIX H

### NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS PLANNING CHECKLIST

This appendix provides a checklist of questions to create a common framework for evacuation planning and operations. These questions focus the detailed planning and dialogue between COM, HN, and US military forces that precedes any successful evacuation operation. They also serve as a good starting point for CCDR priority information requirements development.

#### 1. Operational Environment

a. Is the operational environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?

(1) If it is permissive, are hostilities expected?

(2) If it is uncertain or hostile, what security forces are needed? Will combat forces also be necessary? Will HN provide effective security support?

(3) What is the likelihood of the operational environment changing (permissive to uncertain or to hostile) as the NEO progresses? Have alternate plans been made for changes in the operational environment?

b. What is the current situation in the country? (In the embassy? Near the US citizens? Near the TCNs and HN personnel to be evacuated?)

c. What is the potential threat? (Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment.)

d. What are the possible enemy COAs? (Delay, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or defend.)

e. What is the likelihood of terrorist or violent extremist organization activities?

f. Are there any members of the evacuation force, or anyone reasonably available, who have been in the HN recently, or possess specialized knowledge of the operational environment to leverage situational awareness and provide information that can aid the commander in making informed decisions?

g. Does the National Guard of a US state or territory have a relationship with the HN (i.e., through the DOD State Partnership Program)? How can the National Guard support the ongoing effort?

h. Who provides country studies for the evacuation force with information such as LZs, concentration of US citizens, port facilities, and landing beaches? How will this information be made available to the evacuation force? Who is responsible for updating this information to ensure it is current?

i. Are GEOINT products of the JOA and the embassy compound available? What are the sources?

j. Is the GIBCO and other GEOINT current?

k. Who will provide meteorological and oceanographic information for the NEO force?

l. What are the PMESII and any relevant network considerations for the evacuation?

m. What is the role of civil affairs in the NEO?

(1) What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the evacuation force to avoid confrontation?

(2) Which HN religious events, holy days, festivals, celebrations, or other significant religious activities could impact the operation?

(3) Which HN religious sites, shrines, buildings, facilities, or other locations do evacuation force marshalling teams need to be aware of to avoid desecrating them and antagonizing the populace?

(4) Who conducts an assessment of all civil information relating to the operation within the construct of a framework such as ASCOPE factors?

n. Are there any CBRN, high-yield explosives, or pandemic (e.g., influenza)/infectious disease concerns that could impact the NEO? Have CBRN procedures and necessary equipment to conduct decontamination of personnel, evacuees, and equipment been identified and planned for in the NEO? Have the locations of any toxic industrial materials that can produce effects similar to CBRN been considered?

o. What is the likelihood of interference by others?

## **2. Command and Control, Coordination, Organizations, and Forces**

a. Has early coordination with the COM and DATT or DAO been established during planning? Have CCMD planners reviewed the applicable DOS EAPs?

b. What forces or organizations (e.g., HN, MNFs, NGOs, international organizations) may be operating in the area?

(1) Are these forces and organizations integrated into the evacuation plan? How will they be integrated and synchronized into the evacuation plan?

(2) How are plans being deconflicted if there are separate evacuations?

(3) What are the C2 arrangements if the NEO is conducted as a multinational operation?

(4) Are the coordination and liaison arrangements included in the evacuation plan?

(5) What support is available or required from other USG departments and agencies?

(6) What support is available from other participating nations?

(7) What support is required by other participating nations? Has this been identified ahead of time during SC and other military engagement activities?

c. What is the chain of command for US military forces?

d. What is the relationship of the CDR and subordinate commanders with the COM?

e. Is a sea base going to be established?

f. Will the COM allow an FCE to deploy?

g. Will SOF be inserted?

h. For repatriation operations, has coordination been established with CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSINDOPACOM? Has coordination been established with DHHS and DHS?

i. If an MNF is used, what is the C2 arrangement? Are there any restrictions associated with the use of any of the foreign forces within the MNF?

j. What are the communication requirements?

k. What are the PA requirements?

l. Have specific command relationships been established to facilitate security, evacuation, airfield operations, and operations at the safe haven(s)?

### **3. United States Embassy**

a. Are all US mission and/or embassy officials leaving? If not, who is going to remain?

b. Is the embassy's EAP available? Is it up to date?

c. Who is the POC within the embassy to work with the evacuation force on details of the evacuation?

d. Is there any sensitive equipment or material at the embassy that will need to be evacuated or destroyed? Are personnel with requisite clearances going to assist in evacuating or destroying sensitive equipment or material?

#### 4. Evacuee Identification and Processing

a. What steps are being taken by the embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation?

b. What information is needed immediately from the evacuees?

c. Who screens the evacuees?

(1) Are there embassy personnel assigned to screen?

(2) Are there any evacuees (e.g., citizen liaison volunteers) who will be able to help with processing and screening?

(3) What are the screening requirements?

(4) Who is available to physically search female evacuees?

(5) How are confiscated weapons and other prohibited items going to be handled?

d. Are enough operational NTS terminals available to handle the anticipated number of evacuees? Are an adequate number of personnel trained on NTS? If sufficient NTS equipment or trained personnel are not available, what alternatives are available for accountability and tracking? If a natural or man-made disaster has occurred, will the Personnel Accountability Reporting System also be used and updated for DOD personnel as they are accounted for and evacuated?

e. Are biometrics used to verify certain evacuees? If so, who determines the biometric policy and what databases are going to be used? Who collects and analyzes biometrics? What is the protocol if an evacuee refuses to submit to a biometric collection? Are they still allowed to be processed by DOS for evacuation?

f. Have the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and routes been verified and surveyed?

g. What is the total number of US personnel to be evacuated?

h. Has access to the screening and processing areas been assured?

i. What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of evacuees (e.g., TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs to be evacuated? (Number per priority category and identification.)

j. What will be the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of those listed in the EAP?

k. If families are separated, what method(s) exist to reunite unaccompanied children with parents/guardians during repatriation periods (e.g., matching NTS numbered wristbands if parent/guardian is with child at evacuation site, establishing parent/child relationship in the NTS database)?

l. What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the potential troublemakers? Do any present a possible/credible threat?

m. What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence, criminal activity, or human rights incidents among evacuees?

n. What are the policies for baggage? How much may evacuees carry out? How will it be tracked? Will NTS be used for baggage tracking? Who and how will the baggage and personal property of all evacuees be searched for weapons, explosives, or other restricted items? It may be necessary to expedite this process in a hostile or uncertain environment, but even in such an environment, consideration must be given to asymmetric threats.

o. What proof of US citizenship is acceptable?

p. Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?

q. Has the US embassy assigned evacuation priorities?

r. What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Will protective clothing and/or equipment be required? Will food and drinking water be required? (Type, quantity, location.)

s. Has DOS established a pet policy?

(1) Are any animals (pets) prohibited from traveling on the designated transportation?

(2) Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at the safe haven location(s)?

(3) Is veterinary support required?

(4) Will NTS be used to track pets? If not, what other tracking system will be used? If separation occurs, how will pets be identified and tracked to be reunited with owners?

t. Will evacuation force search teams be sent after missing evacuees?

u. Has the consular affairs office provided enough DOS or embassy personnel to the ECC to support evacuee processing?

## 5. Medical

a. What range of health conditions are likely to be faced by Service members and evacuees in this location?

(1) If infectious disease is of immediate threat/concern, how are evacuees to be tested and, if required, isolated during periods of transmission?

(2) Are CDC guidelines for vaccination requirements applicable to the evacuees? If so, are stocks and personnel available to provide vaccinations as required?

(3) Are facilities available to isolate persons subsequent to vaccination and/or medical testing prior to evacuation/repatriation?

(4) What controls are in place to minimize and mitigate the spread of infectious diseases?

(5) How will medically fragile evacuees be identified and tracked?

b. Will medical support be available from the embassy or HN? Where are the HN health services (i.e., location, availability, capability)?

c. What is the physical condition of all evacuees? Which evacuees have special medical needs such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional family member, geriatric, or pediatric health care problems? What is the policy concerning evacuating the medically fragile? What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees?

d. Are patient evacuation assets required? If so, is there a need to pre-stage those assets nearby? What are the procedures for MEDEVAC and PM? Have MEDEVAC and PM procedures been coordinated with the HN? Should Phoenix Air assets be contracted?

e. What other functional areas will joint force medical personnel be supporting and be supported by (i.e., evacuee screening and intake, coordinate movement control operations, medical forensics support, coordinating logistics support for medical assets)?

f. Have requests for medical information and support been submitted?

## 6. Host-Nation Support

a. Will the HN police force provide support?

(1) Location, availability, and capability.

(2) Loyalty to the host government, hostility to the United States, and factional infighting present.

b. Will the HN fire services provide support? Location, availability, and capability.

c. Will the HN military forces provide support?

(1) Location, availability, and capability.

(2) Loyalty to the host government, hostility to the United States, and factional infighting present.

d. Will local security forces provide support?

(1) Location, availability, and capability.

(2) Loyalty to the host government, hostility to the United States, and factional infighting present.

(3) Diplomatic and political considerations of utilizing non-HN government forces.

e. Will the HN be providing any security for the assembly areas of evacuation sites? (Location, unit, and size of security force.)

f. Who are the key HN personnel, and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation?

g. Are trained EOD personnel available through the HN?

## 7. Communications

a. What joint, interagency, and multinational IT working groups are required? Is a working group for participating CCMDs and organizations established with routine meetings scheduled?

b. What communications support will be available from the embassy?

c. Is the communications infrastructure in the operational area robust, degraded, or nonexistent?

d. Are leased commercial telecommunications available or do military capabilities need to be deployed?

e. What forces, USG departments and agencies, or MNFs require communication support?

f. How will the communication architecture be set up to support the operations?

- (1) What networks and frequencies are needed?
- (2) What is the secure equipment availability?
- (3) Is there a need for relays?
- (4) What is the SATCOM availability? Have satellite database numbers been obtained for any satellite access requests which may need to be submitted to support communications requirements for the NEO?
- (5) Does the evacuation warrant a multinational or international network or both?
- (6) What are information and data exchange requirements between partners to support functional areas, such as C2, information, intelligence, logistics, and fire support?
- (7) What communication equipment do USG departments and agencies, MNFs, and other partners bring, and are they interoperable? If not interoperable, what plans exist for communications?
- (8) In which stages of the NEO do partners participate and require information exchange with the JFC?
- (9) How many servers or other IT devices are required, what services will they support, how will they be secured from cybersecurity threats, and how will they be configured to link all mission partners? Are the mission partners connecting to their national networks and systems?
  - g. Are there any information sharing disclosure and releasability issues?
  - h. Is there time to practice establishing the networks and provide training?
  - i. Can portable communications equipment be sent to the embassy to facilitate improved and secure communication? Can Service-provided theater deployable communications capability be used if HN infrastructure is unavailable?
  - j. Does the threat have an electromagnetic warfare capability that may impact friendly communications, air operations, or ground movement? Will the threat attempt to jam or disrupt nonsecure communications? Will adversaries attempt to jam or disrupt nonsecure communications?
  - k. Where will interpreter/translator support, if needed, come from? Will it be available from the embassy or the HN? Does the evacuation force need to bring its own interpreter/translator support?

## 8. Evacuee Transportation

a. Will the evacuees be transported to a temporary safe haven outside of the United States or repatriated back to the United States or country of origin?

b. What evacuee transportation support will be available from the embassy or the HN? (Type, location, capacity, condition, and operators required.)

c. What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel?

(1) Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying US military airlift? Who will be chartering commercial aircraft (e.g., DOS, USTRANSCOM, NGOs), and how can the USG track those flights in near real time?

(2) Have air requirements for units and equipment been identified?

(3) Will security presence be required on transportation assets (specifically military aircraft)?

(4) Are there training/briefing requirements for evacuees to become familiar with the transportation being provided (e.g., entrance, exit, use of lavatories)?

d. Are US naval forces readily available to stage off the coast?

(1) If evacuees will be transported via ARG or other USN ships, what are the follow-on transportation requirements to move personnel out of theater, if appropriate?

(2) Will landing craft, utility; landing craft, air cushion (LCAC); or other surface connectors be employed to support transportation of evacuees to the ARG? Are personnel transport modules available for the LCAC?

(3) Are naval helicopters or tiltrotor aircraft going to be employed to support evacuee movement?

e. Would commercial air carriers be willing to add charter flights for the NEO?

f. What commercial sealift assets are available? Are prestaged contracts for cruise ships available?

g. What commercial transportation has the US embassy already contracted to assist US citizens if departing voluntarily?

h. What space is available on retrograde flights by USTRANSCOM controlled aircraft deploying forces to the AOR?

i. Have all requirements for strategic transportation system been directed to USTRANSCOM?

j. At what point would commercial sea or air carriers cut back or halt operations?

k. What are the maximum on ground capacity, fuel availability, and passenger loading capabilities at possible evacuation airports?

l. Would the cost of meals, baggage handling, baggage screening, and other service requirements be incorporated into the civilian or government contracts?

m. Are emergency loading waivers required to load evacuees on cargo aircraft or vessels? Emergency waivers are required from USTRANSCOM to load evacuees on military aircraft not configured for passengers or not configured for over-water flights when over-water flight is anticipated. Emergency waivers from the USCG are also required to transport evacuees on cargo vessels not configured or equipped for passengers. Under emergency conditions, both of these options may need to be considered by transportation planners. Planners should also consider whether vessels have the USCG required floatation devices, sufficient onboard facilities for lavatories and fresh water. In some cases, planners may require contract support for bottled water, portable toilets, vomit bags, and purchase of floatation devices.

n. Who will provide operators, security, and other support at the evacuation airports or seaports?

o. Have the proper considerations been made to ensure sanitary conditions and specific food and drinking water requirements are made to accommodate the evacuees on whatever form of transportation is used?

## 9. Logistics

From a logistics perspective, a NEO is the operation of an ad hoc nodal network to move a limited set of commodities, principally people, from one location set to another location set. Drawing and managing the nodal network is the core function of logistics C2 in a NEO. The logistics questions below all relate directly to capacity analysis (e.g., evacuee housing capacity at ISBs) of the various nodes and links in the network.

a. Is an ISB needed? Is one available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support capabilities?

b. What logistics enablers and equipment are required? From where will the personnel and equipment be sourced?

c. Will a sea base be used to provide logistical support? Who will provide the ships for the sea base? Will there be an ARG/MEU?

d. If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party?

e. Where will any requirements for fuel be sourced (includes gasoline or diesel fuel for vehicles)? Have non-DOD mission partners been leveraged to assist with sourcing solutions?

f. What are the logistical requirements for the safe haven to support the evacuees? What is the capacity of the safe haven?

g. Is a risk assessment for food and drinking water required and are there approved food and water procurement sources? Is protective equipment required for a contaminated environment?

h. What capabilities can DLA provide? Should a request for a DLA support team be made?

i. If the CCDR does not authorize baggage due to threat, capacity, or other reasons, what follow-on transportation requirements for personal baggage are required?

j. Who is providing finance and contracting? Are on-ground contingency contracting officers included in the forward elements?

k. What is the plan for real property accountability (e.g., joint, interagency, and multinational forces)?

## 10. Public Affairs

a. Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will it be updated? Who is the lead PAO? Will media representatives be evacuated?

b. Are there areas from which the media are restricted or where access is restricted? Is there a media support plan?

c. Has PA guidance been given from DOS or the embassy to synchronize themes and messages?

d. Who has release authority? The JFC or PAO, working with embassy personnel, should plan and coordinate releases concerning the NEO, and ensure the COM's designated representatives have approved all PA announcements.

e. What coordination has been made with the HN media to support the NEO plan?

f. Will the HN media provide support for the NEO plan?

g. What is the guidance for PA documentation?

h. What coordination has been made for combat camera support?

i. What coordination has been made for the rapid declassification of military intelligence or imagery for release to the media?

## **11. Military Information Support Operations**

a. What is the guidance on the use of MISO to include preapproved MISO? Has release authority been granted to the CCDR?

b. What DOD/USG MISO product development, production, distribution, and dissemination assets are in theater or readily available (i.e., ship or aviation-based dissemination platforms)?

c. What organic tactical MISO capabilities (Army or Marine Corps tactical psychological operations teams) are available in country or afloat?

d. What HN capabilities are available to support MISO product development, production, distribution, and dissemination?

e. What coordination with the country team, SDO/DATT, or HN military information LNO has been made with the HN media to support the NEO MISO plan?

f. Will the HN media provide support for the NEO MISO plan?

## **12. Legal and Rules of Engagement**

a. What are the ROE for the evacuation force? Have all members been properly briefed on ROE?

b. Are there procedures in place to handle claims against US civilians?

c. What action should be taken if someone asks for temporary refuge or political asylum?

d. Is coordination with the HN necessary to determine legal authority for operations such as overflights, staging, intelligence collection, duties and obligations of neutral states, and operational limits under HN law?

e. What is the status of agreements such as SOFAs and MOUs?

*See Appendix B, "Legal Considerations," for further guidance.*

## **13. Possible Dilemmas**

Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. Planners should consider and plan for possible dilemmas. Due to the prevalence of legal issues in the following situations, a judge advocate or legal advisor should be included in the planning. Military personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following:

- a. Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given situation. When is deadly force authorized? Under what conditions can intermediate force capabilities (e.g., nonlethal weapons) be employed?
- b. Interpretation of the ROE, to include possible different application(s) by members of the MNF.
- c. Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the evacuation force.
- d. Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence. Are riot control agents authorized in response to civil disturbance IAW CJCSI 3110.07, *Guidance Concerning Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides*?
- e. Terrorism or actions of violent extremist organizations.
- f. Bombs, improvised explosive device threats, and/or suicide bombers. Recent lessons learned highlight the need to consider such threats when selecting evacuee assembly and holding area locations relative to thoroughfare and security checkpoints.
- g. Snipers and antitank guided missiles.
- h. Illegal detention of evacuees by the HN or the taking of hostages by terrorist, insurgent, or criminal elements. What are the PR considerations and options?
- i. Inadvertent isolation of the evacuees while being transported. What are the PR considerations and options?
- j. Non-ambulatory evacuees or those in need of special assistance (e.g., small children, medically fragile, impaired persons, others with special needs).
- k. Language and/or cultural background problems.
- l. Conflicts between those with different religious, social, tribal, and/or ethnic backgrounds.
- m. Potential evacuee's name not on list provided by the embassy but appearing to be a bona fide evacuee.
- n. Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains.
- o. Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown identifications.
- p. Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband (including weapons).

- q. Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to assembly areas or at the evacuation sites to request evacuation.
- r. Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.
- s. Evacuee attempting to bribe to gain favor.
- t. Inaccurate evacuation lists.
- u. Large numbers of journalists and media converging on the area.
- v. Evacuees carrying large amounts of money, gold, jewelry, and other valuable items and forms of wealth.
- w. Friendly electromagnetic warfare operations' impact on local emergency communications networks and other spectrum management issues.
- x. CBRN contamination or other hazards (e.g., contagious diseases) present and evacuees, including small children, special needs, medically fragile, and the elderly, requiring respiratory and percutaneous protection in transit to or at the evacuation site.
- y. Contamination mitigation (decontamination) required for evacuees, including small children, special needs, medically fragile, and the elderly, due to presence of physical contamination.
- z. Misinformation or lack of influence/control in the information environment complicates a NEO.
- aa. People bringing pets or animals to the evacuation site with no clear DOS pet policy established. Animal rescue groups trying to move large numbers of animals.

## APPENDIX J REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-68 is based upon the following primary references.

### 1. General

a. Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, as amended.

b. *Department of State Emergency Planning Handbook-1*.

### 2. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 1300.22, *Mortuary Affairs Policy*.

b. DODD 2311.01, *DOD Law of War Program*.

c. DODD 3000.03E, *DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy*.

d. DODD 3025.14, *Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad*.

e. DODD 5205.75, *DOD Operations at US Embassies*.

f. DODD 5505.13E, *DOD Executive Agent (EA) for the DOD Cyber Crime Center (DC3)*.

g. DODD 7730.65, *Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*.

h. DODD 8521.01E, *DOD Biometrics*.

i. DODI 1300.18, *Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures*.

j. DODI 2000.11, *Procedures for Handling Requests for Asylum and Temporary Refuge*.

k. DODI 3200.19, *Non-lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization*.

l. DODI 5158.06, *Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) Planning and Operations*.

m. *DOD Foreign Clearance Guide* (<https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/>).

n. *The Joint Travel Regulations.*

o. *Memorandum of Agreement between Departments of State and Defense on the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Nationals and Designated Other Persons from Threatened Areas Overseas.*

### **3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**

a. CJCSI 3110.01K, *(U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).*

b. CJCSI 3110.05F, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.*

c. CJCSI 3110.07D, *(U) Guidance Concerning Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides.*

d. CJCSI 3121.01B, *(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.*

e. CJCSI 6250.01, *Department of Defense Satellite Communications.*

f. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.02F, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.*

g. CJCSM 3130.03A, *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.*

h. JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force.*

i. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support.*

j. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence.*

k. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations.*

l. JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations.*

m. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation.*

n. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.*

o. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations.*

p. JP 3-20, *Joint Doctrine for Security Cooperation.*

q. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense.*

- r. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- s. JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*.
- t. JP 3-50, *Joint Personnel Recovery*.
- u. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- v. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- w. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- x. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
- y. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

#### **4. Other Publications**

- a. AJP 3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*.
- b. ATP 3-22.40/MCTP 10-0A/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*.
- c. ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 3-40A.6/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment*.
- d. MCTP 13-10M/NTTP 3-02.6/AFTTP 3-2.1, *Amphibious Embarkation*.
- e. Navy Warfare Publication 3-62M/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-31.7, *Seabasing*.
- f. NTTP 3-02.1M/MCTP 13-10, *Ship-to-Shore Movement*.

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## APPENDIX K ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

### 1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: [https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp\\_feedback\\_form.pdf](https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf) and e-mail it to: [js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil](mailto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil). These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

### 2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the United States Marine Corps. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent Major Dell Lamont Robinson, United States Marine Corps, and Mr. Johnny Raney, United States Marine Corps; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, CDR Kyle Terwilliger, Joint Staff J-3; Mr. John Gniadek, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch; and Lt Col Lewis Vaughn, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

### 3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, 18 November 2015.

### 4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: [https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp\\_feedback\\_form.pdf](https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf) and e-mail it to: [js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil](mailto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil).

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

### 5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons

learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

## 6. Releasability

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**GLOSSARY**  
**PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS**  
**(ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)**

AE	aeromedical evacuation
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AJP	Allied joint publication
AOR	area of responsibility
ARG	amphibious ready group
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP	Army techniques publication
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CBP	Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CDRUSINDOPACOM	Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command
CDRUSNORTHCOM	Commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM	Commander, United States Transportation Command
CI	counterintelligence
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
COS	chief of station
CSA	combat support agency
DAO	defense attaché office
DATT	defense attaché
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DD	Department of Defense (form)
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State

DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy
DZ	drop zone
EAC	emergency action committee
EAP	emergency action plan
ECC	evacuation control center
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPH	emergency planning handbook
FAST	fleet antiterrorism security team
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FCE	forward command element
FPD	force protection detachment
FSMS	Foreign Service medical specialist
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GIBCO	geospatial-intelligence base for contingency operations
GPMIC	Global Patient Movement Integration Cell
GSA	General Services Administration
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOM	head of mission
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAW	in accordance with
ID	initiating directive
IDENT	Automated Biometric Identification System (DHS)
ISB	intermediate staging base
JFC	joint force commander
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JRCC	joint reception coordination center
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
LZ	landing zone
MCESG	Marine Corps Embassy Security Group
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCSFR	Marine Corps Security Force Regiment
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication

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MDRO	mission disaster response officer
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MILDEC	military deception
MIS	military information support
MISO	military information support operations
MIST	military information support team
MNF	multinational force
MNFC	multinational force commander
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOH	member of household
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSAU	Marine Security Augmentation Unit
MSG	Marine security guard
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NEOCC	noncombatant evacuation operation coordination center
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGI	Next Generation Identification (FBI)
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NST	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support team
NTS	noncombatant evacuation operation tracking system
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OIC	officer in charge
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PM	patient movement
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
POC	point of contact
PR	personnel recovery
RCA	riot control agent
RM	risk management
RMT	religious ministry team
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO	regional security officer
RST	religious support team
SATCOM	satellite communications
SC	security cooperation

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## Glossary

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SCO	security cooperation organization
SDO	senior defense official
SECAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	standard operating procedure
SROE	standing rules of engagement
TACON	tactical control
TCN	third-country national
TDY	temporary duty
TPMRC	United States Transportation Command patient movement requirements center
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)
USG	United States Government
USN	United States Navy
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VIP	very important person
WLG	Washington Liaison Group

## PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

### 1. JP 3-68, *Joint Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, 26 May 2022, Active Terms and Definitions

**authorized departure.** A procedure by which mission employees or dependents, or both, are permitted to leave post in advance of normal rotation when national interests or imminent threat to life require it. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**Automated Repatriation Reporting System.** A Defense Manpower Data Center system used to track the status of noncombatant evacuees after they have arrived in an initial safe haven in the United States. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-68)

**command-sponsored dependent.** A dependent entitled to travel to overseas commands at government expense and endorsed by the appropriate military commander to be present in a dependent's status. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-68)

**dependent.** An employee's spouse; child who is unmarried and under 21 years of age or who, regardless of age, is physically or mentally incapable of self-support; dependent parent, including step and legally adopted parent of the employee's spouse; and dependent brother and/or sister, including step and legally adoptive brothers and sisters of the employee's spouse who is unmarried and under 21 years of age or who, regardless of age, is physically or mentally incapable of self-support. (Approved for replacement of "dependents" and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

**emergency action committee.** An organization established at a foreign service post to direct and coordinate the post's response to contingencies. Also called **EAC**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**evacuation.** 1. Removal of a patient by any of a variety of transport means from a theater of military operation, or between health service support capabilities, for the purpose of preventing further illness or injury, providing additional care, or providing disposition of patients from the military health care system. (JP 4-02) 2. Withdrawal from a threatened area. (JP 3-68) 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, United States or foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. (JP 4-09) (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**force sequencing.** The phased introduction of forces into and out of the operational area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-68)

**geospatial-intelligence base for contingency operations.** A mobile visualization tool that provides access to geospatial data where networks or infrastructure have been damaged or do not exist. Also called **GIBCO**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-68)

**joint reception coordination center.** An organization that supports Department of Defense personnel and noncombatant evacuees repatriating from overseas with assistance for debarkation, movement to final destination, and appropriate follow-on help. Also called **JRCC**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**noncombatant evacuation operation.** The withdrawal of civilians and noncombatants from a threatened area abroad that is carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense. Also called **NEO**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**noncombatant evacuation operation tracking system.** An information technology system that provides evacuee in-transit visibility during a noncombatant evacuation operation. Also called **NTS**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**ordered departure.** An evacuation procedure to reduce the number of United States Government employees, their eligible family members, or both, at a foreign service post. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)


**safe haven.** 1. Designated area(s) to which noncombatant evacuees of the United States Government's responsibility and commercial vehicles and materiel may be evacuated during an emergency. (JP 3-68) 2. A protected body of water or the well deck of an amphibious ship used by small craft operating offshore for refuge from storms or heavy seas. (JP 4-01.6) (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**Washington Liaison Group.** An organization consisting of Department of State and Department of Defense personnel, chaired by a representative of the Department of State, which has basic responsibility for the coordination and implementation of plans for the protection and evacuation in emergencies of persons abroad for whom the Secretaries of State or Defense are responsible. Also called **WLG**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

## 2. Terms Removed from the DOD Dictionary

- **Supersession of JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, 18 November 2015:** foreign service national; noncombatant evacuees; repatriation; warden system

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All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-68** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

